Contemporary Shia–Sunni Sectarian Violence

Author(s):  
Mohammed Nuruzzaman

Religious violence, primarily stemming from Shia–Sunni conflicts, has occupied the center stage in contemporary Middle East. It’s most recent brutal expression, which is viewed as a symptom rather than the cause, is the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS; also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; ISIL) in the summer of 2014 and the violence it unleashed against the Shias, the anti-ISIS Sunnis and other non-Muslim groups across and beyond the Middle East. The violence did not erupt suddenly, however: it is an outcome of a myriad of complex historical, religious, political, economic, and geopolitical factors. Historically, tensions between Islam’s two rival sects, the Shias and the Sunnis, have existed, especially after the Battle of Karbala in 680 (which saw the defeat of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the younger son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth caliph of Islam, at the hand of Damascus-based Umayyad Caliph Yazid I), mostly in abeyance but occasionally resulting in encounters. In the contemporary context, a host of factors, most notably external interventions including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the minority Sunni-led Saddam Hussein government, the sectarianization of politics by the Gulf Arab monarchs, Iran, and other dictatorial regimes in the region to consolidate regime survival, and the geopolitical competitions for power and influence between the region’s two archrivals: the Shia powerhouse Iran and the self-proclaimed defender of the Sunnis, Saudi Arabia, have greatly abetted violence between Islam’s two rival sects. Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria are the battleground states where the two regional heavyweights, being aided by two extra-regional powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, are jostling and jockeying to edge each other out to claim regional preeminence. The malaise of sectarian violence took a more serious toll on the peoples and societies in the region after the outbreak of Arab movements for democracy, what is dubbed the Arab Spring, in December 2010 and what is continuing today. This article partially originates from the author’s research project “Shia – Sunni Sectarian Violence and Middle East Regional Security” funded by the European Union and tenable at Durham University, U.K.

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (01) ◽  
pp. 117-122
Author(s):  
Mieczysław P. Boduszyński

Nearly nine years after a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze in provincial Tunisia, a sense that the aspirations of the Arab Spring were always doomed to fail has set in among pundits and policymakers. The United States, and to a large extent the European Union, have all but given up on any pretense of democracy promotion in the region and have instead turned again to well-trodden policy repertoires emphasizing a realpolitik approach.


2018 ◽  
pp. 3-22
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove ◽  

This article examines the origins of the ‘Islamic State’ or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham or Levant (ISIS) in light of the contemporary political and security challenges posed by its diffusion of Islamic radicalism. The Arab Spring in 2011 ignited instability in Syria providing an operational base for the terrorist group to pursue its once abandoned Islamic state idea. Its growth and expansion has hitherto proved to be a threat not only to the Middle East but to international security given its thrust on world domination. It concludes that the United States of America’s activities in the Middle East were largely responsible for the rise of the Islamic State.


2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-347
Author(s):  
David Faris

Digital media played a key role in a number of uprisings that later became known as the Arab Spring. Now that this moment of resistance has largely given way to a tumultuous and unsettled regional order, we can ask what role these media forms are playing in the new ecology of the postuprisings Middle East. I would argue that we are witnessing a period of experimentation—journalists are attempting to generate both revenue and dissent under circumstances that range from unsettled (Tunisia) to increasingly repressive (Jordan), while proto-state actors and transnational jihadis are exploiting social media to attract supporters and influence diverse audiences. What is clear is that in many states the digital arrangement that characterized the 2000s—activist bloggers squaring off openly with recalcitrant and often clueless states—is gone. States are now more aware of and careful about the strategies they employ vis-à-vis digital dissent. In places such as Egypt, some of the most vocal activists are in prison. In Jordan, they have returned to producing journalism that skirts the line between tolerated and forbidden. Across the region digital media activists are grappling with disillusionment about the trajectory of the Arab Spring, while digital spaces are sites for transnational contestation, including by the most successful challenger to the state system since Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir in the 1950s, the Islamic State (IS). ʿAbd al-Nasir famously used radio to breach the information firewalls erected by new Arab states. IS has similarly employed the technologies of the day to execute a plan of even greater ambition and reach—far from reaching out only across national boundaries within the subsystem, IS militants have crafted a transnational media operation of remarkable scope, one that has drawn tens of thousands of recruits not only from the Middle East but also from Europe, the United States, and Asia.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Neil MacFarlane

FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WESTERN ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKERS HAVE embraced the cause of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. To take but one well-known example, President Clinton in the 1994 State of the Union Address cited the absence of war among democracies as a reason for promotion of democracy around the world. Assistance to former Warsaw Pact and newly independent states has been made conditional to varying degrees on the acceptance of democratic change. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development and associated non-governmental organizations have unleashed armies of promoters of democracy throughout the region to: observe elections; monitor human rights; draft new constitutions and laws defending civil and political rights; train judges and police personnel; and organize and assist political parties, media and non-governmental pressure groups. In short, they have sought to transplant the fabric of civil society and democratic institutions. These armies have landed on terrain often quite foreign to them and have often displayed little sensitivity to the social, economic and political context in which they are operating. This may have contributed to results other than those intended.


Author(s):  
Joshua Byun

Abstract Why do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 112-115
Author(s):  
Samer Abboud

Written at a critical historical juncture of Arab-western relations, Khalidi’stext provides a refreshing and informed account of western intervention inthe Middle East. It stresses the catastrophic human and political consequencesof western colonial adventures in the region and the neglect of thishistorical experience by current American foreign policy decision makers.Although written primarily for a non-academic, American audience, it is auseful and important text on contemporary Middle East history.Accessible and highly readable, it provides insights into a series ofmajor issues currently relevant to the study of the Middle East: democracy, oil, Palestine, and Iraq. The first chapter provides an account of westerncolonialism’s social, political, economic, and cultural legacy wrought on theMiddle East. Beginning with a brief introduction to the American march towar with Iraq, the author establishes an approach employed throughout thetext: juxtaposing the historical western colonial experience with theAmerican invasion and occupation of Iraq. Locating western involvement inthe Middle East within the context of the Ottoman Empire’s decline, Khalidihighlights the differential systems of colonial rule imposed on the region.Throughout, he emphasizes the indigenous resistance to colonialism, thusarguing against Orientalist discourses of indigenous acquiescence and subservienceto the supposed benevolence of colonialist rule. Two importantpoints emerge: first, that the political structures imposed by the colonialregimes have persisted, and second, that the region’s political cultureremains deeply rooted in the anti-colonial experience. This experience –entirely conditioned through European involvement in the region – meantthat for many, the United States never experienced the same political andcultural hostility as Europe. Throughout the cold war, however, the UnitedStates’ image as a disinterested outside power began to give way to an imageof the United States as a significant power broker in the region with manyinterests, and, most importantly, few objectives compatible with the politicaldesires of the region’s peoples ...


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the unrest across the Middle East in the 2010s. The first section focuses on the civil war in Syria and the role of so-called Islamic State., examining the causes of the Syrian uprising and the development of protests against President Assad into civil war. It describes the growth of Jihadism, formation of Ahrar al-Sham, and emergence of ISIS, and the subsequent declaration of a Caliphate. The escalation and destructive impact of the conflict is examined in the context of increasing international intervention and the involvement of foreign powers in both exacerbation of the conflict and efforts to restore peace. The second section describes the growing regional importance of Iran alongside the 2015 nuclear deal and tensions with Saudi Arabia. The chapter concludes with the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, conflict in Yemen, and the downfall of Gaddafi in Libya.


Author(s):  
Eyal Zisser

This article describes how in the middle of the winter of 2010 the “Spring of the Arab Nations” suddenly erupted without any warning all over the Middle East. However, the momentum of the uprisings was impeded rather quickly, and the hopes held out for the “Spring of the Arab Nations” turned into frustration and disappointment. While many Israelis were focusing their attention in surprise, and some, with doubt and concern as well about what was happening in the region around them; suddenly, in Israel itself, at the height of the steamy summer of 2011, an “Israeli Spring” broke out. The protesters were young Israelis belonging to the Israeli middle class. Their demands revolved around the slogan, “Let us live in our land.” However, similar to what happened in the Arab world, the Israeli protest subsided little by little. The hassles of daily life and security and foreign affairs concerns once more became the focus of the public's attention. Therefore, the protesters' hopes were disappointed, and Israel's political, economic, and social order remained unshaken. Thus, towards the end of 2017, the memory of the “Israeli spring” was becoming faded and forgotten. However, while the Arab world was sinking into chaos marked by an ever deepening economic and social crisis that deprived its citizens of any sense of security and stability, Israel, by contrast, was experiencing years of stability in both political and security spheres, as well as economic growth and prosperity. This stability enabled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party to remain in power and to maintain the political and social status-quo in Israel.


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