Ignored no longer: Contributions of the law of agency to principal-agency theory and congressional leadership

2008 ◽  
pp. 235-254
Author(s):  
William J. Phelan
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

Retaliation: Agency Theory and Gaps in the Law

1999 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Crockett ◽  
Julie A. Gilmere
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals Role of Democratic Volunteers as the "Election Marketer"

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
M. Daimul Abror ◽  
Heri Sunarno
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Study Approach ◽  
Model Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

Voter turnout in 1999-2009 has decreased significantly. At 1999 92.6% chosen and 7.3% abstains, at 2004 84.1% chosen and 15.9% abstains, at 2009 70.9% chosen and 29.1% abstains. (www.merdeka.com). These conditions encourage Indonesian Election Commision to form Democratic Volunteer as an agent that helps the socialization of Election 2014. This study aims to comprehensively assess the role of Democratic Volunteer as "Election Marketer" in Principal Agency Theory perspective. This study uses qualitative research with case study approach. The results are (1) Relations between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision as principal with Democratic Volunteerasagent (2) Contract model of Democratic Volunteer in two aspects, the type of contract that contract model is short Term Contracts, and the type of both relationship are relation between government and civil society; (3) In carrying out its role as election marketer, Democratic Volunteer fulfill four criteria in Principal Agency Theory perspective. The weakness of model contract of Democratic Volunteer are Short Term Contracts must be solved by entering into a Long Term Contracts to be interwoven communication simultaneously between the government, in this case between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision with Democratic Volunteer as the embodiment of Civil Societies participation is represented by five segments groups of voters.

A Real Entity Theory of Company Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Eva Micheler
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Autonomous Action ◽  
Entity Theory ◽  
The Third ◽  
Real Entity ◽  
The Law

This chapter provides an overview of a real entity theory of company law. It begins by exploring three main theories of the company. The first theory explains the company as a contract; it forms the basis on which agency theory builds. The second theory conceives the company as a concession of the state, while the third theory characterizes the company as a real entity. The chapter then looks at a modern version of real entity theory and its application to company law. According to real entity theory, organizations or firms are social phenomenon outside of the law and they are autonomous actors in their own right. This occurs because human beings change their behaviour when they act as members of a group or an organization. Company law finds this phenomenon and evolves with a view to supporting autonomous action by organizations.

Theorizing Political Responsiveness in Prosecutorial Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-120
Author(s):  
Christina L. Boyd ◽  
Michael J. Nelson ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Ethan D. Boldt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Presidential Rhetoric ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Congressional Hearings ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

This chapter details our theory for why we should expect the priorities and preferences of the president, Congress, and a U.S. Attorney’s local public to affect prosecutorial behavior. We argue that principal-agency theory provides a useful tool to understand how political principals like the president and Congress can influence U.S. Attorney decision-making. We expect that presidential rhetoric and congressional hearings on crime-fighting priorities will provide important, meaningful signals regarding these principals’ priorities and that federal prosecutors will adjust their behavior depending on the strength of the signals they have received from their principals. Additionally, we anticipate that U.S. Attorneys will be mindful of their local public’s preferences because they are often drawn from the district in which they serve and will continue to work in the district when their tenure ends. We also introduce the empirical measures used to capture political superiors’ communication to federal prosecutors that we rely on in the remainder of the book.

scholarly journals Could Contracts between Pharmaceutical Firms and French Veterinarians Bias Prescription Behaviour: A Principal-Agency Theory Approach in the Context of Oligopolies

Antibiotics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Didier Raboisson ◽  
Ahmed Ferchiou ◽  
Tifenn Corre ◽  
Sylvain Perez ◽  
Pierre Sans ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Body Weight ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Pharmaceutical Firms ◽  
Veterinary Medicines ◽  
Principal Agency Theory

In France, veterinarians can both prescribe and deliver veterinary medicines, which is a questionable situation from the perspective of antimicrobial use (AMU) reduction to avoid antimicrobial resistance (AMR). This situation places veterinarians in direct commercial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry as purchase contracts are signed between veterinarians and pharmaceutical companies. The aim of the present work is to analyse the relationships between veterinarians and pharmaceutical firms in the oligopoly market context of French veterinary medicine to determine whether the prescription behaviour of practitioners can be biased by joint prescription and delivery. Therefore, we develop an analysis based on principal-agent theory. Contracts between pharmaceutical companies and veterinarians during the 2008–2014 period were analysed based on 382 contracts related to 47 drugs belonging to eight main pharmaceutical firms (2320 observations). The price per unit after rebate of each drug and contract was calculated. The descriptive analysis demonstrated high disparity among the contracts across pharmaceutical firms with regard to the provisions of the contracts and how they are presented. Then, linear regression was used to explain the price per unit after rebate based on the explanatory variables, which included the yearly purchase objective, year, type of drug and type of rebate. The decrease in price per unit after rebate for each extra €1000 purchase objective per drug category was established to be €0.061 per 100 kg body weight for anticoccidiosis treatments, €0.029 per 100 kg body weight for anti-inflammatories, €0.0125 per 100 kg body weight and €0.0845 per animal for antiparasitics, and €0.031 per animal for intramammary antimicrobials. Applying agency theory reveals that veterinarians can be considered agents in the case of monopolistic situations involving pharmaceutical firms; otherwise, veterinarians are considered principals (oligopolistic situations in which at least several medicines have similar indications). The present study does not provide evidence suggesting that joint prescription and delivery may introduce any potential prescription bias linked to conflicts of interest under the market conditions during the 2008–2014 period.

Principal Agency Theory and Health Care Utilization

2006 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Schneider ◽  
Alan Mathios
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Care Utilization ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Care Utilization ◽  
Principal Agency Theory
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