scholarly journals John Rawls and compliance to climate change agreements: insights from a laboratory experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaudijo Klaser ◽  
Lorenzo Sacconi ◽  
Marco Faillo
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Voluntary Compliance ◽  
Open Issue ◽  
The Veil

AbstractThe most evident shortcoming of the international agreements on climate actions is the compliance to their prescriptions. Can John Rawls’s social contract theory help us to solve the problem? We apply the veil of ignorance decision-making setting in a sequential dictator game to study the compliance to climate change agreements and we test the model in a laboratory experiment. The veil of ignorance shows to be very powerful at inducing the subjects to converge on a sustainable intergenerational path. However, the voluntary compliance to the agreement still remains an open issue, because even small incentives to defect can undermine the compliance stability, and therefore break the whole sustainable dynamic.

scholarly journals What Do People Say When They Become “Future People”?―Positioning Imaginary Future Generations (IFGs) in General Rules for Good Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6631
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Hiromitsu ◽  
Yoko Kitakaji ◽  
Keishiro Hara ◽  
Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Present Generation ◽  
General Rules ◽  
The Veil

In public decisions with long-term implications, decisions of the present generation will affect long-term welfare, including future generations. However, only the present generation is able to participate in such decision-making processes. In this study, we invited “Imaginary Future Generations” (IFGs), as participants in a discussion who take on the role of members of future generations to argue on behalf of their future interests to engage in present-day deliberations among residents of a Japanese town. Through analysis, it was seen that the deliberations among IFGs rose interest in issues that are related to common fundamental needs across generations. While the cognitive aspects of interpersonal reactivity, which measure the reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another, were seen as useful in arguing for the interests of future generations, it was suggested that the environment for deliberation had a significant impact on the ability to effectively take on the role of members of future generations. Finally, this paper positioned IFGs within the broad context of general rules for good decision-making, based on an analysis of these deliberations and in light of philosophical arguments such as the veil of ignorance by John Rawls.

Habermas on Rawls and the normative foundations of democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
Normative Foundations

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.

scholarly journals Moral Decision Making: From Bentham to Veil of Ignorance via Perspective Taking Accessibility

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Rose Martin ◽  
Petko Kusev ◽  
Joseph Teal ◽  
Victoria Baranova ◽  
Bruce Rigal
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
New Type ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

The Irreconcilable Conflict between Islam and Liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.

scholarly journals The “Original Position” as Public Performance: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Asceticism

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Joseph Rivera
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Public Performance ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Late Works

John Rawls’ well-known device of representation (his terminology) that he names the “original position” is put into play by the veil of ignorance. This imaginative device, found in both his early and late works, is often dismissed because it is misunderstood as an exercise in moral geometry. This essay discusses in more detail the subjective mechanics of the original position; while sympathetic of Rawls’ application of the veil of ignorance, I distinguish between a thick and thin veil, whereby I promote the latter. The final section makes a connection between the simulation of the original position and the religious practice of asceticism.

scholarly journals Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Veil

AbstractThe veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent’s behind the veil are sensitive to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity—which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity—however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity.

scholarly journals Abortion and the veil of ignorance: a response to Minehan

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107615
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Equal Chance ◽  
The Veil

In a recent JME paper, Matthew John Minehan applies John Rawls’ veil of ignorance against Judith Thomson’s famous violinist argument for the permissibility of abortion. Minehan asks readers to ‘imagine that one morning you are back to back in bed with another person. One of you is conscious and the other unconscious. You do not know which one you are’. Since from this position of ignorance, you have an equal chance of being the unconscious violinist and the conscious person attached to him, it would be rational to oppose a right for detachment. Likewise, behind the veil of ignorance, it is rational to oppose abortions since you could be the fetus, Minehan claims. This paper provides a plausible reply to this argument.

scholarly journals No Harm Done? An Experimental Approach to the Nonidentity Problem

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
MATTHEW KOPEC ◽  
JUSTIN BRUNER
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
The Public

Abstract Discussions of the nonidentity problem presuppose a widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who comes into existence do not, thereby, become morally unproblematic. We hypothesize that this intuition is not generally shared by the public, which could have widespread implications concerning how to generate support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies relating to matters like climate change. To test this, we ran a version of the well-known dictator game designed to mimic the public's behavior over identity-affecting choices. We found the public does seem to behave more selfishly when making identity-affecting choices, which should be concerning. We further hypothesized that one possible mechanism is the notion of harm the public uses in their decision making and find that substantial portions of the population seem to each employ distinct notions of harm in their normative thinking. These findings raise puzzling features about the public's normative thinking that call out for further empirical examination.

scholarly journals Freerolls and binds: making policy when information is missing

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
ANNIE DUKE ◽  
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Mirror Image ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Difficult Cases

Abstract When policymakers focus on costs and benefits, they often find that hard questions become easy – as, for example, when the benefits clearly exceed the costs, or when the costs clearly exceed the benefits. In some cases, however, benefits or costs are difficult to quantify, perhaps because of limitations in scientific knowledge. In extreme cases, policymakers are proceeding in circumstances of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they cannot assign probabilities to various outcomes. We suggest that in difficult cases in which important information is absent, it is useful for policymakers to consider a concept from poker: ‘freerolls.’ A freeroll exists when choosers can lose nothing from selecting an option but stand to gain something (whose magnitude may itself be unknown). In some cases, people display ‘freeroll neglect.’ In terms of social justice, John Rawls’ defense of the difference principle is grounded in the idea that, behind the veil of ignorance, choosers have a freeroll. In terms of regulatory policy, one of the most promising defenses of the Precautionary Principle sees it as a kind of freeroll. Some responses to climate change, pandemics and financial crises can be seen as near-freerolls. Freerolls and near-freerolls must be distinguished from cases involving cumulatively high costs and also from faux freerolls, which can be found when the costs of an option are real and significant, but not visible. ‘Binds’ are the mirror-image of freerolls; they involve options from which people are guaranteed to lose something (of uncertain magnitude). Some regulatory options are binds, and there are faux binds as well.

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