scholarly journals Applying Ramseyfication to Infrared Spectroscopy

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Toppel
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Chemistry ◽  
Infrared Spectroscopy ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Mathematical Structures ◽  
Application Problem

AbstractThe so-called Ramsey–Carnap approach, or Ramseyfication, has gone out of fashion in the philosophy of science. Advocates have tried to argue for a revival by writing methodological and metatheoretical studies of Ramseyfication. For this paper I have chosen a different approach; I will apply Ramseyfication to infrared spectroscopy—a method used in analytical chemistry—in order to logically analyse the relation between measurements and mathematical structures. My aim in doing so is to contribute to the debate about the Application Problem of Mathematics, thereby making a case for Ramseyfication as a method of study for scientific theories.

Laws of Nature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Universe

The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.

scholarly journals Consideraciones sobre una semiología de la ciencia

1985 ◽  
Vol 17 (51) ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Javier Echeverría
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Logical Atomism

One of the main deficiencies of the twentieth century philosophy of science, in spite of evident achievements in the logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific theories, is the separation between formal sciences and those sciences with empirical contents. This distinction derives from Carnap and it was generally admitted by the Vienna Circle since the publication of “Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft” in Erkenntnis in 1935. Later philosophy of science, in spite of other criticism of the neopositivist programme, has maintained this separation. It can be claimed that Realwissenschaften, physics in particular, have determined the development of later philosophy of science. Analyses of scientific theories most of the time refer to physical theories, and occasionally to biological ones. There is still a lot to be done in the field of mathematics and logic, in order to analyse and reconstruct their theories. But even if this task is undertaken, and some progress has been done lately, there is still a lot of work to do before a general theory of science can be proposed which transcends such a division between formal and empirical sciences, let alone the human or social sciences. This paper is intended as a contribution to supersede the first dichotomy between formal and physical sciences. One of the main problems in order to make some progress along these lines is that since its origins logical positivism had a deficient theory of knowledge, and the same happened with analytical philosophy developed immediately afterwards. This paper thus criticises examples of such a type of theory of knowledge, as expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The core argument is as follows: these theorizations are inadequate for scientific knowledge; this type of knowledge, particularly the notion of ‘sign’ cannot be adapted to the simple scheme proposed in those works. The criticism here undertaken is developed from a rationalist point of view, in a sense which is closer to Leibniz and Saussure, than to recent philosophers fascinated with the word ‘reason’. Some new proposals are put forward, necessarily provisional, which justify the term, which in turn could be perfectly substituted by another, of Semiology of Science.

scholarly journals Editor's Introduction

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Curtis Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Realism Debate

The debate over scientific realism, simply put, is a debate over what we can and should believe about reality once we've critically assessed all the available arguments and empirical evidence. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism as a philosophical thesis requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. This issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science aims to make participating in the scientific realism debate easier for both newcomers and veterans, collecting over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title "The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism."

1. The methods and fruits of science

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
David Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Dark Matter ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Real Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Theory Test

This chapter briefly discusses central key topics in the philosophy of science that the remainder of the book draws upon. It begins by considering the scientific method. ‘Induction’—the idea that we construct scientific theories just by generalizing from observations—is a very poor match to real science. ‘Falsification’—Popper’s idea that we create a theory, test against observation, and discard it if it fails the test—is much more realistic, but still too simple: data only falsifies data given auxiliary assumptions that can themselves be doubted. The issues are illustrated through an example from modern astrophysics: dark matter. The chapter then explores how we can resolve issues of underdetermination, where two theories give the same predictions. Finally, it introduces ‘scientific realism’, the view that our best theories tell us things about the world that go beyond what is directly observable.

Towards a philosophy of organisation sciences

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erwan Lamy ◽  
Yoann Bazin ◽  
Laurent Magne ◽  
Baptiste Rappin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Content Type

Purpose – This study aims to investigate a declaration of the principles of the Société de Philosophie des Sciences de Gestion/Society for the Philosophy of Organisation sciences (SPSG). Organisation sciences still need to be questioned and rendered more complex, even mistreated, and the concepts they apply have yet to be clarified, mastered and organised to go beyond management ideologies that obscure the project to develop a genuine science, with pseudo-rationalisation replacing real thought. Design/methodology/approach – This task could be accorded to a philosophy of organisation sciences that should be understood as a “philosophy of science of organisation sciences”. Findings – The aim of such a philosophical programme is twofold: to expose the presuppositions and predispositions of organisation scholars and to analyse and clarify their scientific theories and concepts. Originality/value – The ambition of the SPSG is to contribute to the development of that philosophical programme.

Understanding

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Grimm ◽  
Michael Hannon
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
Science Understanding

Understanding is a kind of cognitive accomplishment, and the objects of understanding—from people, to languages, to scientific theories, to logical proofs—are strikingly varied. As this variety suggests, debates about the nature and value of understanding occur across philosophy. In the philosophy of science, understanding is typically taken to be one of the main goods at which scientific inquiry aims; it is therefore intimately related to issues concerning scientific explanation and to debates about what it is that makes scientific inquiry distinctive. In epistemology, the interest lies in characterizing what kind of cognitive accomplishment understanding is, exactly, and how (if at all) it differs from other cognitive accomplishments such as knowledge and wisdom. In the philosophy of language, a central concern is characterizing what is involved in understanding (or grasping) linguistic items like words, sentences, or languages as a whole; similar questions about what is involved in our understanding or grasp of concepts are crucial to the philosophy of mind. Debates in additional areas will be discussed in this article, but one overarching question is whether the sort of understanding we have of scientific theories, languages, people, and the like are similar in name alone or whether they share certain essential traits. For example, one common thought is that across all of these areas understanding involves the discernment of structure of some kind. It is also commonly thought that to achieve understanding this structure must not be discerned in just any old way, but that it must be “seen” or “grasped.” Just how to understand the metaphors of “seeing” and “grasping” has been a central issue in work on understanding across disciplines.

Confirmation

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Dallmann ◽  
Franz Huber
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Observational Data ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Other Information ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation

The term confirmation is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and other information that is taken for granted speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically, confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to believe regarding the future given information that is restricted to the past and present. One relation between confirmation and induction is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, then the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r.

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