scholarly journals Guarantor Institutions

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tarunabh Khaitan

Abstract The last few decades have seen a proliferation of constitutional institutions, especially in the Global South, that do not neatly fit within any of three traditional branches of the state. These supposedly ‘fourth branch’ institutions may include electoral commissions, human rights commissions, central banks, probity bodies such as anti-corruption watchdogs, knowledge institutions such as statistics bureaus and census boards, information commissioners, auditors general, attorneys general and so on. In this paper, I will argue that some of these new institutions are best understood as “guarantor institutions”. I will show that in a given political context, a guarantor institution is a tailor-made constitutional institution, vested with material as well as expressive capacities, whose function is to provide a credible and enduring guarantee to a specific non-self-enforcing constitutional norm (or any aspect thereof). Section I explains why polities need credible and enduring guarantees for specific norms, and claims that the expertise, independence, and accountability of guarantor institutions are likely to be key ingredients that determine their effectiveness in serving that purpose. It also argues that constitutional entrenchment of the guarantor institution is entailed in the independence requirement. Section II shows that in order to credibly and enduringly guarantee a norm, certain primary and secondary duties need to be discharged by relevant actors in relation to the norm's content as well as its impact. It further argues that while some of these duties may be performed by institutions that possess expressive capacity alone (roughly, the capacity to speak, express, communicate), others require material capacity (i.e. the physical capacity to effect material changes in the world). Guarantor institutions, unlike integrity institutions, can shoulder primary as well as secondary duties. Furthermore, they are typically vested with expressive as well as material capacities, which is key to their classification-defying hybridity. Section III argues that guarantor institutions are constitutionalised in two respects: the norm they seek to guarantee is constitutional, and the institution itself has constitutional status. What matters for a norm or institution to be constitutional is that it is entrenched, i.e. protected from change from the ordinary political and legal processes of the polity to some extent. It is their doubly constitutional character that distinguishes guarantor institutions from ordinary regulators. Section IV explains how some constitutional norms are non-self-enforcing, in the sense that powerful actors are likely to have the will as well as the capacity to frustrate or erase them. It also shows that the three traditional branches, whether acting severally or jointly, cannot provide a credible and enduring guarantee to all non-self-enforcing constitutional norms. Hence the need for constitutional guarantor institutions. Section V highlights that guarantor institutions are typically tailor-made to guarantee specific constitutional norms. Their specificity has important consequences for their internal design and their mode of functioning, which distinguish them from key institutions in the three traditional generalist branches. Section VI concludes. Attention to guarantor institutions by constitutional scholars may help the discipline escape its blinkered worldview, which sees judicial review as the only game in constitution-town.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
NAVI GITA MAULIDA

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on the historical trajectory of the struggle, has the only state construction in the world where the nation is born first, then forms the state. The first President of the Republic of Indonesia Ir. Soekarno emphasized that the Unitary State is a National State. The purpose of the Indonesian nation to be born, independent, and to form a state has one goal, the will to elevate the dignity and life of the Indonesian people (Indonesian People's Sovereignty). Through an analysis of the reality of today's life, the Indonesian nation has lived in a condition of life order as if it were the same as a democratic state, namely that the first state was formed and the nation was born later. So that the sovereignty of the Indonesian people based on the principles of deliberation and representation has not been able to be realized.


NUTA Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
Rameshwor Upadhyay

This paper highlighted Nepalese statelessness issue from Nationality perspective. Nationality is one of the major human rights concerns of the citizens. In fact, citizenship is one of the major fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. According to the universal principle related to the statelessness, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality. In this connection, on one hand, this paper traced out the international legal obligations created by the conventions to the state parties in which state must bear the responsibility for making national laws to comply with the international instruments. On the other hand, this paper also appraised statelessness related lacunae and shortcomings seen in Municipal laws as well as gender discriminatory laws that has been supporting citizens to become statelessness. By virtue being a one of the modern democratic states in the world, it is the responsibility of the government to protect and promote human rights of the citizens including women and children. Finally, this paper suggests government to take necessary initiation to change and repeal the discriminatory provisions related to citizenship which are seen in the constitution and other statutory laws.


