Why was democracy lost in Russia's regions? Lessons from Nizhnii Novgorod

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova

The phenomenon of crony capitalism has been explored primarily with reference to its impact on economic growth. This study investigates the political implications of crony capitalism and, specifically, the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism. Based on a case study of a political trajectory in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, I argue that under crony capitalism political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state authorities and such democratic institution as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during the electoral campaigns unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites engaged in struggle for power and wealth and increases public perceptions of corruption.


Author(s):  
Dawn Langan Teele

This chapter presents a case study of women's enfranchisement in the United States. It argues that the formation of a broad coalition of women, symbolized by growing membership in a large non-partisan suffrage organization, in combination with competitive conditions in state legislatures, was crucial to securing politicians' support for women's suffrage in the states. The chapter first gives a broad overview of the phases of the US suffrage movement, arguing that the salience of political cleavages related to race, ethnicity, nativity, and class influenced the type of movement suffragists sought to build. It then describes the political geography of the Gilded Age, showing how the diversity of political competition and party organization that characterized the several regions mirrors the pattern of women's enfranchisement across the states.



2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Govorun ◽  
Israel Marques ◽  
William Pyle

A business enterprise interested in influencing the design, adoption or enforcement of a particular law, rule or regulation often confronts a choice. Does it lobby officials directly? Or does it do so indirectly, using a collective action group as an intermediary? We draw on data from a large, 2010 survey of enterprises across the Russian Federation to demonstrate that the propensity to engage in intermediated lobbying increases with region-level political competition. Our explanation builds on recent evidence confirming Mancur Olson's claim (1982) that less encompassing actors tend to lobby for more distortionary policies. We hypothesize that with greater political competition government officials become more responsive to encompassing voices (i.e. associations of businesses as opposed to single firms), since the electoral costs of being captured by narrower interests becomes greater. Evidence from a complementary survey of regional business association managers points in the same direction; the relative attention paid by officials to lobbying efforts by encompassing associations increases with political competition.



2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Abassy

The presented paper is of a theoretical character. It includes a reflection on the mechanisms behind the rebirth of totalitarianism, using contemporary Russia as a case study. The research period taken as exemplification for the theoretical part comprises years 2000–2020 and was chosen for three reasons, mutually interconnected. The first among them is the election of Vladimir Putin, regarded as a strong symbolical representation of centralized state power, as the president of Russian Federation. Secondly, the consolidation of power in the hands of one man who had the tools to control and affect the political system. Thirdly, the modification of the Russian Federation Constitution to favor the durability of Putin’s government. The presented results point to the mechanisms behind the activation of totalitarian tendencies in Russian culture in the light of long-lasting cultural paradigms: collectivism and con-centrism.



Author(s):  
Brad Epperly

This book argues that explaining judicial independence—considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics—requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and indeed of greater import in autocracies. This is because a full “insurance” account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition’s effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is developed via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country’s 2010 “constitutional revolution,” and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.



2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Jeffrey F. Timmons

The authors present and test a theory about the effects of political competition on the sources of economic growth. Using Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s model of economic growth and data for roughly 80 countries, the authors show that political competition decreases the rate of physical capital accumulation and labor mobilization but increases the rate of human capital accumulation and (less conclusively) the rate of productivity change. The results suggest that political competition systematically affects the sources of growth, but those effects are cross-cutting, explainingwhy democracy itself may be ambiguous. These findingshelp clarify the debate about regime type and economic performance and suggest new avenues for research.



2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.P. King ◽  
B. Váradi

Using case study data from Hungary, this paper explores the developmental impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) in transition economies. A review of the debate on FDI is conducted by exploring the political discourse surrounding this issue in Hungary. The numerous and competitive purported mechanisms linking FDI with either economic growth or stagnation are used to analyze the case studies. This analysis reveals that FDI can take very different forms, with very different economic consequences. On balance, the evidence suggests that foreign direct investment has been very positive for the Hungarian economy. However, there exists the possibility that the current success of foreign owned firms will lead to socially detrimental market concentration or even hinder future growth.



1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Clawson ◽  
Cyrus Sassanpour

Few oil-producing economies, and for that matter few primary commodity-producing countries, have experienced as abrupt and severe a loss of foreign exchange earnings as that undergone by Iran in the period 1951–1953 following the nationalization of the oil industry and the subsequent international boycott of Iranian oil. While the literature on Iran during this period is extensive, it has focused largely on the political implications of nationalization and not so much on the economy's adjustment to the loss of foreign exchange. This article argues that the Iranian experience provides an instructive case study–admittedly an extreme one—of the ability of countries exposed to external shocks to adjust to the new realities.



2021 ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Massimo Della Misericordia

This essay analyzes the ways in which rural lordship was legitimized, maintained and sometimes contested in the late Middle Ages. The focus is not on the local societies and the political competition within the regional state, but rather on the position of seigneurial power in the interstices of international relations. Specifically, the dynamics of the frontier allowed the lords to enforce their power, but produced situations that put their authority in risk, providing opportunities for their subjects to contrast it. Political brokerage is the key to exploring the competition and the relationship between a variety of local actors and the state authorities. The source I selected is the Carteggio sforzesco, consisting of the written correspondence between these protagonists. From this viewpoint and thanks to records rich in narrative and descriptive contents, I will try to reconstruct economic tensions, military instability, the need for diplomatic agreements and for individual protection, that define the relationship between the Duchy of Milan, Valais, Switzerland and Grisons. Finally I will go into depth in the case-study of Val Formazza, where the domination of the lords family was in decline during the 15th Century, while local protagonists of this diversified local world – highlanders of lower social conditions settled in a peripheral valley forming an ethno-cultural minority of German speakers – were capable.



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