scholarly journals CEO Pay For Long-Run Performance: A Dynamic View

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji-Young Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Dynamic Response ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Complete Convergence ◽  
Partial Adjustment ◽  
Incentive Effects ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Dynamic View ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
One Year

This study examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. We find that target pay levels are set on long-run past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay.

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Augustine Duru ◽  
Lawrence A. Gordon ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Financial Gain ◽  
Price Performance ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Initial Effect ◽  
Ceo Pay

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

Forecasting Kansas land values using net farm income

2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen M. Featherstone ◽  
Mykel R. Taylor ◽  
Heather Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Land ◽  
Farm Income ◽  
Land Values ◽  
Partial Adjustment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Condition ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Capitalization Rate ◽  
One Year

Purpose With the decline of US net farm income from $123.8 billion in 2013 to $71.5 billion forecasted for 2016, concern has developed regarding the future path of agricultural land values. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between net farm income, cash rents and land values in the state of Kansas and provides insight regarding future land values. Design/methodology/approach This study estimates partial adjustment models for cash rent and land values and uses those results to infer long-run capitalization rates and earnings multipliers. These models are used to forecast Kansas land values through 2018 and also the long-run price of farmland given 2016 expectations. Findings Land adjusts to changes in Kansas net farm income slowly with a one-year elasticity of 6.7 percent. The long-run elasticity is 96.9 percent which is very close to the 100 percent suggested by the theoretical income capitalization model. The long-run multiplier for income in Kansas is 21.71 which implies a capitalization rate of 4.61 percent. The estimated results suggest that Kansas land values would peak in 2016 and begin to slowly decline. If market conditions were to remain the same, land values would ultimately decrease to $1,171 per acre, a 28 percent decline from current levels. Originality/value Declines of the magnitude in estimated land values could negatively affect the financial condition of the sector. Factors such as a change in the long-run capitalization rate or unexpected supply or demand shocks for agricultural commodities globally could certainly alter the long-term prospects. However, current expectations as of March 2016 suggest that farmers will face difficult conditions over the next few years.

The determinants of CEO compensation: new insights from United States

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Bouteska ◽  
Salma Mefteh-Wali
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

Institutional Investors and CEO Pay Performance in Malaysian Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tee Chwee Ming ◽  
Yee-Boon Foo ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Abdul Majid
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study uses Malaysian data to examine whether institutional investors affect the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. Overall, we find that total institutional investor ownership has a negative effect on the positive association between firm performance and CEO compensation, which suggests ineffective monitoring. When the institutional investors are categorized into local and foreign, we find that the negative effect is driven by local institutional ownership, consistent with the argument that foreign institutional investors are associated with better monitoring. Our results provide new insights on the association between institutional investors and the CEO compensation-firm performance relationship in an emerging economy. JEL Classifications: G34; J33.

scholarly journals Top Executives’ Pay For Long-Run Performance And Corporate Governance

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 661
Author(s):  
Ji-Young Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
External Control ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay

This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively from the optimal contracting view. Overall, the findings imply that firm’s governance mechanism can generate cross-sectional variations in CEO long-term incentive contracts.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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