1956 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 264-277
Author(s):  
George Goyder

Justice, according to Aristotle, is giving to every man his own. But what is a man's own, and how is it to be determined relative to what belongs to other men? We call fair distribution between persons by the name of justice, and in doing so we acknowledge that justice stands over and between men as something prior to and outside a man's will or even the State's will. The moment we invoke ‘justice’, we in fact appeal to a supreme Being as the source of justice. Either God disposes of the world, determines the order of His creatures, and endows them with the qualities necessary to that order, or justice is based on power, and the expression of justice is the edict of the State. Either there is a Supreme Lawgiver who is the source of Jus or right and therefore of law, or there is no objective right but only the will of the powerful. Hugo Grotius agrees with the Stoics in deriving Jus from Jove.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (03) ◽  
pp. 415-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred G. Cuzán

ABSTRACTDrawing on more than 500 elections from around the world, this article presents five empirical laws of politics. Four of these laws span democracies and dictatorships, and one sets a boundary between the two. In both regimes the governing party or coalition represents a minority of the electorate. In democracies this minority usually represents a plurality that amounts to about one third of the electorate. Judging by the outcome of the first free elections in regimes undergoing a transition, there is reason to believe that in dictatorships the minority is much smaller. Even as they have an advantage over the opposition, the incumbents experience an erosion of support over time. In democracies this leads to alternation in office, which in turn ensures that across many elections about two-thirds of the electorate gets to see its favorite party or coalition in government from time to time. In dictatorships, during long periods in office, support for the ruling party shrinks to insignificance. Also in democracies, it is rare for incumbents to receive more than 60 percent of the vote, and itneverhappens twice within the same spell in government. This appears to be a reliable indicator that differentiatesalldemocracies frommostdictatorships. The conclusion is inescapable—the dictatorial “passion for unanimity” and illusion of “organic unity” notwithstanding, the state is a plurality. The will of the electorate emerges as a result of competition among political parties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 320-334
Author(s):  
Silas W. Allard

In her essay “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” Hannah Arendt famously wrote, “Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached the state where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether.” Surveying the aftermath of the world wars, the same aftermath that eventually led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arendt found that a person had to be emplaced—the subject of a political space—in the state-oriented order of geopolitics to be cognizable as a subject of human rights. The stateless, being displaced, were excluded from such a regime of rights and from the global political community. Bare humanity, Arendt argued, was an insufficiently binding political identity. As she wrote in her arresting language, “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126
Author(s):  
André Luiz Olivier da Silva

Resumo: Neste trabalho analisam-se as exigências por direitos humanos enunciados a partir de uma perspectiva universal, segundo a qual esses direitos se constituem dentro de obrigações gerais e são válidos para todas as pessoas do mundo. Mas podemos falar em direitos humanos considerados gerais e absolutos mesmo quando não se consegue especificar o detentor e o destinatário dos direitos em uma relação obrigacional específica? Com base em um procedimento de observação e na explicitação de algumas exigências por direitos humanos no mundo contemporâneo, aborda-se a natureza dos direitos a partir da correlação obrigacional entre direitos e deveres, bem como a distinção entre direitos especiais e direitos gerais, destacando que os direitos humanos são reivindicados como direitos gerais e universais, embora não se possa afirmar que sejam universais em si mesmos. A hipótese  neste artigo é a de que os direitos humanos são reivindicados “como se” fossem “gerais” dentro de obrigações específicas, seja em um conflito entre cidadãos e o Estado, seja a partir das relações dos países na comunidade internacional. Quando não estão especificados em obrigações concretas, esses direitos apresentam dificuldades quanto à sua efetividade justamente porque não se consegue identificar e especificar sujeitos e destinatários – que não são exatamente o Estado ou o cidadão deste ou daquele país, mas, sim, a pessoa humana. Nesse sentido, ainda estamos longe do ideal de universalização dos direitos humanos na comunidade internacional, e esses direitos só podem ser exercidos quando incorporados a um ordenamento jurídico ou, ao menos, inseridos em práticas morais e sociais.Palavras-chave: Direitos humanos. Direitos gerais. Universalidade. Obrigações específicas. Abstract: This paper discusses the claims by human rights from a universal perspective, according to which human rights constitute general obligations and are valid for all people of the world. Can we talk about human rights considered general and valid for all human beings even when we can not specify the holder and the addressee of rights in a specific obligational relationship? Based on a procedure of observation and explanation of some claims for human rights in the contemporary world, this article aims to approach the nature of these rights from the obligational correlation between rights and duties, as well as the distinction between special rights and general rights, highlighting that human rights are claimed as general rights, emphasizing its “universal” character, although we can’t ensure that these rights are universal in themselves. Our hypothesis is that human rights are claimed “as if” they were “general” within specific obligations, whether in a conflict between citizens and the state, as based on the relations of countries in the international community. When not specified in concrete obligations, human rights have doubts as to its effectiveness precisely because it is not easy to identify and specify recipients and subject of rights – which are not exactly state or country, but rather the human person. In this sense, we are still far from the ideal of universal human rights in the international community, and these rights may be exercised only when incorporated into a law, or at least, embedded in moral and social practices.Keywords: Human Rights. General rights. Universality. Specific obligations.


