Theorizing Political Responsiveness in Prosecutorial Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-120
Author(s):  
Christina L. Boyd ◽  
Michael J. Nelson ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Ethan D. Boldt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Presidential Rhetoric ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Congressional Hearings ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

This chapter details our theory for why we should expect the priorities and preferences of the president, Congress, and a U.S. Attorney’s local public to affect prosecutorial behavior. We argue that principal-agency theory provides a useful tool to understand how political principals like the president and Congress can influence U.S. Attorney decision-making. We expect that presidential rhetoric and congressional hearings on crime-fighting priorities will provide important, meaningful signals regarding these principals’ priorities and that federal prosecutors will adjust their behavior depending on the strength of the signals they have received from their principals. Additionally, we anticipate that U.S. Attorneys will be mindful of their local public’s preferences because they are often drawn from the district in which they serve and will continue to work in the district when their tenure ends. We also introduce the empirical measures used to capture political superiors’ communication to federal prosecutors that we rely on in the remainder of the book.

Redisign of the Air Traffic Control System-Moving People through Distributed Management

1978 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 485-485
Author(s):  
John G. Kreifeldt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Control System ◽  
Traffic Control ◽  
Air Traffic Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Air Traffic ◽  
Critical Function ◽  
Congressional Hearings ◽  
The Future ◽  
Traffic Control System

The present national Air Traffic Control system is a ground-centralized, man intensive system which through design allows relatively little meaningful pilot participation in decision making. The negative impact of this existing design can be measured in delays, dollars and lives. The FAA's design plans for the future ATC system will result in an even more intensive ground-centralized system with even further reduction of pilot decision making participation. In addition, controllers will also be removed from on-line decision making through anticipated automation of some or all of this critical function. Recent congressional hearings indicate that neither pilots nor controllers are happy or sanguine regarding the FAA's design for the future ATC system.

scholarly journals Role of Democratic Volunteers as the "Election Marketer"

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
M. Daimul Abror ◽  
Heri Sunarno
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Model Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

Voter turnout in 1999-2009 has decreased significantly. At 1999 92.6% chosen and 7.3% abstains, at 2004 84.1% chosen and 15.9% abstains, at 2009 70.9% chosen and 29.1% abstains. (www.merdeka.com). These conditions encourage Indonesian Election Commision to form Democratic Volunteer as an agent that helps the socialization of Election 2014. This study aims to comprehensively assess the role of Democratic Volunteer as "Election Marketer" in Principal Agency Theory perspective. This study uses qualitative research with case study approach. The results are (1) Relations between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision as principal with Democratic Volunteerasagent (2) Contract model of Democratic Volunteer in two aspects, the type of contract that contract model is short Term Contracts, and the type of both relationship are relation between government and civil society; (3) In carrying out its role as election marketer, Democratic Volunteer fulfill four criteria in Principal Agency Theory perspective. The weakness of model contract of Democratic Volunteer are Short Term Contracts must be solved by entering into a Long Term Contracts to be interwoven communication simultaneously between the government, in this case between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision with Democratic Volunteer as the embodiment of Civil Societies participation is represented by five segments groups of voters.

scholarly journals El cargo y descargo como procedimiento jurídico-contable neutralizador de los desequilibrios derivados de las relaciones de agencia

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-232
Author(s):  
Susana Villaluenga de Gracia ◽  
Inmaculada Llibrer Escrig
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Discharge System ◽  
Agency Relationship ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

El método contable de cargo y descargo, un procedimiento de naturaleza más jurídica que contable, se empleaba cuando la actividad económica de la organización era confiada a un agente, circunstancia que facilita su análisis desde la Teoría de la Agencia. Tradicionalmente ha estado ligado a la toma de decisiones y al control del agente, sobre lo que existe una amplia bibliografía. Sin embargo, hasta ahora no se ha considerado como un instrumento que anula el conflicto de intereses contrapuestos surgidos en la relación entre principal y agente en una gestión delegada.El análisis de los documentos de cargo y descargo, contenido en estudios previos que tienen como base las fuentes documentales manuscritas y en los que se ha estudiado la relación entre principal y agente desde la perspectiva histórico-contable, ha permitido identificar todos los elementos característicos de la relación de agencia, inferir los intereses de principal y agentes, deducir los incentivos empleados por el principal para alinear el comportamiento de los agentes y concluir que este modo de registro era capaz de neutralizar los desequilibrios de intereses y la información asimétrica entre ambos. This paper examines some accounting and legal aspects of the charge and discharge system and the relationship between it and the Agency Theory. This type of accounting was used when the economic activity was entrusted to an agent; it suggests that the Agency Theory is an excellent framework to analyze the accounts. Traditionally the Charge and Discharge has been linked to the decision making and control of the agent's management, on which there is a wide bibliography, however, until now, it has not been considered as an instrument to cancel conflicts that arisen in the relationship between principal and agent and getting the equilibrium of the relationship between them.We analyzed the documents and that allowed us to show different aspects as identify all characteristic elements of the agency relationship, infer the interests of principal and agents, deduct the incentives used by the principal to align the behavior of the agents and conclude that this mode of registration was able to neutralize the imbalances of interests and the asymmetric information between both.

