scholarly journals How to Split Gains and Losses? Experimental Evidence of Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Neumann ◽  
Sabrina Kierspel ◽  
Ivo Windrich ◽  
Roger Berger ◽  
Bodo Vogt
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Monetary Loss ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Prior Experiences ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Monetary Gain ◽  
Distribution Problems

Previous research has typically focused on distribution problems that emerge in the domain of gains. Only a few studies have distinguished between games played in the domain of gains from games in the domain of losses, even though, for example, prospect theory predicts differences between behavior in both domains. In this study, we experimentally analyze players’ behavior in dictator and ultimatum games when they need to divide a monetary loss and then compare this to behavior when players have to divide a monetary gain. We find that players treat gains and losses differently in that they are less generous in games over losses and react differently to prior experiences. Players in the dictator game become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing an ultimatum game first.

scholarly journals Comparing mind perception in strategic exchanges: human-agent negotiation, dictator and ultimatum games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
Cognitive Aptitude ◽  
Negotiation Agents ◽  
Emotional Capacity

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.

scholarly journals The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Agnès Festré ◽  
Pierre Garrouste
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.

Pentecostalism as an Informal Political Institution: Experimental Evidence from Ghana

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. McCauley
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Informal Institution ◽  
Resource Endowment ◽  
The Status ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
New Form ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Cultural Leaders

AbstractInformal institutions continue to govern political exchange in Africa, but the traditional, ethnic-based form of “big man rule” is now threatened by an alternative informal institution — charismatic Pentecostalism. This study evaluates the status of Pentecostalism empirically, in a micro-level experiment in Ghana. Using data from a variant of the dictator game, in which participants divide a resource endowment with randomly assigned partners as well as cultural leaders, the study provides evidence of Pentecostal exclusivity, excessive allegiance to leaders, and a shift away from ethnic-based patronage to Pentecostal patronage. As Pentecostalism continues to expand, these findings suggest a modification in the exchange of resources for loyalty in Africa, and grounds for viewing the movement as a new form of big man rule in the region.

Video conferencing software selection based on hybrid MCDM and cumulative prospect theory under a major epidemic

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jie Xu ◽  
Jian Lv ◽  
Hong-Tai Yang ◽  
Yan-Lai Li
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Weighting Function ◽  
Video Conferencing ◽  
Cumulative Prospect Theory ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Software Selection ◽  
Interval Numbers ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
Gains And Losses

The video conferencing software is regarded as a significant tool for social distancing and getting incorporations up and going. Due to the indeterminacy of epidemic evolution and the multiple criteria, this paper proposes a video conferencing software selection method based on hybrid multi-criteria decision making (HMCDM) under risk and cumulative prospect theory (CPT), in which the criteria values are expressed in various mathematical forms (e.g., real numbers, interval numbers, and linguistic terms) and can be changed with natural states of the epidemic. Initially, the detailed description of video conferencing software selection problem under an epidemic are given. Subsequently, a whole procedure for video conferencing software selection is conducted, the approaches for processing and normalizing the multi-format evaluation values are presented. Furthermore, the expectations provided by DMs under different natural states of the epidemic are considered as the corresponding reference points (RP). Based on this, the matrix of gains and losses is constructed. Then, the prospect values of all criteria and the perceived probabilities of natural states are calculated according to the value function and the weighting function in CPT respectively. Finally, the proposed method is illustrated by an empirical case study, and the comparison analysis and the sensitivity analysis for the loss aversion parameter are conducted to prove the effectiveness and robustness. The results show that considering the psychological characteristics of DMs in selection decision is beneficial to avoid the unacceptable and potential loss risks. This study could provide a useful guideline for managers who intend to select appropriate video conferencing software.

scholarly journals Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 101613
Author(s):  
François Cochard ◽  
Julie Le Gallo ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Jean-Christian Tisserand
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Different Populations ◽  
Meta Analyses

A Prospect Theory Explanation of the Disposition to Trade Losing Investments for Less Than Market Price

2002 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 851-857
Author(s):  
D. J. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Mental Accounting ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Psychological Benefits ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Monetary Loss ◽  
Mental Integration

Investors have a proven general reluctance to realize losses. The theory of “mental accounting” suggests that losses are easier to accept when mentally integrated with either preceding losses or with compensatory gains. Mental integration is made easier when a failed asset is exchanged against a new, apparently profitable, acquisition. The alternative is to sell the existing asset on the open market before re-investing the proceeds as desired. This is emotionally less appealing than “rolling over” a losing investment into a new venture by way of an asset trade. The psychological benefits of exchanging rather than selling a failed asset come at a cost. It is typical of trade-in arrangements, e.g., where one trades an old car against a new one, that the effective sale price of the existing asset is less than current market value. Acceptance of this low price adds to the investor's total monetary loss on the existing asset but is essential to an overall package deal apart from which that asset would often remain belatedly unsold.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

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