How to share the cost of a public good?

Anyone who has ever lived with roommates understands the Hobbesian state of nature implicitly. People sharing accommodations quickly discover that buying groceries, doing the dishes, sweeping the floor, and a thousand other household tasks, are all prisoner's dilemmas waiting to happen. For instance, if food is purchased communally, it gives everyone an incentive to overconsume (because the majority of the cost of anything anyone eats is borne by the others). Individuals also have an incentive to buy expensive items that the others are unlikely to want. As a result, everyone's food bill will be higher than it would be if everyone did their own shopping. Things are not much better when it comes to other aspects of household organization. Cleaning is a common sticking point. Once there are a certain number of people living in a house, cleanliness becomes a quasi-public good. If everyone ‘pitched in’ to clean up, then everyone would be happier. But there is a free-rider incentive—before cleaning, it's best to wait around a bit to see if someone else will do it. As a result, the dishes will stack up in the sink, the carpet will get grungy, and so on.

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Metabolic Heat in Microbial Conflict and Cooperation

10.20944/preprints202005.0211.v2 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Steven A. Frank

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Heat Production ◽

Future Study ◽

Local Heat ◽

Local Temperature ◽

Optimum Temperature ◽

Conflict And Cooperation ◽

Metabolic Heat ◽

A Cell ◽

The Cost

Many microbes live in habitats below their optimum temperature. Retention of metabolic heat by aggregation or insulation would boost growth. Generation of excess metabolic heat may also provide benefit. A cell that makes excess metabolic heat pays the cost of production, whereas the benefit may be shared by neighbors within a zone of local heat capture. Metabolic heat as a shareable public good raises interesting questions about conflict and cooperation of heat production and capture. Metabolic heat may also be deployed as a weapon. Species with greater thermotolerance gain by raising local temperature to outcompete less thermotolerant taxa. Metabolic heat may provide defense against bacteriophage attack, by analogy with fever in vertebrates. This article outlines the theory of metabolic heat in microbial conflict and cooperation, presenting several predictions for future study.

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Cheater suppression and spite through quorum sensing

10.1101/2021.06.16.448736 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Alexander S Moffett ◽

Peter J Thomas ◽

Michael Hinczewski ◽

Andrew W Eckford

Keyword(s):

Population Dynamics ◽

Quorum Sensing ◽

Public Good ◽

Bacterial Population ◽

Extinction Time ◽

Population Extinction ◽

Good Production ◽

Alternative Sources ◽

Demographic Noise ◽

The Cost

The evolutionary consequences of quorum sensing in regulating bacterial cooperation are not fully understood. In this study, we reveal unexpected consequences of regulating public good production through quorum sensing on bacterial population dynamics, showing that quorum sensing can be a "spiteful" alternative to unregulated production. We analyze a birth-death model of bacterial population dynamics accounting for public good production and the presence of non-producing cheaters. Our model demonstrates that when demographic noise is a factor, the consequences of controlling public good production according to quorum sensing depend on the cost of public good production and the presence of alternative sources of the fitness benefits provided by public goods. When public good production is inexpensive, quorum sensing is a spiteful alternative to unconditional production, in terms of the mean population extinction time. When costs are higher, quorum sensing becomes a selfish strategy for the producing strain, both stabilizing cooperation and decreasing the risk of population extinction.

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Inter–Jurisdictional Cost–Sharing of Public Spending

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice ◽

10.1332/251569210x15665367279471 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 28 (2) ◽

pp. 179-186

Author(s):

Michele G. Giuranno

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Public Spending ◽

Welfare Gain ◽

The Public ◽

The Cost

Abstract This paper deals with the issue of how two geographically separate jurisdictions should share the cost of a centralized and uniformly provided public good. The key assumption is that jurisdictional representatives make decisions by bargaining in die centralised legislature. Results suggest that jurisdictions may reach a mutually beneficial agreement by equalising the net welfare gain produced by the provision of die public good, rather than the public good cost. The model identifies the efficiency and redistributive implications of such an agreement.

