Regional security cooperation against hegemonic threats: Theory and evidence from France and West Germany (1945–65)

Author(s):  
Joshua Byun

Abstract Why do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.

2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 553-572
Author(s):  
Kaisheng Li

The current security architecture in Asia is facing serious challenges including more offensive alliances and less defensive collective security mechanisms, the co-existence of redundancy and deficit of security regimes, and the absence of effective management of Sino-American structural contradictions. Given the diversification and complexity of these security challenges, the priority on the Asian security agenda should be to pursue effective coordination among various security regimes, rather than try to build an integrated architecture. This article argues that a new security framework can be created from three levels of security regimes. On the first level, forums led by smaller Asian countries with participation from China and the U.S. can boost more dialogues and mutual trust. On the second level, regional regimes can deal with regional security issues by harmonizing regional powers with the collective security mechanism. On the third level, Sino-American security regimes can help manage the conflicts between two great powers. Ultimately, the concert of regimes depends on the benign and effective interactions between China and the United States.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-44
Author(s):  
M. Najeri Al Syahrin

This article will explain the regional security complex as a key challenge in the establishment of regional security cooperation in East Asia. The complex of security in East Asia described by explaining the security relations between North Korea and South Korea, China and Japan, the United States with Japan, and China with the United States and a pattern of chain reaction to the various security policies of these countries. This security complex makes it difficult to establish effective regional security cooperation. The Challenge of the regional security complex that most decisive in the formation of cooperation that will be done by the countries of the East Asia region is due to competition and differences of interests between the United States and China as a superpower state in the region. In addition, the many differences in the nature and orientation of political interests of Japan, South Korea, and North Korea are also still a constraint in the formation of regional security organizations and cooperation.


Author(s):  
Mohammed Nuruzzaman

Religious violence, primarily stemming from Shia–Sunni conflicts, has occupied the center stage in contemporary Middle East. It’s most recent brutal expression, which is viewed as a symptom rather than the cause, is the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS; also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; ISIL) in the summer of 2014 and the violence it unleashed against the Shias, the anti-ISIS Sunnis and other non-Muslim groups across and beyond the Middle East. The violence did not erupt suddenly, however: it is an outcome of a myriad of complex historical, religious, political, economic, and geopolitical factors. Historically, tensions between Islam’s two rival sects, the Shias and the Sunnis, have existed, especially after the Battle of Karbala in 680 (which saw the defeat of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the younger son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth caliph of Islam, at the hand of Damascus-based Umayyad Caliph Yazid I), mostly in abeyance but occasionally resulting in encounters. In the contemporary context, a host of factors, most notably external interventions including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the minority Sunni-led Saddam Hussein government, the sectarianization of politics by the Gulf Arab monarchs, Iran, and other dictatorial regimes in the region to consolidate regime survival, and the geopolitical competitions for power and influence between the region’s two archrivals: the Shia powerhouse Iran and the self-proclaimed defender of the Sunnis, Saudi Arabia, have greatly abetted violence between Islam’s two rival sects. Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria are the battleground states where the two regional heavyweights, being aided by two extra-regional powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, are jostling and jockeying to edge each other out to claim regional preeminence. The malaise of sectarian violence took a more serious toll on the peoples and societies in the region after the outbreak of Arab movements for democracy, what is dubbed the Arab Spring, in December 2010 and what is continuing today. This article partially originates from the author’s research project “Shia – Sunni Sectarian Violence and Middle East Regional Security” funded by the European Union and tenable at Durham University, U.K.


Author(s):  
M. Florencia Rubiolo

The asymmetric distribution of power in the Asian maritime region is favoring China, increasing theapprehension of its neighbors that, faced with their evident vulnerability, fear about Beijing’s intentions. In this context, the balance of power maintains the status quo and limits China’s behavior against other coastal countries. Given the disparity of military and economic power between Southeast Asia and China, this balance can only be achieved with the intervention of an extra-regional power, the United States. The renewed American participation as a guarantor of regional security has created new bonds of strategic dependence for Southeast Asia, which in turn have economies that mainly rely on China. The South China Sea conflict is then posing two dilemmas for the region: China’s increasing economic leverage and Washington’s reactive and challenging Indo-Pacific policy, which might make a stalemate in the maritime conflict possible.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 447-469
Author(s):  
Dongxiao Chen

The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) is at a critical juncture of development and transformation. In the past two decades, CICA has developed itself into the most representative and inclusive pan-Asian forum on regional security and cooperation, making steady progress on confidence building and regional cooperation, as well as promoting ideas of comprehensive, common, cooperative, and sustainable security. CICA has played a unique role in gradually raising Asia's self-awareness on a regional security agenda and regional architecture building. Nevertheless, CICA's overall influence on Asia's security agenda is still limited, its potential is far from being fully realized, let alone its long-term goal of upgrading into an organization of security and cooperation in asia (OSCA). In the context of changing dynamics in the regional security landscape, there are both great opportunities and huge challenges for CICA's further development and transformation. China, as the chairing country of CICA in the next few years, should show its stewardship to strategically prioritize CICA's road map for its transformation, by enhancing CICA's capacity and institutional building, improving the efficacy of CBMs for regional security, and helping build CICA's capability of delivering more regional security public goods. For the purpose of realizing these agendas of CICA, China should not only work more closely with the core members of CICA, but also engage well with extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, in the area of regional security architecture building.


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