The Epistemic Value of Understanding-why

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Xingming Hu
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Know How ◽  
Strengthened Version

Abstract Some philosophers (e.g., Pritchard, Grimm, and Hills) recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate (or accurate enough), and it is this true belief, along with many other true beliefs understanding-why entails, that makes understanding-why finally epistemically valuable. Then, I explain why the two anti-veritist accounts are both false. Finally, I briefly discuss the idea that understanding involves a kind of know-how and show how veritism can explain the epistemic value of know-how in general.

Epistemic value

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Luis Pinto de Sa
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Mere True Belief

Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at various formulations of the value problem and various accounts of the value of knowledge in ancient and modern philosophy. The article then considers some contemporary discussions of the value problem, including the charge that reliabilist accounts cannot account for the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Various virtue-theoretic accounts of epistemic value are discussed as possible improvements over process reliabilism, and the epistemic value of understanding (as compared to knowledge) is considered.

scholarly journals Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 658-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Steinberger
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Methodological Principle ◽  
Epistemic Risk ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Epistemic Conservatism

Abstract Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.

How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Matheson
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Justified Belief

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might be generalized beyond the epistemic domain to the ethical.

scholarly journals Un viaje por las emociones en procesos de investigación feminista

2021 ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Dau García Dauder ◽  
Marisa G. Ruiz Trejo
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Research Process ◽  
Vulnerable Population ◽  
Feminist Research ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Emotional Impact ◽  
Know How ◽  
Emotional Work ◽  
Feminist Epistemologies

En este artículo enfatizamos el valor epistémico de las emociones en los procesos de investigación (en el saber qué y en el saber cómo). Nos centramos no sólo en cómo las emociones de quien investiga afectan el proceso de investigación sino cómo el propio proceso afecta –emocionalmente- a las investigadoras. En concreto, explicamos las diferentes razones por las cuales es importante reconocer el papel de las emociones en los procesos de investigación: metodológicas e instrumentales, éticas, analíticas, políticas y sanadoras. También exponemos los inconvenientes de enfatizar las emociones en la investigación. Partiendo del concepto de “reflexividad fuerte” de las epistemologías feministas, proponemos un viaje para reflexionar sobre las emociones y sus diferentes implicaciones en una investigación académica: el impacto emocional de la investigación en la investigadora (especialmente cuando se trabaja con población vulnerable), el trabajo emocional que implica la investigación y, en concreto, el trabajo de campo (y los dilemas éticos que puede implicar), las emociones como datos o evidencia y el conocimiento emocionalmente sentido.In this paper, we emphasize the epistemic value of emotions in the research process (to know what and know how). We focus not only on how the researcher's emotions affect the research process but also on how the process itself affects – emotionally- the researchers. Specifically, we explain the different reasons why it is important to recognize the role of emotions in research processes: methodological and instrumental, ethical, analytical, political and “healers”. We also expose the drawbacks of emphasizing emotions in research. Starting from the concept of "strong reflexivity" of feminist epistemologies, we propose a journey through emotions and their different implications in feminist research: the emotional impact of research on the researcher (especially when working with vulnerable population); the “emotional work” involved in the research and, specifically, in the fieldwork (and the ethical dilemmas that may involve); emotions as data/evidence and emotionally sensed knowledge.

Knowledge, concept of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Klein
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Factual Knowledge ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Know How ◽  
Central Focus ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Many ◽  
Meaning Theory ◽  
Mere True Belief

The branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and extent of human knowledge is called epistemology (from the Greek epistēmē meaning knowledge, and logos meaning theory). Knowledge seems to come in many varieties: we know people, places and things; we know how to perform tasks; we know facts. Factual knowledge has been the central focus of epistemology. We can know a fact only if we have a true belief about it. However, since only some true beliefs are knowledge (consider, for example, a lucky guess), the central question asked by epistemologists is ‘What converts mere true belief into knowledge?’. There are many, and often conflicting, answers to this question. The primary traditional answer has been that our true beliefs must be based upon sufficiently good reasons in order to be certifiable as knowledge. Foundationalists have held that the structure of reasons is such that our reasons ultimately rest upon basic reasons that have no further reasons supporting them. Coherentists have argued that there are no foundational reasons. Rather, they argue that our beliefs are mutually supporting. In addition to the constraints upon the overall structure of reasons, epistemologists have proposed various general principles governing reasons. For example, it seems that if my reasons are adequate to affirm some fact, those reasons should be adequate to eliminate other incompatible hypotheses. This initially plausible principle appears to lead directly to some deep puzzles and, perhaps, even to scepticism. Indeed, many of the principles that seem initially plausible lead to various unexpected and unwelcome conclusions. Alternatives to the primary traditional answer to the central epistemic question have been developed, in part because of the supposed failures of traditional epistemology. These alternative views claim that it is something other than good reasons which distinguishes (mere) true beliefs from knowledge. Reliabilists claim that a true belief produced by a sufficiently reliable process is knowledge. Good reasoning is but one of the many ways in which beliefs can be reliably produced. The issue of whether the objections to traditional epistemology are valid or whether the proposed substitutes are better remains unresolved.

