Reducing Teacher Moral Hazard in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Educational System through Merit-pay: An Application of the Principal–Agency Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Casson
2018 ◽  
pp. 762-773
Author(s):  
Jemimah L. Young ◽  
Jamaal R. Young

The achievement socialization of Black girls is highly dependent upon the interactions within their sphere of socialization. Black gender socialization patterns may build an academic resilience in Black women that gives them the capacity to navigate the U.S. educational system substantially better than their male counterparts. In this chapter, the authors describe how parents and teachers can leverage the racial, disciplinary, and academic identities of Black girls to increase their performance in mathematics. This chapter equips teachers and parents with explicit tools to build on the trends observed in prior research. These tools can help parents and teachers build bridges to mathematics success for Black girls.


2019 ◽  
pp. 156-191
Author(s):  
William Lazonick ◽  
Jang-Sup Shin

This chapter uses innovation theory to provide both a general theoretical critique and a selective empirical critique of the use of agency theory to rationalize the looting of the U.S. business corporation as enhancing economic efficiency. It focuses on three empirical works, Bebchuk and Fried, Pay Without Performance (2004); Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge-Fund Activism” (2015); and Fried and Wang, “Short-Termism and Capital Flows” (2017). The chapter contends that MSV ideology as promulgated by agency theorists has contributed to inferior corporate and economic performance. It then argues that, for analyzing the operation and performance of the economy, innovation theory should replace agency theory.


Author(s):  
Navin A. Bapat

This study argues that the war on terror can be explained as an effort to cement the U.S. dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency by expanding American control over the global energy markets. Since the 1970s, the states of OPEC agreed to denominate their oil sales in U.S. dollars in exchange for American military protection. The 9/11 attacks gave the U.S. cover to eliminate current challengers to this system while simultaneously striking new security agreements with host states throughout the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia that are critical to the extraction, sale, and transportation of energy to global markets. However, the U.S. security guarantee soon created a moral hazard problem. Since the host states had American protection, they were free to engage in corrupt behaviors—while labeling their political opponents as terrorists. To make matters worse, these states had incentives to keep terrorists in their territory, given that doing so would force the U.S. to protect them indefinitely. As a result of this moral hazard problem, terrorists in the host states gradually grew in power and transitioned to insurgencies, which caused a rapid escalation in violence. Facing the increasing cost of securing the host states, the U.S. was forced to scale back its security guarantee, which in turn contributed to greater violence in the energy market. Although the U.S. began the war to maintain its economic dominance, it now finds itself locked into a seemingly permanent war for its economic security.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Seok-Weon Lee

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
M. Daimul Abror ◽  
Heri Sunarno

Voter turnout in 1999-2009 has decreased significantly. At 1999 92.6% chosen and 7.3% abstains, at 2004 84.1% chosen and 15.9% abstains, at 2009 70.9% chosen and 29.1% abstains. (www.merdeka.com). These conditions encourage Indonesian Election Commision to form Democratic Volunteer as an agent that helps the socialization of Election 2014. This study aims to comprehensively assess the role of Democratic Volunteer as "Election Marketer" in Principal Agency Theory perspective. This study uses qualitative research with case study approach. The results are (1) Relations between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision as principal with Democratic Volunteerasagent (2) Contract model of Democratic Volunteer in two aspects, the type of contract that contract model is short Term Contracts, and the type of both relationship are relation between government and civil society; (3) In carrying out its role as election marketer, Democratic Volunteer fulfill four criteria in Principal Agency Theory perspective. The weakness of model contract of Democratic Volunteer are Short Term Contracts must be solved by entering into a Long Term Contracts to be interwoven communication simultaneously between the government, in this case between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision with Democratic Volunteer as the embodiment of Civil Societies participation is represented by five segments groups of voters.


Author(s):  
Christina L. Boyd ◽  
Michael J. Nelson ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Ethan D. Boldt

This chapter details our theory for why we should expect the priorities and preferences of the president, Congress, and a U.S. Attorney’s local public to affect prosecutorial behavior. We argue that principal-agency theory provides a useful tool to understand how political principals like the president and Congress can influence U.S. Attorney decision-making. We expect that presidential rhetoric and congressional hearings on crime-fighting priorities will provide important, meaningful signals regarding these principals’ priorities and that federal prosecutors will adjust their behavior depending on the strength of the signals they have received from their principals. Additionally, we anticipate that U.S. Attorneys will be mindful of their local public’s preferences because they are often drawn from the district in which they serve and will continue to work in the district when their tenure ends. We also introduce the empirical measures used to capture political superiors’ communication to federal prosecutors that we rely on in the remainder of the book.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Author(s):  
Amanda Agan ◽  
Matthew Freedman ◽  
Emily Owens

Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. To provide these services, many jurisdictions rely on assigned counsel systems, where private attorneys represent indigent defendants on a contract basis. These defendants are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated than defendants with privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records, we investigate the mechanisms behind this disparity and consider their policy implications. We find that adverse selection among lawyers is not the primary contributor to the assigned counsel penalty. We conclude that reform efforts should address moral hazard in assigned counsel systems.


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