European Union Decision-Making, Third States and Comitology

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Evans

Historically and conceptually, EU law originates in the idea that member States have approved restrictions of national sovereignty in the interests of establishing a common market. In accordance with this idea, significant elaboration or extension of these restrictions must also be approved by the member States or at least by a majority of their representatives in the Council of the Union. The implication is not only that the development of the rules of the common market is dependent on the will of the member States. The further implication is that the rules of the common market and the rules of Union decision-making are separable, in the sense that the latter rules are not affected by the former rules. While such implications are ill-adapted to the pluralist tendencies of integration processes, particularly the participation of third States (that is, non-member States) in these processes, they are confirmed by the formal structure of the EC Treaty.

Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Łazowski ◽  
Ramses A. Wessel

The Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court of Justice) decided to strike again. On 18 December 2014, for the second time in history, the Court rejected the European Union's (EU) accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although the judges do not seem to negate the idea as a matter of principle, they made the renegotiation of the Draft Accession Treaty very difficult, to say the least. The message sent by the Court of Justice to the Member States may have surprised some, but for many it was a rather expected development. The Court of Justice has always been a fierce defender and promoter of the autonomy of EU law. For that purpose, the procedure based on Article 218 (11) TFEU has been, among the others, the Court's greatest weapon. Over the years a clear pattern has emerged: Whenever there is a threat to the autonomy and to the Court's exclusive jurisdiction, the judges will not shy away from taking bold decisions going against the will of the Member States. For obvious reasons, theraison d'êtrebehind the Court's decision is kept secret behind the doors of the deliberation rooms at Kirchberg in Luxembourg. Still, it cannot be denied thatOpinion 2/13shows that the Court of Justice will not give up its resistance to the ECHR accession so easily. In 1996, in Opinion 2/94, the Court held that the European Community, as the law stood then, had no competence to accede to ECHR. Now that Article 6(2) TEU provides for an obligation to accede, subject to conditions laid down in Protocol No 8 to the Founding Treaties, the Court has opted for strict interpretation of the latter, which, ultimately turns the caveats laid down therein into locks. It is clear that these caveats turned into locks are something that the judges will hold on to in the future and, by the same token, they will happily pursue interpretation that is very different from what the Member States intended when negotiating the Treaty of Lisbon and the Draft Accession Agreement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-119
Author(s):  
Maciej Jabłoński

The organization of environmental protection in Poland and the European Union is a mutual connection of competencies and a correlation of systems and rights according to national and EU laws. The legal system of the EU is the result of decades of cooperation undertaken by the will of the Member States known as the acquis communautaire. EU law has primacy over national law, which in practice means that in the event of a conflict between the provisions of national law and EU law, the national law is deemed inapplicable and needs to be adjusted by the Member State.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Michael Heinig

Approximately ten to fifteen years ago the “danger of Europeanization” of the German law on churches and religion was hotly debated. The churches in Germany feared that the influence of the European Union would dramatically change their legal framework. But also academic writers worried about the influence of the common market law or European antidiscrimination law on the legal situation of the churches in the member states – sometimes in rather shrill tone. One almost got the impression that Brussels replaced the Marxist Ideologiekritik (critique of ideology) as the main enemy of Christianity in Europe.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-414
Author(s):  
Gérardine Garçon

The plant protection law within the European Union has been continuously developed over the past two decades. Whereas harmonized provisions for the placing of plant protection products on the common market were introduced by Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 (hereinafter the “Directive”), almost two decades later, a revision of the Directive has been passed which takes, in order to ensure consistency throughout the Member States and to provide for simplification, the form of a regulation. Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (hereinafter the “Regulation”) was adopted on 21 October 2009.


Prawo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 323 ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Andrzej Borkowski

Real property trade in the European Union and free movement of capitalThe subject matter of this article is to selectively discuss the basic factors affecting the freedom of real property trade within the common market of the European Union. The guaranties secur­ing thefreedom to acquire by union foreigners real property in the member states follow directly from the provisions of TFEU. The set of treaty regulations relating to internal market freedoms holds a key role in the process of realising the fundamental purposes of the European Union. The free movement of capital has profound meaning for the realisation of all the treaty freedoms. Deviations from the rule, which allow for limiting the freedom and which result from the will of the member states, are acceptable within the legal system of the European Union only in exceptional circum­stances provided by that law. There are two groups of conditions required for alawful deviation from the rule of the free movement of capital. The first group covers the considerations resulting directly from the Treaty. The second includes the circumstances deemed lawful pursuant to the for­mula of imperative requirements of the public interest.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.


Author(s):  
M. Krivogouz ◽  
D. Fesenko

The authors analyze current situation in the common market and the data on foreign trade of the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union. Also, the EAEU decisions in the sphere of establishing common financial space and the measures on boosting the cooperation in industry are being examined. The conclusion is made that further common steps towards higher pace of industrial cooperation are needed.


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