The Intrinsic Value of Scientific Knowledge and Understanding

2020 ◽  
pp. 47-88
Author(s):  
James S.J. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Cognitive Achievement ◽  
Naturalistic Approach ◽  
Scientific Worldview

This chapter provides a detailed and epistemologically informed defense of the intrinsic value of scientific knowledge and understanding. It responds to Lars Bergström’s criticisms of the value of scientific knowledge. It then devises a naturalistic approach to intrinsic value that is used to argue that true belief (and, in turn, knowledge) is intrinsically valuable because true beliefs are valued for their own sake, and such acts of valuation help to explain the overall scientific worldview. It next considers and rejects Duncan Pritchard’s attempt to show that understanding is more epistemically valuable than true belief, arguing that Pritchard’s view of understanding as a cognitive achievement fails to include anything of epistemic value other than the epistemic value of the true beliefs which are compresent with understanding. Finally, it uses virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemic value to generate prima facie obligations to acquire scientific knowledge and understanding.

IS TRUE BELIEF REALLY A FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC VALUE?

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-104
Author(s):  
Lance K. Aschliman
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
A Value ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Mere True Belief

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I question the orthodox position that true belief is a fundamental epistemic value. I begin by raising a particularly epistemic version of the so-called “value problem of knowledge” in order to set up the basic explanandum and to motivate some of the claims to follow. In the second section, I take aim at what I call “bottom-up approaches” to this value problem, views that attempt to explain the added epistemic value of knowledge in terms of its relation to a more fundamental value of true belief. The final section is a presentation of a value-theoretic alternative, one that explains the value problem presented in the first section while also doing justice to intuitions that may cause us to worry about bottom-up approaches. In short, knowledge and not mere true belief is a fundamental epistemic value as it is the constitutive goal of propositional inquiry.

The Special Value of Experience

2021 ◽  
pp. 130-168
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Special Value ◽  
Better Than

Why think that conscious experience of reality is any more epistemically valuable than testimony? I argue that conscious experience of reality is epistemically valuable because it provides cognitive contact with reality. Cognitive contact with reality is a goal of experiential inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Such inquiry has awareness of the truth-makers of one’s true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience of reality is more epistemically valuable than testimony about reality is that it gives us more epistemic goods than only true belief or propositional knowledge. I defend this view from two rival accounts. First, that while conscious experience of reality has greater value than testimony, its value is only eudaimonic. Second, that while it has greater epistemic value than testimony, this value is not distinctive: for it only promotes truth better than testimony.

Epistemic Value

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-158
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Mere True Belief

Chapter 5 turns to issues relating to epistemic value. It argues that activities with constitutive aims constitute value domains in which the constitutive aims are domain-relative for-their-own-sake values. Applying this to the case of the two forms of inquiry, we get the results that knowledge and understanding are valuable for their own sake in the domains constituted by these activities. Chapter 5 argues that the two forms of inquiry constitute the epistemic domain, thus shedding light on the boundaries and the structure of the epistemic domain. Finally, it is shown that the resulting view can solve a number of so-called value problems in epistemology, including the difficult tertiary value problem according to which knowledge must come out more valuable than mere true belief as a matter of kind.

All swamping, no problem

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Bjelde
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
Better Than

Abstract The swamping problem is to explain why knowledge is epistemically better than true belief despite being no more true, if truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. But Carter and Jarvis (2012) argue that the swamping thesis at the heart of the problem ‘is problematic whether or not one thinks that truth is the sole epistemic good’. I offer a counterexample to this claim, in the form of a theory of epistemic value for which the swamping thesis is not problematic: evidence monism. Then I argue that another kind of response to the swamping problem given by Sylvan 2018 does not escape the problem unscathed, because it is not only instrumentalism that gives rise to the swamping problem. The upshot is that, given a standard account of fundamental value, the swamping problem favours evidence monism over truth monism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document