Counter-Majoritarian Democracy: Persistent Minorities, Federalism, and the Power of Numbers

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
ARASH ABIZADEH
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Democratic Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Democratic Equality

The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism—and even representative institutions—are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy’s core normative commitments—namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails to account for the power of numbers and thereby fails to explain the inequality faced by members of persistent minorities. Although strict majority rule serves the democratic values of political agency and equality as interpreted by a set of formal conditions, an adequate conception of power shows why in real-world conditions formal-procedural inequalities, instantiated by counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism, are sometimes required to serve democratic equality.

The Origins of the Electoral College

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-116
Author(s):  
George C. Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Complex Method ◽  
Population Differences ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Constitutional Revision

This chapter traces the origins of the electoral college. The Constitution's framers chose a unique and complex method of selecting the president—one that clearly violates fundamental tenets of political equality and majority rule. As such, this chapter considers the historical motivations behind the founding of electoral colleges, such as slavery, legislative intrigue, population differences, and voter parochialism. Afterward, it argues that most of the motivations behind the creation of the electoral college are irrelevant today and can be easily dismissed. In addition, the broad thrust of constitutional revision over the past two centuries has been in the direction of democratization and majority rule.

Democratising Moves: Power, Agency and the Body

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-17
Author(s):  
Stacey Prickett
Keyword(s):  
18Th Century ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Democratic Values ◽  
Creative Processes ◽  
American Colonies ◽  
American Values ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Masses

Abstract Recently, the word ’democracy’ has been featured prominently in the press, with calls to restore it, save it from ominous threats and expose challenges to its principles, all predicated on an assumed understanding of the concept. Many of the roots of today’s democracies reach back to the 18th century revolutions in the pre-U.S. American colonies and France, which continue to reinforce Euro-American values and ideologies of nation. The transfer of power remains a defining principle, shifting control from elites to the masses. How do the principles that inspired democratic revolutions relate to the ballot-box versions of democracy today? This article considers contemporary complexities of democracy as a concept, offering examples of how it is embodied through iconography, gestures of defiance and civil disobedience. Democratic values are explored in more formal choreography and in creative processes that establish associations with political agency.

Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Second Chamber as a Randomly Selected Assembly

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Abizadeh
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Many ◽  
Treat All ◽  
Legislative Review ◽  
Political Turn

The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative democracy: elections are a mechanism of people’s political agency and of accountability, but run counter to political equality and impartiality, and are insufficient for satisfactory responsiveness; sortition is a mechanism for equality and impartiality, and of enhancing responsiveness, but not of people’s political agency or of holding representatives accountable. Whereas the two traditional justifications initially grew out of anti-egalitarian premises (about the need for elite wisdom and to protect the elite few against the many), the justification advanced here is grounded in egalitarian premises about the need to protect state institutions from capture by the powerful few and to treat all subjects as political equals. Reflecting the “political” turn in political theory, I embed this general argument within the institutional context of Canadian parliamentary federalism, arguing that Canada’s Senate ought to be reconstituted as a randomly selected citizen assembly.

Legitimacy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule

Ratio Juris ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
WOJCIECH SADURSKI
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Political Equality

scholarly journals Democracy by Delegation? Who Represents Whom and How in European Governance

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bellamy ◽  
Dario Castiglione
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Democratic Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
European Governance ◽  
European Public ◽  
Modes Of Governance ◽  
New Modes Of Governance

AbstractThe democratic legitimacy of European governance is often said to rest on its ‘output’. However, such arguments also make the implicit ‘input’ claim that the community method and new modes of governance offer a more participatory and deliberative style of democratic politics to standard democratic processes, which is best suited to represent the European interest. We test such claims by analysing them from three different perspectives: functional, societal and delegatory. We conclude that they are grounded on a substantive conception of representation in which the agents of European governance ‘stand’ or ‘act’ for the European public. However, such claims are empty without formal democratic processes of authorization and accountability that ensure European governance effectively promotes the democratic values of political equality and responsiveness.

scholarly journals The ‘Uncle Tom’ dilemma: Minorities in power-sharing arrangements

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Fraenkel
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
New Caledonia ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy

Mandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms or to advance minority objectives and become seen as ‘Uncle Tom’ type figures who no longer represent their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

scholarly journals Is Global Capitalism Compatible with Democracy? Inequality, Insecurity, and Interdependence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen V Milner
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Global Capitalism ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Extreme Right Parties

Abstract Global capitalism seems to be placing democracy, especially liberal democracy, under considerable stress. Support for populism has surged, especially for extreme right parties with populist and authoritarian programs. Inequality, insecurity, and interdependence—all associated with globalization—have grown globally and appear to be key sources of stress. New technologies spread readily by globalization are also a force for destabilization. Do these international forces pose existential challenges to democracy? Liberal democracy rests on a foundation of political equality among citizens; it requires free and fair elections, competition among programmatic parties, political legitimacy from public support, and institutional constraints on executive power and majority rule. Is the rise global capitalism eroding all of these key elements? If so, what can be done about it?

Legal preconditions for majoritarian democracy: The case of Hungary

2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
Gábor Attila Tóth
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
New System

The Constitution of Hungary promulgated in 2011 and officially called the Fundamental law thoroughly altered the Hungarian constitutional system. Scholars encounter difficulties when attempting to label the new system. While some typologies maintain that despite its illiberalism and populism the new system meets the formal criteria of legality and democracy, others insist that it represents an abuse of democratic constitutionalism. In what follows, I put two rival conceptions of democracy into the main focus to better understand the nature of the Hungarian constitutional system and the competing scholarly positions. First, I briefly introduce the contrast between the majoritarian and what I call the complex conception of democracy. My aim is to demonstrate that even if one subscribes to a majoritarian conception of democracy, certain legal and constitutional preconditions must be fulfilled. In the following sections, I examine the case of Hungary within this theoretical framework. The Hungarian constitutional system presents itself as a winner-takes-all majoritarian democracy. Nevertheless, an analysis of the legal preconditions of democracy - constitutional text, electoral system, legal institutions, fundamental rights, and the rule of law - can demonstrate that in this system, legal mechanisms do not serve to govern the formation of a legitimate majority rule. They create instead an autocratic system, the key attribute of which is the pretence of majoritarian democracy.

Power‐sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet Formation in Twenty Democracies

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Ideal Type ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Westminster Model ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
The Ideal

THE TERM ‘MAJORITY RULE’ IS OFTEN USED EITHER AS A synonym of democracy or as one of its defining characteristics. An important contribution that the scholars belonging to the consociational school have made to democratic theory is to point out that this close identification of majorit rule and democracy is fallacious. Majoritarian democracy, of which the Westminster model is the ideal type, is not the only form of democracy; the major alternative is consociational democracy. Furthermore, majority rule is not necessarily the best form of democracy; especially in plural societies - that is, societies deeply divided by religious, ideological, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or racial cleavages into separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication - consociational democracy is the more suitable democratic model.

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