Why do people make risky decisions during a fire evacuation? Study on the effect of smoke level, individual risk preference, and neighbor behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 105245
Author(s):  
Meiqing Fu ◽  
Rui Liu ◽  
Yu Zhang
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommy Gärling ◽  
Dawei Fang ◽  
Martin Holmen ◽  
Patrik Michaelsen

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate how social comparison and motivation to compete account for elevated risk-taking in fund management corroborated by asset market experiments when performance depends on rank-based incentives.Design/methodology/approachIn two laboratory experiments, university students (n1 = 240/n2 = 120) make choices between risky and certain outcomes of hypothetical sums of money. Both experiments investigate in which direction risky choices in an individual condition (individual risk preference) are shifted when participants compare their performance to another participant's performance (social comparison), being instructed or not to outperform the other (incentive to compete).FindingsIn the absence of incentives to compete, participants tend to minimize the differences between expected outcomes to themselves and to the other, but when provided with incentives to compete, they tend to maximize these differences. An independent additional increase in risk-taking is observed when participants are provided with incentives to compete.Originality/valueOriginal findings include that social comparison does not evoke motivation to compete unless incentives are offered and that increases in risk-taking depend both on what the other chooses and the incentives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Tobey K. Scharding

Abstract I evaluate two contractualist approaches to the ethics of risk: mutual constraint and the probabilistic, ex ante approach. After explaining how these approaches address problems in earlier interpretations of contractualism, I object that they fail to respond to diverse risk preferences in populations. Some people could reasonably reject the risk thresholds associated with these approaches. A strategy for addressing this objection is considering individual risk preferences, similar to those Buchak discusses concerning expected-utility approaches to risk. I defend the risk-preferences-adjusted (RISPREAD) contractualist approach, which calculates a population’s average risk preference and permits risk thresholds below that preference, only.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 89-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Chen ◽  
Wolfgang K. Härdle ◽  
Qiang He ◽  
Piotr Majer

Abstract Understanding how people make decisions from risky choices has attracted increasing attention of researchers in economics, psychology and neuroscience. While economists try to evaluate individual’s risk preference through mathematical modeling, neuroscientists answer the question by exploring the neural activities of the brain. We propose a model-free method, 3-dimensional image functional principal component analysis (3DIF), to provide a connection between active risk related brain region detection and individual’s risk preference. The 3DIF methodology is directly applicable to 3-dimensional image data without artificial vectorization or mapping and simultaneously guarantees the contiguity of risk related brain regions rather than discrete voxels. Simulation study evidences an accurate and reasonable region detection using the 3DIF method. In real data analysis, five important risk related brain regions are detected, including parietal cortex (PC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), lateral orbifrontal cortex (lOFC), anterior insula (aINS) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while the alternative methods only identify limited risk related regions. Moreover, the 3DIF method is useful for extraction of subjective specific signature scores that carry explanatory power for individual’s risk attitude. In particular, the 3DIF method perfectly classifies both strongly and weakly risk averse subjects for in-sample analysis. In out-of-sample experiment, it achieves 73 -88  overall accuracy, among which 90 -100  strongly risk averse subjects and 49 -71  weakly risk averse subjects are correctly classified with leave-k-out cross validations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prashanth Rajivan ◽  
Efrat Aharonov-Majar ◽  
Cleotilde Gonzalez

Abstract Installing software updates is one of the most important security actions that people can take to protect their computer systems. However, people often delay installing updates. Why would people delay installation of security updates, knowing that these updates may reduce the risk of information loss from attacks? In a laboratory experiment, we studied how people learn to make update decisions from past experiences. In a simulated “work” environment, participants could defend against low probability and high impact losses, by installing a security update. The cost of updates was variable; participants could update immediately for a high cost or wait to update for free, risking increased exposure to attacks and losses. Thus, the optimal decision was to update immediately when the update was made available. The results from our experiment indicate people learn from experience to delay security updates. The cost of the update and individual risk preference both significantly predicted the tendency to delay the update; people with higher willingness to take risks may be more likely to neglect to update, keeping the status quo even when it may be sub-optimal. We discuss the implications of these findings for the design of interventions to reduce delays in update installations.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Matthew Pisklak ◽  
Christopher R Madan ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L Spetch

When making risky decisions, people and pigeons often show similar choice patterns. When people learn the reward probabilities through repeated exposure to the outcomes, their preference is disproportionately influenced by the extreme (highest and lowest) outcomes occurring in the decision context. Overweighting of these extremes increases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the highest outcome and decreases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the lowest outcome, termed the extreme-outcome rule. This rule predicts greater risk seeking for choices between safe and risky high-value outcomes than for choices between safe and risky low-value outcomes, when both choices occur in the same context. In a series of studies, we examine how this extreme-outcome rule generalizes within and across two evolutionary distant species: pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens). Both species showed risky choices consistent with the extreme-outcome rule when a low-value risky option could yield an outcome of zero. When all outcome values were increased such that none of the options could lead to zero, people but not pigeons were still consistent with the extreme-outcome rule. Unlike people, pigeons no longer avoided a low-value risky option when it yielded a non-zero food outcome. These results suggest that, despite some similarities, different mechanisms underlie risky choice in pigeons and people.


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