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The Optimal Provision of Services in National Parks

Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy ◽

10.2202/1538-0653.1041 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Robert W. Turner

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

National Parks ◽

National Park ◽

Pure Public Good ◽

The Future ◽

Provision Of Services ◽

Park Service ◽

Good Provision ◽

The Cost

Abstract A national park provides recreational opportunities and also provides a pure public good. This paper presents an intergenerational model in which a club good and a pure public good are provided jointly. The focus is on optimality conditions for services provided by park managers. At the margin, the cost of providing the services should be balanced by the benefits of services. Services can directly enhance visitor enjoyment, both immediately and in the future; they can also affect congestion currently and in the future; they can affect the quality of park resources; and they can affect the pure public good provision. The framework developed in this paper suggests what information should be used by the National Park Service when deciding on the level and kind of services to provide.

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Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

CLEI electronic journal ◽

10.19153/cleiej.17.2.6 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 17 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Rocío Botta ◽

Gerardo Blanco ◽

Christian E. Schaerer

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Public Good ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Cost Models ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Community Projects ◽

The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

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Metabolic Heat in Microbial Conflict and Cooperation

10.20944/preprints202005.0211.v1 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Steven A. Frank

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Heat Production ◽

Future Study ◽

Local Heat ◽

Local Temperature ◽

Optimum Temperature ◽

Conflict And Cooperation ◽

Metabolic Heat ◽

A Cell ◽

The Cost

Many microbes live in habitats below their optimum temperature. Retention of metabolic heat by aggregation or insulation would boost growth. Generation of excess metabolic heat may also provide benefit. A cell that makes excess metabolic heat pays the cost of production, whereas the benefit may be shared by neighbors within a zone of local heat capture. Metabolic heat as a shareable public good raises interesting questions about conflict and cooperation of heat production and capture. Metabolic heat may also be deployed as a weapon. Species with greater thermotolerance gain by raising local temperature to outcompete less thermotolerant taxa. Metabolic heat may provide defense against bacteriophage attack, by analogy with fever in vertebrates. This article outlines the theory of metabolic heat in microbial conflict and cooperation, presenting several predictions for future study.

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SNA Under the framework of global public goods

National Accounting Review ◽

10.3934/nar.2021020 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 3 (4) ◽

pp. 377-397

Author(s):

Dong Qiu ◽

◽

Dongju Li ◽

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Network Effect ◽

Global Public Good ◽

National Accounts ◽

Global Public Goods ◽

System Of National Accounts ◽

Knowledge Based ◽

New Perspective ◽

The Cost

<abstract> <p>ISWGN (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts) is revising 2008 SNA and is expected to publish the latest version of SNA in 2025. In this context, this paper observes SNA (System of National Accounts) from a new perspective of global public goods and further understands the public goods attributes of national accounts. The global public good is developed from the theory of public goods. According to its definition, classification, and supply rule, SNA is considered a global public good in essence. In terms of characteristics, SNA belongs to means-oriented and best shot supply-oriented global public goods. It has network effect and belongs to network global public goods. And it is also global institutional knowledge, belonging to knowledge-based global public goods. Although SNA serves as a global standard of national accounts, it is not mandatory for consumption. As a global public good, SNA can enhance a country's statistical ability, avoid and reduce the cost of developing the system of national accounts, and reduce transaction costs. At the same time, SNA has the problem of underprovision and underuse, which requires global cooperation in the revision process of SNA. The evolution of SNA demand determines the evolution of SNA supply. Therefore, even if SNA is a global public good, it does not mean that countries should copy SNA, but need to "localize" SNA and transform it from a global public good to a national or regional public good.</p> </abstract>

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Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods

The Journal of Economic Perspectives ◽

10.1257/jep.6.3.117 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 117-131 ◽

Cited By ~ 129

Author(s):

Charles L Ballard ◽

Don Fullerton

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Optimal Level ◽

Marginal Rate ◽

The Public ◽

Lump Sum ◽

Marginal Rates Of Substitution ◽

Efficient Level ◽

Distortionary Taxes ◽

The Cost

Economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure. The classic statement of the problem was given by Paul Samuelson (1954). An optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good (ΣMRS = MRT). However, Samuelson's formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump-sum taxes. Since this is not generally possible, the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system. An appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). In the case of Samuelson's formula, where government is entirely financed with lump-sum taxes, the MCF would be exactly 1.0. In the traditional view of economists, distortionary taxes cause the MCF to be greater than one, thus raising the cost of providing public goods. In this paper, we discuss some cases where the MCF may be less than one. We will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes.

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