scholarly journals Can Knowledge Be Justified True Belief?

2011 ◽  
pp. 407-412
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
True Belief

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Significant Aspect ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
What Matters

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risto Hilpinen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Current Belief ◽  
The Future ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
The Gettier Problem ◽  
The Way ◽  
Forward Looking

Medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type objections to the commonly accepted view of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and formulated additional conditions that meet the objections or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. The proposed conditions can be divided into two kinds: backward-looking conditions and forward-looking conditions. The former concern an inquirer’s current belief system and the way the inquirer acquired her beliefs, the latter refer to what the inquirer may come to learn in the future and how she can respond to objections. Some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology can be regarded as variants of the conditions put forward by medieval authors.

scholarly journals Foundational Moments, Representative Claims and the Ecology of Social Ignorance

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199563
Author(s):  
Mihaela Mihai
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Blind Spot ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Opinion Formation ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Political Imaginary

This article identifies a blind spot in constructivist theories of representation and their account of legitimacy in terms of the challenge posed by ecologies of social ignorance, generally and especially during foundational moments. Social ignorance is conceptualised here not merely as the absence of knowledge or true belief but as a social practice of legitimising epistemically problematic political imaginaries and the institutional systems they underpin. In dialogue with social epistemologists and phenomenologists, the article shows how representation can nurture social ignorance, despite the availability of ample opportunities for political contestation and alternative opinion formation. A permanent feature of democratic politics, this problem becomes most salient during moments of constitutional re-founding, such as regime change, post-conflict reconstruction or constitutional referenda, when representative claims can reconfigure a community’s political imaginary, rendering it more or less ignorant. The representative claims made by the Vote Leave’s key figures during the Brexit referendum campaign serve as illustration.

Meta Logou in Plato’s Theaetetus

Apeiron ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Hennig
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Rational Capacity

AbstractThe account of knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, as true belief meta logou, seems to lead to a regress, which may be avoided by defining one kind of knowledge as true belief that rests on a different kind of knowledge. I explore a specific version of this move: to define knowledge as true belief that results from a successful and proper exercise of a rational capacity (a dunamis meta logou).

Plantinga on warrant

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Statistical Probability ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Design Plan ◽  
Cognitive Environment ◽  
The Way

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

scholarly journals Attitude reports with and without true belief

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deniz Ozyildiz
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
Embedded Clauses ◽  
Presupposition Triggers

In Turkish, attitude verbs or embedded clauses cannot be identified as factive presupposition triggers. Yet, the presupposition s observed when certain verbs embed nominalized clauses. I propose to derive the inference globally in the composition, rather than encoding it as a lexical property of certain "triggers."

A logic of knowledge based on abstract arguments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yì N Wáng ◽  
Xu Li
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Model Checking ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Logical Omniscience ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Logic Of Knowledge ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Base Logic

Abstract We introduce a logic of knowledge in a framework in which knowledge is treated as a kind of belief. The framework is based on a standard KD45 characterization of belief, and the characterization of knowledge undergoes the classical tripartite analysis that knowledge is justified true belief, which has a natural link to the studies of logics of evidence and justification. The interpretation of knowledge avoids the unwanted properties of logical omniscience, independent of the choice of the base logic of belief. We axiomatize the logic, prove its soundness and completeness and study the computational complexity results of the model checking and satisfiability problems. We extend the logic to a multi-agent setting and introduce a variant in which belief is characterized in a weaker system to avoid the problem of logical omniscience.

Believing That I Don’t Know

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Adequate Information ◽  
To Come ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This chapter explores cases in which we believe something (P) to be true but readily admit we do not know it. Beliefs outside our areas of expertise are commonly like this. In contrast to the knowledge stories of contemporary epistemology, such cases are autobiographical, fusing the roles of storyteller and subject as one. Even in such a scenario the chapter argues that there is nothing puzzling about such reports, though the chapter also looks into other accounts of knowledge which have a harder time explaining such reports. Reliability and justification theorists may be able to come up with ways of explaining why reports of the form “I believe but don't know P” are common, but the chapter argues that there is no need even to search if knowledge is understood in terms of true belief plus adequate information.

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