The challenge of relevance in national security studies

Author(s):  
Chen Li
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ekbladh

Security studies, as an American field of inquiry, has particular historical origins. Contrary to standard views, it was the unraveling of the international order in the 1930s that compelled a collection of internationalist institutions and individuals, led by historian Edward Mead Earle, to bind together a variety of new and traditional disciplines to create an entirely new field focused on the problem of security. These institutions and individuals not only sought to confront the crisis at hand by influencing public views, altering academic discussion, enhancing government capacity, and creating an American “grand strategy,” but also to establish strong institutional and intellectual foundations for an enduring scholarly project that would contended with future national security problems generated by the modern world. In this effort, Earle and his foundation, government, and university collaborators had significant influence on the evolution of security studies as a field that are still felt today.


2021 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-121
Author(s):  
Alexandru LUCINESCU

Currently, the definition of security that was put forward in 1952 by Arnold Wolfers in his article “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol” is widely cited within the field of security studies while the definition of this concept that have been advanced by Walter Lippmann in his book from 1943, “US foreign policy: Shield of the Republic” is largely absent, a situation which hinders the turning into a research topic of the connections between these definitions. However, there are authors who cite both the definition of security advanced by Wolfers and the definition of it put forward by Lippmann, but they either do not mention the existence of connections between these definitions or take notice of them but do not investigate them, with the consequence that a thoughtful consideration of this problem is lacking. In order to fill this gap in the study of the early stages of the development of security studies, this article provides an in-depth investigation of the links between the two definitions of security which reveals that Wolfers’ reflection on security was meant to explain implicit aspects of Lippmann’s definition of this concept but that eventually and somehow unintentional Wolfers advanced a different perspective on security.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (6) ◽  
pp. 1727-1747
Author(s):  
Joe Burton ◽  
George Christou

Abstract The conceptual debate around the term cyber warfare has dominated the cybersecurity discipline over the last two decades. Much less attention has been given during this period to an equally important question: what constitutes cyber peace? This article draws on the literatures in peace and conflict studies and on desecuritization in critical security studies, to suggest how we might begin to rearticulate the cybersecurity narrative and shift the debate away from securitization and cyberwar to a more academically grounded focus on desecuritization and cyber peace. It is argued that such a move away from a vicious circle where states frame cybersecurity predominantly within a national security narrative and where they seek to perpetually prepare for cyberwar, to a virtual cycle of positive cyber peace, is not only a desirable, but a necessary outcome going forward. We assert that this is particularly important if we are to avoid (continuing) to construct the very vulnerabilities and insecurities that lead to the prioritization of offence and destruction in cyberspace, rather than transformative, human-centred development in information and communications technology innovation.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Desch

This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Mitchell

“We are committed to grow the skills and competence of men and women who are or soon will be at the center of making decisions associated with strategic and operational security matters in the public or private sector. Content of our 2-week courses will expose them to the next generation of security thinking and allow them to interact with and learn from colleagues of other agencies and organizations. It will take them to the next level of their careers both intellectually and professionally.” - Flyer for the National Security Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse University


2020 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2091718
Author(s):  
Yagil Levy

Mainstream scholars of IR favor policy-relevant research, that is the agenda to influence government policymakers by offering policy recommendations. In this article, I offer a different perspective by presenting alternative arguments about social scientists’ responsibility to influence. By drawing on themes of public sociology and critical sociology, security studies and public policy, I argue that the core of this responsibility is to seek to influence policy via engagement with the public rather than with policymakers.


1993 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Wendt ◽  
Michael Barnett

The relationship between militarization and state formation in the West has been the subject of considerable scholarship,1 and there is thus some temptation to simply transfer concepts and arguments from that domain to the study of Third World militarization. Yet state formation dynamics in the two contexts were and are quite different, with important implications for the nature of national security threats. In the West threats tended to be external, rooted in anarchical competition between relatively equal states possessing domestic legitimacy, which meant that militarization could be understood primarily in terms of the political realist focus on security dilemmas and action-reaction dynamics. In contrast, Third World state formation has occurred in a largely dependent context in which relative external security contrasts with domestic insecurity.2 In this case the external environment, rather than being a source of threat, becomes a source of opportunities for elites lacking domestic legitimacy to gain support against internal security threats. In short, national security problems look very different in the First and Third Worlds because of different trajectories and contexts of state formation. Very different mechanisms may therefore account for militarization, suggesting the need for concepts and theories different than those that dominate security studies in the West.


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