How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Matheson
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Justified Belief

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend an epistemic value pluralism according to which true belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all fundamental epistemic values. After laying out reasons to reject epistemic value monism in its central forms, I present my pluralist alternative and show how it can adequately explain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over both true belief and justified belief, despite their fundamentality. I conclude with a sketch of how this pluralism might be generalized beyond the epistemic domain to the ethical.

Epistemic value

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Luis Pinto de Sa
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Mere True Belief

Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at various formulations of the value problem and various accounts of the value of knowledge in ancient and modern philosophy. The article then considers some contemporary discussions of the value problem, including the charge that reliabilist accounts cannot account for the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Various virtue-theoretic accounts of epistemic value are discussed as possible improvements over process reliabilism, and the epistemic value of understanding (as compared to knowledge) is considered.

Through Virtues to Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-21
Author(s):  
Artur R. Karimov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Cognitive Activity ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Fundamental Value

By all accounts, virtue epistemology is making a value turn in contemporary analytic epistemology. In this article, this twist is explicated through the transformation of the understanding of epistemic values and the value of the epistemic. In the first sense, we are talking about how the view has changed on what determines the epistemic value of such categories as truth, knowledge, understanding, etc. In the second sense, we are talking about the value of our epistemic concepts (the value of the epistemic): what is true belief, knowledge, etc. for? It is shown how the causal link between our beliefs and intellectual virtues allows us to explain the nature and value of knowledge as a central category of epistemology. The author reveals the difference between the main types of virtue epistemology through the prism of two different approaches to the justification of values: value internalism and value externalism. Value externalism assumes that a state/motive/action gains value from something outside of a person's consciousness. In contrast, value internalism holds that the conditions that determine value are internal to consciousness. For reliabilism, the value of cognitive success lies in its causal connection with the reliable competences of the subject, for responsibilism – with virtuous motives of cognitive activity. Common to reliabilism and responsibilism is that they shift the focus from the value of an effect (truth) to its relationship with the value of a cause – an ability or excellent trait of intellectual character. The main approaches to substantiating the fundamental value of knowledge in virtue epistemology are analyzed. If for reliabilism the highest epistemic value is truth as cognitive achievement, then for responsibilism the value of epistemic categories is primarily in their moral significance – the achievement of a good life and happiness (eudaimonia). In conclusion, the problematic aspects of virtue epistemology are formulated and promising directions for its further development are shown.

IS TRUE BELIEF REALLY A FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC VALUE?

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-104
Author(s):  
Lance K. Aschliman
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
A Value ◽  
Fundamental Value ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Mere True Belief

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I question the orthodox position that true belief is a fundamental epistemic value. I begin by raising a particularly epistemic version of the so-called “value problem of knowledge” in order to set up the basic explanandum and to motivate some of the claims to follow. In the second section, I take aim at what I call “bottom-up approaches” to this value problem, views that attempt to explain the added epistemic value of knowledge in terms of its relation to a more fundamental value of true belief. The final section is a presentation of a value-theoretic alternative, one that explains the value problem presented in the first section while also doing justice to intuitions that may cause us to worry about bottom-up approaches. In short, knowledge and not mere true belief is a fundamental epistemic value as it is the constitutive goal of propositional inquiry.

scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Social World ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Real People ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACTIn order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldman's theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldman's theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

The Aim of Inquiry

2021 ◽  
pp. 10-42
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Detailed Case ◽  
Knowing That

Chapter 1 focuses on epistemologically substantive accounts of the aims of inquiry into specific questions. It mounts a detailed case that knowing that p/not-p is the aim of inquiry into whether p. To this end, Chapter 1 first develops two arguments that the knowledge aim of inquiry compares favourably with the main rivals in the literature, according to which the aim of inquiry is true belief or justified belief. Next, it shows how these arguments can be generalized to other views about the aim of inquiry that might be conceived. Finally, Chapter 1 responds to a number of objections to the idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry and the argument developed in support of it.

Anti-Realism, Value, Perspectivism

2019 ◽  
pp. 84-112
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Affective Responses ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
The World ◽  
World Hypothesis

If all value judgments arise from affective responses, what are the implications for judgments about epistemic value and Nietzsche’s naturalism? The chapter offers a new reading of perspectivism: while all expressions of knowledge depend on “will” or “affect,” evolutionary pressures select in favor of some of these affects, such that most “creatures like us” converge on many epistemic values, albeit not all. Beyond that baseline, the “Busy World Hypothesis” reminds us that which objects of cognition command our attention is influenced by our other affects and interests, which determines what we come to know about the world. Nietzsche emerges as an anti-realist about epistemic value, as well as moral value, defending something like the old Stevensonian view that where people share attitudes, reasoning about what one ought to do and believe is possible; where people do not share attitudes, reasoning is not possible and only force prevails in a dispute.

scholarly journals Purchase Intention of Korean Beauty Products among Undergradaute Students

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Chui Seong Lim ◽  
Jia Leng Loo ◽  
Siew Chin Wong ◽  
Kay Tze Hong
Keyword(s):  
Purchase Intention ◽  
Study Data ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Functional Value ◽  
Performance Matrix ◽  
Purchase Behaviors ◽  
Beauty Products

As one of the most growing sector, the market size of cosmetics in the Asia Pacific region and was forecasted to reach around USD 126.86 billion by 2020, accounting for 32% of sales worldwide (Statista 2019). The prestige cosmetics segment in Malaysia has reached USD 198 million in 2019 with expected yearly growth of 5% (Statista 2019). The influence of  K-Pop and K-Drama have stimulated interests  towards Korean products, especially Korean beauty products which is very popular amongst the young consumers. The purpose of present study is to investigate the influence of value factors on purchase intention among undergraduates. The study grounding on Theory of Consumption Value (TCV) of Functional Value, Social Value and Epistemic Value is to examine undergraduates purchase intention towards Korean beauty products. A sample of 351 undergraduates who aged between 18 to 26 responded to the study. Data analysis using SmartPLS reveals that Functional Value, Social Value and Epistemic Value are significant predictors of Korean beauty products purchase intention in Klang Valley Malaysia. Importance and Performance Matrix (IPMA) analysis reveals that social values having the importance performance and with more room for improvement as compared to the functional and epistemic values. This study contributes to both marketing literature and practical perspective in Korean beauty products purchase behaviors. 

scholarly journals Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 658-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Steinberger
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Methodological Principle ◽  
Epistemic Risk ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Epistemic Conservatism

Abstract Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.

EPISTEMIC VALUE AND EPISTEMIC COMPROMISE: A REPLY TO MOSS

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Konigsberg
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Arithmetic Mean ◽  
General Idea ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Rule Model ◽  
Epistemic Peers ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The Difference

AbstractSarah Moss has recently suggested that when they encounter conflict, epistemic peers should not split the difference between the credence that they each assign to some disputed proposition p, as has been suggested by conciliatory approaches to belief revision in the debate surrounding disagreement in the literature. Moss contends that an epistemic compromise between peers need not be the arithmetic mean of prior credences, in the sense that if my credence in some proposition p is x and yours is y, the credence that is the result of our compromise need not be (x + y)/2. More generally, Moss's proposal advocates an approach to how estimations of truth value, exhibited in credences, should in fact be considered in resolving conflict and disagreement. The general idea is that splitting the difference between credences may be inadequate, seeing as agents may assign different epistemic values to different credences. While novel and clearly argued, I think that Moss's proposal fails to provide entirely convincing reasons for abandoning the traditional symmetrical approach to epistemic compromise and for adopting the scoring rule model instead. I demonstrate two problems with the model that Moss advocates.

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