Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 1019-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 203-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUANZHU LU

This paper investigates whether the relative-profit-maximization objective of private firms affects endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. Assuming firms have constant marginal costs and symmetric private firms are more efficient than the public firm, it is found that such an objective does not affect endogenous timing compared with the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a leader, social welfare increases compared with the level in the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a follower, social welfare remains unchanged.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293
Author(s):  
Shoji Haruna ◽  
Rajeev K. Goel

AbstractThis paper merges three strands of the literature – industrial organization, international trade, and economics of technical change – to examine the effect of tariffs on international mixed oligopolies which conduct research and development (R&D) that is prone to spillovers. Mixed oligopolies are prevalent in the defense sector, among other sectors. Using a two-stage sequential game with R&D in the first stage and production in the second stage, results show that higher tariffs reduce outputs of both the domestic public firm and foreign private firms, and private R&D. Effects on domestic R&D and welfare, and profits of foreign private firms depend upon spillovers. Within a large range of research spillovers, higher tariffs can in fact lower welfare. Some of these findings are different from traditional oligopolies and from models that ignore research spillovers. Policy implications are discussed.


Author(s):  
Latha Nagarajan ◽  
Anwar Naseem ◽  
Carl Pray

Purpose Since the start of seed and other market reforms in the 1990s, the annual number of improved varietal releases for maize in Kenya has increased substantially. Prior to the reforms, private firms were restricted in introducing new varieties, could not protect their intellectual property and farmers had to rely exclusively on improved seeds developed and marketed by the public sector. Reforms have resulted in not only private firms entering the market and releasing improved varieties, but also an increase in varietal releases by the public sector. The purpose of this paper is to review some of the key policy reforms related to maize in Kenya, and their impacts on varietal development and yields. Design/methodology/approach The authors estimate a yield model that relates national maize yields to a number of input policy variables. The authors employ a two-stage least square regression, as one of the explanatory variables – the number of varietal releases – is likely endogenous with yield. The authors use policy variables such as public R&D, the number of plant breeder’s rights issued, and the years since private varieties have been introduced as instrument variables to estimate their influence new varietal releases directly, and then new varieties, inputs and other policies to measure their impact on yields. Findings The results show that policy changes such as the introduction of intellectual property rights had an important impact on the number of improved maize varieties released. However, the outcomes of the policy change such as the number of varieties and the share of area under improved varieties has no impact on increasing maize yields. The authors argue that this is because farmers continue to use older improved varieties because of the dominance of a parastatal in the maize, seed market and that newer improved varieties may not have the assumed yield advantage. Future policy and programs should be directed toward increasing the adoption of improved varieties rather than simply releasing them. Originality/value This paper provides evidence that while policy change may lead to new varietal development and release, its aggregate productivity impacts may be limited without additional reforms and intervention.


1962 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 161 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Stefan Dupre ◽  
W. Eric Gustafson

Sociologias ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (46) ◽  
pp. 102-164
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Keller ◽  
Fred Block ◽  
Marian Negoita

Abstract The value of the Department of Energy (DOE)-owned national laboratories to the U.S. national innovation system has long been a subject of debate. Advocates have drawn attention to the central role of the labs in the development of technologies including advanced batteries, solar energy breakthroughs, imaging technologies, and various IT endeavors, among others. Critics have recurrently suggested that the labs’ innovative capacities have been undermined by a lack of engagement with commercial firms and managerial tactics. Perhaps surprisingly, what has often been missing from the debate is a thorough review of data on the public-private partnerships in which the labs engage with private firms. This paper draws on heretofore non-public data on one type of contractual arrangement - Work-For-Others (WFO) agreements - in which the labs perform contract work for private firms. We review 10 years of WFO data for a single DOE laboratory. Our analysis provides an initial picture of the surprisingly diverse geography and array of firms that employed the labs as contract R&D providers, as well as of key characteristics of these agreements. Although our data capture only a single laboratory’s agreements, the findings reinforce the importance of looking at the complex, overlapping network of programs within the U.S. federal system that support private sector innovation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
N. P. Audu ◽  
T. O. Apere

Using the Cournot and Stackelberg theories of oligopolistic competition, the paper re-evaluate the importance of tariff ranking issue under a mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrated that under Cournot theory, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms becomes more unequally distributed, maximum–welfare tariff will exceed maximum–revenue tariff. The study also revealed that under Stackelberg theory, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher maximum–welfare tariffs versus maximum–revenue tariffs. These two positions notwithstanding, when the Nigerian government decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus maximum–welfare tariffs. The findings of this paper remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower in the market.


Author(s):  
Brian J. Galli

This research takes a comparative analysis approach to study the process of economic decision-making within the private sector and the public sector. There are four main research objectives that guided this article. First, it aims to identify the different kinds of decision-making methods. Second, this article analyzes the economic decision-making processes that stakeholders have to make in public and private firms. Third, this r seeks to illustrate that establish effective decision-making and financial performance relate. Lastly, the article will offer effective economic decision-making procedures in private and public organizations, so as to make recommendations and to guide these businesses. To do so, there is a literature review in this research to find the best economic decision-making processes. Data collection tools were created in reference to the literature review that directed the structuring of the variables, and the study based the quantitative analysis on the adopted descriptive methodology. The sample was comprised of 100 respondents from China, and since 95% responded, that was a total of 95 responses. Based on the formulated study hypothesis and the research objectives, the collected data was examined for descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. In general, the findings showed that cost-benefit analysis was the favored economic evaluation method, and the respondents specified that they their internal and external economic decisions directly influence the company's operations. When focusing on how organizational performance is affected by effective economic decisions, the findings established that there was a key component for a better economic analysis outcome in the public and private firms: accounting information. Additionally, evaluating the number of processes in public and private firms led to findings that revealed the following: every decision in the public sector requires many approvals. These approvals greatly hinder economic decisions and decision-making. Social, cultural, and environmental aspects influence the decision process significantly, so they must be addressed immediately.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. G. Isaev

Analysis results of the modern situation connected with development of a commercial segment of the space services rendered by Russia are provided. It is shown that it, it is necessary to consider as quite difficult. It is offered developed situations to attract the scientific and economic capacity of private firms to overcoming, using the mechanism of public-private partnership. It is noted that the public-private partnership will allow to raise considerable additional resources of the companies and corporations in addition to the budget expenditure. Tasks which are reasonable for solving to the state and what should be charged to private firms are formulated. Possible areas of interaction of the state and private business in case of the solution of research problems of near-earth space are offered.


Author(s):  
Mårten Blix ◽  
Henrik Jordahl

This chapter discusses the conceptual foundations of introducing market forces in the public sector, drawing on pioneering work by the British academic Julian Le Grand. Creating market-like conditions in tax-financed welfare services (so-called quasi-markets) is a way to empower users and introduce competition among providers. Ideally, service provision will be efficient, responsive, equitable, and of high quality. Such ideal outcomes are, however, far from guaranteed to materialize. A crucial and defining characteristic of quasi-markets is that the end-users do not pay for the services consumed. As a result, care needs to be taken that the incentives of the buyer (the public sector) and the sellers (private firms) are properly aligned. The chapter also brings out the main challenges for quality and contract design that are discussed in depth in later chapters. A fundamental challenge for the government is to assess and monitor quality in welfare services, be they provided directly by the public sector or by the private sector.


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