scholarly journals The effect of decision time horizon on short termism: An experimental approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4, special issue) ◽  
pp. 293-301
Author(s):  
Abdallah Bader Mahmoud Alzoubi ◽  
Gavin Nicholson ◽  
Mohammad Bader Mahmoud Alzoubi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Decision Time ◽  
Long Term Performance ◽  
Term Performance ◽  
Short Termism

Short-termism (i.e., the sub-optimal favouring of short-term performance over long-term performance) is generally explained as an outcome of the agency relationship whereby self-interested managers and/or stock market pressures distort the balance between short and long-term performance. We investigate if short termism (Crilly, 2017; Reilly, Souder, & Ranucci, 2016) is due to cognitive bias (temporal distortion) rather than agency costs. We test these hypotheses with an experimental approach by applying a 3x2 factorial design to manipulate temporal distortion on 60 non-conflicted decision-makers. Results suggest that individuals make inconsistent investment decisions based on differing payout time horizons. Participants faced with simple comparisons between investment opportunities were consistent across different time periods and followed a model of rational decision-making. In contrast, more complex decisions led to intertemporal inconsistency. We provide evidence that: 1) individuals on the whole struggle to deal with incorporating time into business decisions in a consistent way causing us to question the link between short-termism and agency theory; 2) principals likely view investment decisions inconsistently across time and so are a cause of sub-optimal investment decision-making and 3) we need to look beyond studies of moral hazard associated with agency theory and/or myopic market pricing when investigating short-termism.

An Agency Theory Perspective on Corruption in Sport: The Case of the International Olympic Committee

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Mason ◽  
Lucie Thibault ◽  
Laura Misener
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Control Function ◽  
International Olympic Committee ◽  
Sport Organizations ◽  
Control Functions ◽  
Management Function ◽  
Olympic Movement ◽  
Corrupt Behavior ◽  
And Control

This article discusses agency problems in sport organizations in which the same individuals are involved in both the management and control of decision making. We focus our analysis on the case of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by reviewing the behavior of selected IOC members with regard to the bidding process for the Olympic Games and the resulting reform attempts made by the IOC in an effort to address issues of corruption. After a review of examples of corrupt behavior on the part of IOC members, agency theory is introduced to discuss IOC reforms and provide some suggestions for future reform. We propose incorporating other stakeholders (in addition to the IOC members), such as corporate partners, media conglomerates, and other members of the Olympic movement (e.g., athletes, coaches, officials), into management and control functions. More specifi cally, it is suggested that these stakeholders comprise a board that oversees the operations of the IOC (similar to the IOC’s current executive committee) and be given the ability to remove and/or sanction IOC members who act self-interestedly to the detriment of the Olympic movement. Thus, by delegating the control function of decision making to a board and the management function to internal agents, greater accountability for all organization members can be achieved.

Ownership Structure and Branding Strategies

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-95
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Bakkour ◽  
Fatiha Fort ◽  
Anne Mione
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Conceptual Model ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Corporate Image ◽  
Branding Strategies ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Relationship

The brand is the most important asset for enterprises. In a competitive marketplace, brand is considered the best way to differentiate products, to build corporate image and to develop bargaining power with retailers. Branding strategies are therefore a key aspect of corporate decision making. In this paper, the authors analyse the relationship between the ownership structure of agri-food SMEs and branding strategies. A conceptual model of how these variables are related is proposed and empirically tested using data from two surveys (2003 and 2010) of a representative sample of agri-food SMEs in the Languedoc–Roussillon region (South of France). The results show that ownership structure influences branding strategies in SMEs. This finding might be considered a challenge to the relevance of applying agency theory to a very particular form of enterprise and sector of activity.

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