Author(s):  
Sonia Cardenas

The modern state’s role vis-à-vis human rights has always been ambiguous. States are the basic guarantors of human rights protections, just as they can be brutal violators of human rights. This basic tension is rooted in the very notion of statehood, and it pervades much of the literature on human rights. As the central organizing principle in international relations, state sovereignty would seem to be antithetical to human rights. Sovereignty, after all, is ultimately about having the last word; it is virtually synonymous with the principle of territorial non-interference. Meanwhile, humanitarian intervention would at first glance seem to be a contravention of state sovereignty. Yet not all observers interpret human rights pressures as a challenge to state sovereignty. Modern states can be highly adaptive, no less so when confronted with human rights demands. One of the principal, if overlooked, ways in which states have adapted to rising global human rights pressures is by creating new institutions. This is reflected in the formation of national human rights institutions (NHRIs): permanent state bodies created to promote and protect human rights domestically. These state institutions are remarkable due to their rapid and widespread proliferation around the world, the extent to which they sometimes represent a strategy of appeasement but nonetheless can be consequential, and their potential for domesticating international human rights standards.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  

This GSoD In Focus Special Brief provides an overview of the state of democracy in Asia and the Pacific at the end of 2019, prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, and assesses some of the preliminary impacts that the pandemic has had on democracy in the region in 2020. Key fact and findings include: • Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries across Asia and the Pacific faced a range of democratic challenges. Chief among these were continuing political fragility, violent conflict, recurrent military interference in the political sphere, enduring hybridity, deepening autocratization, creeping ethnonationalism, advancing populist leadership, democratic backsliding, shrinking civic space, the spread of disinformation, and weakened checks and balances. The crisis conditions engendered by the pandemic risk further entrenching and/or intensifying the negative democratic trends observable in the region prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. • Across the region, governments have been using the conditions created by the pandemic to expand executive power and restrict individual rights. Aspects of democratic practice that have been significantly impacted by anti-pandemic measures include the exercise of fundamental rights (notably freedom of assembly and free speech). Some countries have also seen deepened religious polarization and discrimination. Women, vulnerable groups, and ethnic and religious minorities have been disproportionately affected by the pandemic and discriminated against in the enforcement of lockdowns. There have been disruptions of electoral processes, increased state surveillance in some countries, and increased influence of the military. This is particularly concerning in new, fragile or backsliding democracies, which risk further eroding their already fragile democratic bases. • As in other regions, however, the pandemic has also led to a range of innovations and changes in the way democratic actors, such as parliaments, political parties, electoral commissions, civil society organizations and courts, conduct their work. In a number of countries, for example, government ministries, electoral commissions, legislators, health officials and civil society have developed innovative new online tools for keeping the public informed about national efforts to combat the pandemic. And some legislatures are figuring out new ways to hold government to account in the absence of real-time parliamentary meetings. • The consideration of political regime type in debates around ways of containing the pandemic also assumes particular relevance in Asia and the Pacific, a region that houses high-performing democracies, such as New Zealand and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a mid-range performer (Taiwan), and also non-democratic regimes, such as China, Singapore and Viet Nam—all of which have, as of December 2020, among the lowest per capita deaths from COVID-19 in the world. While these countries have all so far managed to contain the virus with fewer fatalities than in the rest of the world, the authoritarian regimes have done so at a high human rights cost, whereas the democracies have done so while adhering to democratic principles, proving that the pandemic can effectively be fought through democratic means and does not necessarily require a trade off between public health and democracy. • The massive disruption induced by the pandemic can be an unparalleled opportunity for democratic learning, change and renovation in the region. Strengthening democratic institutions and processes across the region needs to go hand in hand with curbing the pandemic. Rebuilding societies and economic structures in its aftermath will likewise require strong, sustainable and healthy democracies, capable of tackling the gargantuan challenges ahead. The review of the state of democracy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 uses qualitative analysis and data of events and trends in the region collected through International IDEA’s Global Monitor of COVID-19’s Impact on Democracy and Human Rights, an initiative co-funded by the European Union.


Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand ◽  
Robert Garner ◽  
Stephanie Lawson

This chapter explores the interrelationships between law, constitutions, and federalism. It first explains the importance of constitutions in shaping the basic structure of the state and the fundamental rights of citizens that they establish before discussing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular asking whether it is Western-centric. It then considers the ways in which states may attempt to realize justice in applying the law, with emphasis on the distinction between Islamic and Western practice. It also examines the role of constitutional courts and judicial review, legal adjudication of political problems, how the institution of federalism is used to contain the powers of the state and to manage diverse societies, and consociationalism as an alternative approach to handling social diversity. Finally, it analyses the increasing legalization of political life.


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