Agent of Empire? The National Bank of Turkey and British Foreign Policy

1975 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Kent

‘The National Bank of Turkey was founded in 1909 with British Government encouragement and support to further British economic enterprise in the Ottoman Empire’ so we are told in all die standard and respectable works on the subject. This is correct in form but incorrect in substance, for one cannot accept the implications it carries with it, in some cases explicitly stated. These are that, in the first place, the Foreign Office was instrumental in actually starting the Bank, in the second place, that the Bank succeeded very far in its objects, and in the third place, that it ever received much Foreign Office support in what it sought to do.

Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Potter

During the late 1930s international broadcasting was mobilized as a weapon for deployment in the coming conflict, an essential tool of propaganda. In 1938 the BBC began broadcasting to the Middle East in Arabic and to Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese. In running the Arabic Service in particular, the BBC was obliged to accept the input of civil servants from the Foreign Office and other branches of the state, particularly when it came to the editing of news bulletins. Material was carefully included and omitted to further British foreign policy goals. BBC officers sought to build up an Arabic Service that would appeal to listeners across the Middle East but made limited headway due to a lack of resources and the scarcity of listener feedback. Similarly, there seemed little evidence to suggest that the BBC Latin American Service developed a significant audience. Attempts to strengthen links between British and American broadcasters meanwhile continued. Only vestiges of wireless internationalism remained: these were years of wireless nationalism, driven by the expansion of fascist broadcast propaganda. The September Crisis of 1938 prompted the inauguration of BBC broadcasts in German, Italian, and French. In all these activities the BBC adhered closely to official policies of appeasement, and accepted government directions to avoid broadcasts that would provoke Germany and Italy. The British government also covertly broadcast to Europe from commercial stations on the Continent, particularly Radio Luxembourg, with the involvement of the Secret Intelligence Service.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Kholil Arraki

<p class="15bIsiAbstractBInggris"><em><span lang="EN-US">The purpose of this study was to determine the perception of KPI UIKA Bogor students towards the RRI Bogor Radio Pro 2 program and later in it would be known what points were the input for the programs in it. This research method uses quantitative methods, namely the method of distributing questionnaires to KPI UIKA Bogor students by using Suharsimi Arikunto's theory which takes a partial sample or representative of the population being studied. If the subject is less than 100, it is better to take all, on the contrary if the subject is greater than 100, it can be taken between 10-15%. The results obtained from the study were firstly the results of the research on the perception of UIKA KPI students on the satisfaction motive of the Pro 2 RRI Bogor program which got first place by getting a score of 550 from the results of the questionnaire answers, then the program effect dimension was ranked second with a score of 460 from the results of the questionnaire answers. In the third place, there is a motive for the respondents' knowledge of all programs in Pro 2 RRI Bogor with a score of 295. Finally, there is a motive for the general view of respondents on the Pro 2 RRI Radio Bogor which is ranked fourth with a score of 221. In general, the results obtained are known. that the listener's perception, namely the Islamic Broadcasting and Communications Students, University of Ibn Khaldun Bogor, is found in the satisfaction motive of the RRI Bogor Pro 2 Program.</span></em></p><p class="16aJudulAbstrak"><strong><span lang="IN">Abs</span><span lang="EN-US">trak</span></strong></p><p class="16bIsiAbstrak"><span lang="IN">Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui persepsi mahasiswa KPI UIKA Bogor terhadap program Radio Pro 2 RRI Bogor dan nantinya didalamnya akan di ketahui apa saja poin yang menjadi masukan untuk program-program didalamnya. Metode penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif yaitu dengan metode penyebaran angket kepada Mahasiswa KPI UIKA bogor dengan menggunakan teori Suharsimi Arikunto yang mengambil sempel sebagian atau wakil populasi yang diteliti. Apabila subyeknya kurang dari 100 lebih baik diambil semua, sebaliknya jika subyeknya lebih besar dari 100 dapat diambil antara 10-15%.</span><span lang="IN">Hasil yang diperoleh dari penelitian tersebut pertama hasil penelitian persepsi mahasiswa KPI UIKA terhadap motif kepuasan program Pro 2 RRI bogor mendapat peringkat pertama dengan mendapat skor 550 dari hasil jawaban kuesioner, Selanjutnya dimensi efek program menempati peringkat kedua dengan skor 460 dari hasil jawaban kuisoner, Kemudian di peringkat ketiga ada motif pengetahuan responden terhadap seluruh program-program yang ada di Pro 2 RRI Bogor dengan skor 295, Terakhir ada motif pandangan umum responden terhadap radio Pro 2 RRI Bogor yang mendapat peringkat keempat dengan skor 221. Secara umum, hasil penelitian yang diperoleh diketahui bahwa persepsi pendengar yaitu Mahasiswa Komunikasi dan Penyiaran Islam Universitas Ibn Khaldun Bogor terdapat pada motif kepuasan Program Pro 2 RRI Bogor.</span></p>


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 553-557
Author(s):  
Ole R. Holsti

