scholarly journals SNA Under the framework of global public goods

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 377-397
Author(s):  
Dong Qiu ◽  
◽  
Dongju Li ◽  

<abstract> <p>ISWGN (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts) is revising 2008 SNA and is expected to publish the latest version of SNA in 2025. In this context, this paper observes SNA (System of National Accounts) from a new perspective of global public goods and further understands the public goods attributes of national accounts. The global public good is developed from the theory of public goods. According to its definition, classification, and supply rule, SNA is considered a global public good in essence. In terms of characteristics, SNA belongs to means-oriented and best shot supply-oriented global public goods. It has network effect and belongs to network global public goods. And it is also global institutional knowledge, belonging to knowledge-based global public goods. Although SNA serves as a global standard of national accounts, it is not mandatory for consumption. As a global public good, SNA can enhance a country's statistical ability, avoid and reduce the cost of developing the system of national accounts, and reduce transaction costs. At the same time, SNA has the problem of underprovision and underuse, which requires global cooperation in the revision process of SNA. The evolution of SNA demand determines the evolution of SNA supply. Therefore, even if SNA is a global public good, it does not mean that countries should copy SNA, but need to "localize" SNA and transform it from a global public good to a national or regional public good.</p> </abstract>

2021 ◽  
pp. 91-118
Author(s):  
Daniel Behn ◽  
Ole Kristian Fauchald ◽  
Malcolm Langford

The relationship between the concepts of international investment law and global public goods poses two essential challenges. The first is whether the international investment regime by design is a global public good. The second is whether the regime delivers benefits that are public and global in nature. This chapter addresses these two challenges through a largely empirical perspective. Drawing on three datasets, the authors seek to move beyond the current theorizing in the literature on this theme and base their findings on a comprehensive de jure and de facto analysis. After having discussed the idea of global public goods, they find that the regime high levels of de facto exclusion and in places rivalry, together with an uneven distribution of benefits, such that the international investment regime only partly fits the requirements for a global public good.


2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.


2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Krisch

The consensual structure of the international legal order, with its strong emphasis on the sovereign equality of states, has always been somewhat precarious. In different waves over the centuries, it has been attacked for its incongruence with the realities of inequality in international politics, for its tension with ideals of democracy and human rights, and for standing in the way of more effective problem solving in the international community. While surprisingly resilient in the face of such challenges, the consensual structure has seen renewed attacks in recent years. In the 1990s, those attacks were mainly “moral” in character. They were related to the liberal turn in international law, and some of them, under the banner of human rights, aimed at weakening principles of nonintervention and immunity. Others, starting from the idea of an emerging “international community,” questioned the prevailing contractual models of international law and emphasized the rise of norms and processes reflecting community values rather than individual state interests. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the focus has shifted, and attacks are more often framed in terms of effectiveness or global public goods. Classical international law is regarded as increasingly incapable of providing much-needed solutions for the challenges of a globalized world; as countries become ever more interdependent and vulnerable to global challenges, an order that safeguards states’ freedoms at the cost of common policies is often seen as anachronistic. According to this view, what is needed—and what we are likely to see—is a turn to nonconsensual lawmaking mechanisms, especially through powerful international institutions with majoritarian voting rules.


2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Thorsten Giersch

Abstract In what sense is the Lindahl approach useful for analyzing global public goods? After introducing the positive and normative parts of the Lindahl approach we look at the relation to the Nash-Cournot model of voluntary provision. An integration of both blurs the subtle difference between an explicit bargain about the cost sharing and the implicit bargain by providing individual quantities of the collective good. We take a closer look on the possible relevance of this difference in relation to problems of global public goods that are usually seen more in line with a private provision process not envisaged by Lindahl.


1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 117-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L Ballard ◽  
Don Fullerton

Economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure. The classic statement of the problem was given by Paul Samuelson (1954). An optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good (ΣMRS = MRT). However, Samuelson's formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump-sum taxes. Since this is not generally possible, the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system. An appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). In the case of Samuelson's formula, where government is entirely financed with lump-sum taxes, the MCF would be exactly 1.0. In the traditional view of economists, distortionary taxes cause the MCF to be greater than one, thus raising the cost of providing public goods. In this paper, we discuss some cases where the MCF may be less than one. We will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes.


Author(s):  
Inge Kaul

The world is confronting a lengthening list of unresolved global challenges, many of which possess the properties of global public goods. However, we still lack a fully-fledged theory and practice of genuine global public policy. Based on an analysis of what sets global public goods, such as climate change, cyber-security, and international financial stability apart from other policy concerns, this chapter identifies five basic features that a global public policy would need in order to suit the purpose of global public good provision and develop into a recognized new policy field as a function of governance systems, nationally and internationally.


Author(s):  
Maria L. Loureiro ◽  
Maria Alló

Abstract Scientific discoveries can be classified as public goods. Arrow [1] discussed properties of knowledge that make it a public good; highlighting in particular, the fact that it cannot be depleted when shared, and once it is made public others cannot easily be excluded from its use. So, public good is a commodity or service that is provided without profit to all members of a society, either by the government or by a private individual or organization. Thus, a global public good is a public good that goes beyond borders, and CERN scientific output is the perfect example of a global public good.


Author(s):  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Jan Schmitz ◽  
Claudia Schwirplies

AbstractWe investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.


2009 ◽  
pp. 86-95
Author(s):  
Yu. Ivanov

The article contains a review of underlying concepts and definitions of non-observed economy which are formulated in the international standards on this topic and used by the CIS countries for computation of GDP and other key indicators of the System of National Accounts. The article considers the methods used for measuring non-observed economy and some figures on the share of non-observed economy in GDP of the CIS countries and other selected countries of the world. Perfection of methods of measuring non-observed economy and raising reliability of its estimates requires improvement of general level of work on compilation of national accounts.


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