Reduction and Emergence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
The World ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.

1. The methods and fruits of science

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
David Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Dark Matter ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Real Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Theory Test

This chapter briefly discusses central key topics in the philosophy of science that the remainder of the book draws upon. It begins by considering the scientific method. ‘Induction’—the idea that we construct scientific theories just by generalizing from observations—is a very poor match to real science. ‘Falsification’—Popper’s idea that we create a theory, test against observation, and discard it if it fails the test—is much more realistic, but still too simple: data only falsifies data given auxiliary assumptions that can themselves be doubted. The issues are illustrated through an example from modern astrophysics: dark matter. The chapter then explores how we can resolve issues of underdetermination, where two theories give the same predictions. Finally, it introduces ‘scientific realism’, the view that our best theories tell us things about the world that go beyond what is directly observable.

scholarly journals Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Federico Laudisa
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Representation ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Scientific Naturalism ◽  
The World

Abstract In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.

scholarly journals Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation

1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Winsberg
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Mathematical Models ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Constitutive Equations ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Complex Chain ◽  
The World

The ArgumentIn its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior of these systems. In many instances, these computer simulations are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of transformation has its own epistemology. I also argue that this kind of epistemology is unfamiliar to most philosophy of science, which has traditionally concerned itself with the justification of theories, not with their application. Finally, I urge that the nature of this epistemology suggests that the end results of some simulations do not bear a simple, straightforward relation to the theories from which they stem.

scholarly journals A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap

Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Martinez-Saito
Keyword(s):  
Neural Circuits ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Neutral Monism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Functional States ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

AbstractThe epistemological chasm between how we (implicitly and subjectively) perceive or imagine the actual world and how we (explicitly and “objectively”) think of its underlying entities has motivated perhaps the most disconcerting impasse in human thought: the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical properties of the world. Here, I advocate a combination of philosophical skepticism and simplicity as an informed approach to arbitrate among theories of consciousness. I argue that the explanatory gap is rightly a gap in our understanding, but one that is not surprising; and we being observers biased by our first-person perspective and our existence may both hinder and (the realization we have them) assist our reasoning. Further, I unfold the concept of observer into two distinct notions based on its functional and phenomenal aspects, and exploit this device to elucidate the subject-observer relationship. Then, I proceed to analyze the philosophical zombie dilemma. Lastly, I contend that from a skeptical viewpoint, panpsychism (or neutral monism) is the most parsimonious doctrine accounting for the explanatory gap, and suggest that it would be possible to make headway in the hard problem of consciousness by uncovering non-trivial causal relationships between qualia states and functional states, if routine and controlled manipulation of neural circuits were easily available.

Les “Théories de L’image” De Helmholtz et de Hertz et les Motifs de Carnap Dans L’aufbau

1998 ◽  
pp. 148-154
Author(s):  
Jean Leroux
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Semiotic System ◽  
Systematic Treatment ◽  
Hermann Von Helmholtz ◽  
General Semantics ◽  
The World ◽  
Heinrich Hertz

I propose to sketch and compare the "picture theories" of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz. These semiotic conceptions of scientific knowledge are forerunners of the now prevailing semantic views of scientific theories in philosophy of science, and my intent is to bring out the respective main features that either proved to be influential or, as such, retained in contemporary formal approaches to the semantics of physical theories. For our purposes, "picture theories" can be characterized as conceptions that (a) take as a departure the fact that scientific theories are embodied in a system of signs and (b) involve a systematic treatment of the relation that obtains between the semiotic system and the world. Essentially, such a theory will have in its core an answer to the question: "What does it take for a picture to be a picture of something?" In concludion, I outline a filiation between Helmholtz, Hertz and Carnap pertaining to the question of monomorphism or categoricity in the general semantics of physical theories.

scholarly journals Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap

1999 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Block ◽  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Science is... at the Birmingham Museum of Science and Industry

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Baldock
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Cultural Perspective ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Hands On ◽  
The World ◽  
Images Of Science ◽  
Scientific Phenomena ◽  
Realistic Images

Science interpretation in museums has, until now, largely focused on the products of science—the technological artefacts of our scientific past and the scientific phenomena presented in hands-on galleries. Little, if anything, is said about the process of science—what it is, how it's done, who does it, and why. For this reason, the Birmingham Museum of Science and Industry is planning a new gallery based on science itself. Science is... will interpret science from a cultural perspective by looking at how culture affects science, and how changes in scientific thought have changed our own views of ourselves and the world around us. The objectives of the exhibition are: to raise awareness that science is a key part of our culture; to increase understanding of the method, history and philosophy of science and the scientific community; and to promote realistic images of science and scientists. Using the example of the Copernican Revolution, part of the gallery will focus on changing ideas in science, how change is affected by culture, and the consequences of accepting new scientific theories.

scholarly journals The explanatory gap account and intelligibility of explanation

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Daniel Kostic
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Modes Of Presentation ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Epistemic Gap

This paper examines the explanatory gap account. The key notions for its proper understanding are analyzed. In particular, the analysis is concerned with the role of ?thick? and ?thin? modes of presentation and ?thick? and ?thin? concepts which are relevant for the notions of ?thick? and ?thin? conceivability, and to that effect relevant for the gappy and non-gappy identities. The last section of the paper discusses the issue of the intelligibility of explanations. One of the conclusions is that the explanatory gap account only succeeds in establishing the epistemic gap. The claim that psychophysical identity is not intelligibly explicable, and thus opens the explanatory gap, would require an independent argument which would prove that intelligible explanations stem only from conceptual analysis. This, I argue, is not the case.

Laws of Nature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Universe

The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.

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