The bifurcation of American and non-American perspectives in foreign policy analysis is a large topic to which justice cannot be done in limited space. To reduce the subject to somewhat more manageable scope, the focus here is on teaching and. more specifically, on undergraduate courses on American foreign policy. After examining some evidence that might shed light on the question, this essay will suggest some reasons, both within and outside the discipline, for this development, as well as some possible ways of avoiding undue parochialism by ensuring that non-American perspectives get some hearing.This is not the place to undertake extensive content analyses of foreign policy texts, but even a cursory glance at several recent, widely used volumes indicates that many students are exposed almost wholly to American perspectives. Materials cited in footnotes and as suggested readings are overwhelmingly written by American authors. That pattern also extends to three of the best recent collections of readings on American foreign policy. The first includes 32 essays, not one of which is by a non-American, all nine chapters in the second are by Americans, and only one of 12 essays in the third is co-authored by a foreign scholar. In fairness, it should be pointed out that these materials hardly present a homogeneous viewpoint on the sources, conduct, and consequences of American diplomacy; a collection of readings that includes essays by George Kennan, Carl Gershman, Henry Kissinger, and Stanley Hoffmann can hardly be accused of presenting a single outlook. Moreover, the diversity of choices among available texts provides a broad range of perspectives, from moderately hard-line to distinctly revisionist.


Author(s):  
Eric Kurlander

This chapter evaluates the influence of the supernatural imaginary on the Third Reich's conception of foreign policy, investment in fanciful weaponry, and use of astrology, divination, clairvoyance, and telepathy in prosecuting the war. The Second World War was neither caused nor directed primarily by occult designs. However, many aspects of the war were influenced or determined by folklore, border science, and the broader Nazi supernatural imaginary. Rather than rely on a practical evaluation of risks and rewards, Hitler frequently tapped into his own intuition in making foreign-policy decisions and appealed to the German people's collective unconscious in selling his aggressive policies. Abetting Hitler's faith-based foreign policy, the Propaganda Ministry and Foreign Office employed professional astrologers and diviners to produce wartime propaganda aimed at both the Allies and the German public. Finally, the Third Reich utilized occultism and border science to gather military intelligence, search for enemy battleships, and train Nazi soldiers.


1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart A. Rice

This paper deals with the applicability of statistical principles and methods to research in political science. The subject is virgin and comprehensive. At the outset it will be necessary to delimit the treatment to be given it here, and to state some of the premises upon which this treatment will be based.In the first place, the topic is unrelated to questions of public finance, or any of the bookkeeping aspects of government. I shall confine attention to more fundamental problems, distinctly psychological and sociological as well as political in character. These have to do with the nature and operation of forces that give rise to political activity and that determine its forms and its direction. A socio-political-psychology, quantitative in method, is the goal with respect to which orientation is sought.In the second place, only data of a kind now available for research will be considered. Every statistician will agree with Professor Merriam's demand for the development and extension of governmental reporting, but my immediate concern is with undeveloped possibilities of utilizing existing materials.In the third place, the desirability of a quantitative approach to political research problems is taken for granted. Yet the statistical method has serious limitations, not merely because it can never replace logic as a means of interpretation, but also because it is not universally available for scientific inquiry. The developments of recent years in the field of abnormal psychology, for example, have no quantitative method of discovery behind them. When subjective processes give rise to or accompany behavior, measurements of the latter may be possible.


1994 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
David Dutton

This is according to Protocol. More briefly ‘Dear Anthony meet me at Geneva. Yrs. Cleopatra’Very few of the figures who held responsibility for the making and direction of British foreign policy in the 1930s did so with much benefit to their subsequent historical reputations. Three of the four men who occupied the post of Foreign Secretary after the General Election of 1931 appeared in the cast list of the ‘Guilty Men’, vilified by the triumvirate of left-wing journalists who wrote under the pseudonym of ‘Cato’ in the dramatic summer of 1940. That vilification has been only partially redeemed by the efforts of later revisionist biographers. Certainly, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Halifax all left the Foreign Office with their political reputations lower in the public mind than at the time of taking office. The exception to this experience was, of course, the case of Anthony Eden who, at the time of his resignation in February 1938 after more than six years as a member of the National Government, stood, in Churchill's famous words, as the ‘one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender’. The making of his reputation had begun in the early 1930s when Eden occupied only subordinate office within the administration. Yet an examination of the making of British foreign policy in the years 1931–5 will show that popular perceptions of Eden's position and of an apparently serious rift between him and his departmental superior were somewhat misleading.


2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 525-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER J. BECK

Responding positively to the 1957 ‘funding experience’ initiative encouraging Whitehall departments to use history more systematically in their everyday work, the Foreign Office commissioned a pilot project centred upon the 1951 Anglo-Iranian Abadan crisis. The resulting study, completed by Rohan Butler in 1962, included a lengthy section drawing lessons from the historical narrative. During the early 1960s Butler's Abadan history, attracting interest and comment from both ministers and officials, fed into ongoing reviews of British foreign policy and methods stimulated by the 1956 Suez debacle and Britain's initial failure to join the Common Market (1963). Confronting policymakers with the contemporary realities affecting Britain's role in the world, the history prompted serious thinking about the case for a radical change of direction in both foreign policy and methods. Generally speaking, the Foreign Office has made little use of history in the actual policymaking process. From this perspective, this episode, centred upon Butler's Abadan history, offers a useful case study illuminating any appraisal of history's potential as a policy input, most notably concerning the role of historical analogies in the formulation, conduct, and presentation of British foreign policy.


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