scholarly journals Stake size effects in ultimatum game and dictator game offers: A meta-analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 151 ◽  
pp. 61-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Larney ◽  
Amanda Rotella ◽  
Pat Barclay
Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 101613
Author(s):  
François Cochard ◽  
Julie Le Gallo ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Jean-Christian Tisserand

Author(s):  
Alan R. Dennis ◽  
Michael L. Williams

The goal of this article is to analyze the effect of group size on idea generation in both verbal and electronic brainstorming (EBS) groups. Group size effects were analyzed by a meta-analysis of 21 previously published articles. Section one reviews how group size impacts the communication process in group idea generation. Section two and three present the methods and results of our meta-analysis. Section four is a discussion of the results and implications for future research and practice.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 824-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randolph C. Grace ◽  
Simon Kemp

The predictive validity of the ultimatum game (UG) for cross-cultural differences in real-world behavior has not yet been established. We discuss results of a recent meta-analysis (Oosterbeek et al 2004), which examined UG behavior across large-scale societies and found that the mean percent offers rejected was positively correlated with social expenditure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan A. Häusser ◽  
Christina Stahlecker ◽  
Andreas Mojzisch ◽  
Johannes Leder ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange ◽  
...  

Abstract It has been argued that, when they are acutely hungry, people act in self-protective ways by keeping resources to themselves rather than sharing them. In four studies, using experimental, quasi-experimental, and correlational designs (total N = 795), we examine the effects of acute hunger on prosociality in a wide variety of non-interdependent tasks (e.g. dictator game) and interdependent tasks (e.g. public goods games). While our procedures successfully increase subjective hunger and decrease blood glucose, we do not find significant effects of hunger on prosociality. This is true for both decisions incentivized with money and with food. Meta-analysis across all tasks reveals a very small effect of hunger on prosociality in non-interdependent tasks (d = 0.108), and a non-significant effect in interdependent tasks (d = −0.076). In study five (N = 197), we show that, in stark contrast to our empirical findings, people hold strong lay theories that hunger undermines prosociality.


Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.


2004 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hessel Oosterbeek ◽  
Randolph Sloof ◽  
Gijs van de Kuilen

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 1051-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew T. Stephen ◽  
Michel Tuan Pham
Keyword(s):  

This research examined how reliance on emotional feelings as a heuristic influences how offers are made. Results from three experiments using the ultimatum game show that, compared with proposers who do not rely on their feelings, proposers who rely on their feelings make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum game, more generous offers in a variant of the game allowing responders to make counteroffers, and less generous offers in a dictator game in which no responses are allowed. Reliance on feelings triggers a more literal form of play, whereby proposers focus more on how they feel toward the content of the offers than on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of those offers, as if the offers were the final outcomes. Proposers who rely on their feelings also tend to focus on gist-based construals of the negotiation that capture only the essential aspects of the situation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (11) ◽  
pp. 839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendrik Poorter ◽  
Jonas Bühler ◽  
Dagmar van Dusschoten ◽  
José Climent ◽  
Johannes A. Postma

The majority of experiments in plant biology use plants grown in some kind of container or pot. We conducted a meta-analysis on 65 studies that analysed the effect of pot size on growth and underlying variables. On average, a doubling of the pot size increased biomass production by 43%. Further analysis of pot size effects on the underlying components of growth suggests that reduced growth in smaller pots is caused mainly by a reduction in photosynthesis per unit leaf area, rather than by changes in leaf morphology or biomass allocation. The appropriate pot size will logically depend on the size of the plants growing in them. Based on various lines of evidence we suggest that an appropriate pot size is one in which the plant biomass does not exceed 1 g L–1. In current research practice ~65% of the experiments exceed that threshold. We suggest that researchers need to carefully consider the pot size in their experiments, as small pots may change experimental results and defy the purpose of the experiment.


Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.


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