Propaganda as a means of implementing the ideological function of the state

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Aleksey Bredikhin ◽  
Andrei Udaltsov
Keyword(s):  
Mass Media ◽  
Feedback System ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Position ◽  
Equal Footing ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
The Mass Media

In the article the authors analyze the essence of propaganda as a means of implementing ideological function of the state. It is noted that propaganda is a mechanism of spreading information persuasive influence in the interpretation and estimation of state power representatives. The structure of propaganda is determined: beneficiary of propaganda, subjects of propaganda, content of propaganda, channels of realization of propaganda, addressee of propaganda, feedback system. Types of propaganda are distinguished: political, axiological, educational, preventive. The authors come to the conclusion that the basic directions and the propaganda content are established in normative acts and the programs and organizational actions accepted according to them. Along with the implementation of propaganda, the ideological function is implemented by prohibiting or restricting propaganda or other dissemination of information that endangers the foundations of the constitutional order and is otherwise aimed at destabilizing the political situation in the State, as well as prohibiting the propaganda of ideas that may harm the foundations of morality and morality. The mass media are essential in carrying out propaganda. The State widely uses this resource on an equal footing with other actors to disseminate ideas of public importance and uses the services of various communication agencies. However, the state forms a legal framework for the mass media, their rights and limitations, which still determines the special position of the state in this process.

Is Racial Equality Unconstitutional?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Golub
Keyword(s):  
Racial Formation ◽  
Racial Equality ◽  
Racial Consciousness ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Racial Democracy ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
Peculiar Form ◽  
American Law ◽  
Racial Domination ◽  
Fundamental Transformation

This concluding chapter considers the implications of the book’s central claims: that constitutional law marks a contested site of racial formation, that color-blind constitutionalism represents an assertion of white racial interest and identity, and that the peculiar form of racial consciousness it enacts renders the pursuit of racial equality a violation of white rights. Taking up the question of political possibility within a legal system constituted by racial domination, the chapter suggests that racial equality may not be achievable within the current American constitutional order. It calls for a rethinking of American law and politics from the premise that racial equality will require a more fundamental transformation than these constraints would permit, and points toward an explicitly antiredemptive political vision upon which a more authentic racial democracy might be founded.

scholarly journals Coronavirus and Soft Law in Germany: Business as Usual?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Matthias Knauff
Keyword(s):  
Legal Order ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Binding Forms ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Business As Usual ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Made In

In combating the coronavirus pandemic in Germany, soft law has played an important, albeit not a central, role. Its use basically corresponds to that of under “normal circumstances”. In accordance with the German constitutional order, almost all substantial decisions are made in a legally binding form. However, these are often prepared through or supplemented by soft law. This article shows that soft law has played an important role in fighting the pandemic and its effects in Germany, although there cannot be any doubt that legally binding forms of regulation have prevailed. At the same time, the current pandemic has shed light on the advantages and effects of soft law in the context of the German legal order.

Inventing Canada in the Mulroney Years

1993 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-478
Author(s):  
George Feaver
Keyword(s):  
Conservative Party ◽  
The State ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Know How ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Pierre Trudeau ◽  
Political Bargaining ◽  
Examination Question ◽  
Bargaining Table

‘IF THE STATE DID NOT EXIST, WE WOULD HAVE TO INVENT IT. Comment.’ Few of the responses to this examination question qualified its suggestion that the state might be amenable to instantaneous contrivance or conscious design. The oversight on the part of my undergraduate charges pointed to the still potent legacy of a generation of Canadian political artificers whose projects of inventing the Canadian state had abetted the rise of a species of ‘constitutional politics’ given to the ever more elaborate concoction of comprehensive solutions to Canada's vexing constitutional shortcomings. These projects tended to politicize historically embedded elements in the constitutional order, serviceable if imperfect, which had been conventionally regarded as resistant beyond redemption to improved reformulation. This new-style politics was at centre stage in the long and eventful prime ministerial years of the Liberal Party's Pierre Trudeau, the great Cartesian inventor par excellence of the contemporary Canadian state. It would remain a central feature of the nine-year incumbency of Trudeau's Conservative Party successor, Brian Mulroney. Trudeau's vision of a reinvented Canada had proceeded from his background preparation for public life as an academic constitutional lawyer. Mulroney, aiming to finesse what the more cerebral Trudeau could not, would bring to bear on the affairs of the Canadian state the skills of a labour lawyer with the know-how to get Canada's perennially fractious provinces and interest groups to the political bargaining table, there to resolve once and for all any constitutional differences still outstanding.

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

Balancing of Values and the Value of Balancing (Part One)

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
Gadis A. Gadzhiev ◽  
◽  
Elena A. Voinikanis ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Critical Issue ◽  
Specific Mode ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Relationship

The article discusses the specific mode of existence of values – balancing or op­timization when it comes to deontological values. The authors using examples of values such as the principles of law and human rights, the rules of balancing are analyzed, which, according to G. Hart's classification, are secondary norms. The critical issue for the legal balancing procedure is the relationship between legal reality and values as such. Are the constitutional and legal values set by the Basic Law (Constitution), or do they objectively exist in society as a general (pre-constitutional) order of values? Should the Basic Law be confined to its own text and remain value-neutral in this sense? Are legal values purely deonto­logical, or can they be related to utilitarian goals and interests? The second part of the article explores the value of balancing as one of the methods for resolving the most complex legal conflicts. The well-known dispute between J. Habermas and R. Alexy about the admissibility of balancing of human rights demonstrates how complex and philosophically rich the legal balancing procedure is. Based on Luhmann’s concept of the cognitive openness of law, at the end of the article, the authors substantiate their own position on the role of values in modern justice.

Render unto Caesar Just a Little Bit Longer: The Relationship between Constitutional Reforms and Executive Survival

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Tofigh Maboudi ◽  
Ghazal P. Nadi ◽  
Todd A. Eisenstadt
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document