Warsaw Treaty Organization

1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 1075-1076
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
East Germany ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Consultative Committee ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
The Soviet Union

At a meeting in Warsaw on January 19–20, 1965, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization adopted a communiqué condemning proposals for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) multilateral force (MLF). Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union were represented at the meeting by their respective Prime Ministers and Foreign and Defense Ministers and by the First Secretaries of their Communist Parties. Albania, although invited, did not send a delegation on the ground that the meeting had been convened without prior consultation.

Warsaw Treaty Organization

1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-868
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
German Democratic Republic ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
East Germany ◽  
The Political ◽  
Consultative Committee ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Ministers

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization met in Bucharest on July 4–6, 1966. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union were represented by the first secretaries of their respective Communist parties and by their prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. Albania, which had taken no part in the work of the organization since its break with the Soviet Union in 1961 and had refused an invitation to attend the Committee's 1965 meeting, had not been invited.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-611
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

During the summer of 1953, two questions of political importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were raised. According to press reports, some NATO members felt that the Council should discuss the questions of Germany and of the policy which the west should adopt if the Soviet Union proposed full withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany as a prelude to reunification. The eventual agreement, if any were reached, was not made known, but press reports indicated that there were several obstacles to such a discussion: 1) the German Federal Republic was not a member of NATO; 2) the United States did not want to consider publicly alternatives to the European Defense Community; 3) France opposed direct entrance of the German Federal Republic into NATO; and 4)other NATO members felt that the work of the organization should be first in the military, and eventually in the economic social and cultural fields but not in the political-diplomatic field.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-655 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Annual Conference ◽  
The West ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Communist China ◽  
Test Ban

The ninth annual Conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentarians was held in Paris on November 4–8, 1963. Addressing the parliamentarians, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary-General of NATO, outlined the three essential aspects of the evolution in international relationships presently confronting the Alliance: first, relations between East and East—the rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China; secondly, relations between East and West—the questions arising from the Soviet Union's agreement to sign a partial test-ban treaty and the relations between the West and the uncommitted world; and, thirdly, relations between West and West—relations within the Atlantic Alliance itself.

Instructed Silence, Constructed Memory: The SED and the Return of German Prisoners of War as ‘War Criminals’ from the Soviet Union to East Germany, 1950–1956

2004 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA MORINA
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
East Germany ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Prisoners Of War ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Security ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
War Criminals ◽  
Nazi Past

After 1950, at least 23,000 German POWs remained in Soviet captivity as ‘war criminals’, and they were pardoned and released in several amnesties from 1950 to 1956. This article examines the political and propagandistic reactions of the ruling SED to the return of those prisoners. It analyses how the SED's attempts to reintegrate ‘war criminals’ into a socialist society related to the official politics of the past (Vergangenheitspolitik) and the construction of a memory of the Nazi past in East Germany. The SED's key strategy in dealing with these returnees – avoiding the question of individual and collective responsibility – is put into the context of the party's central ideological objective, namely to dissociate the socialist GDR from the legacy of Nazi Germany. On the basis of newly accessible documents from the archives of the former Ministry for State Security, the article also describes the intensive involvement of the Stasi in repatriation and reintegration matters at all levels of society.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-223
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military ◽  
Met Expectations

The fifteen countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by their defense ministers at a conference held in Paris from October 10 to 12, under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay (Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO). The meeting, which was attended by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, was a preliminary to the full ministerial session, to be held in December; it was the first occasion on which the NATO defense ministers met in Council without the foreign or finance ministers. A communique issued at the close of the meeting stated that the meeting had primarily been for the exchange of information, and that the ministers had heard statements on the strategic situation and on western defensive arrangements from General Sir John Whiteley (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Standing Group, and from his colleagues on the Standing Group, General Joseph Lawton Collins (United States), General Jean Valluy (France), General Alfred M. Gruenther (SACEUR), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) and several other officers. Following these statements, a useful exchange of views between the defense ministers took place, the communique concluded. It was reported that many of the speakers had concurred in the view that the military potential of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, especially in the areas of atomic weapons and submarines, that the recently announced decision to reduce the armed forces in the Soviet Union and some of the people's democracies did not modify the potential of communist forces, and that it was therefore indispensable to intensify the NATO military effort, which so far had not met expectations for it.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-484 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Press ◽  
Geneva Conference ◽  
Foreign Ministers

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Paris early in May 1959 to consider the proposals of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom for presentation to the Soviet Union at the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers. According to the press, the proposals won a favorable reception from the Council. No formal action of approval was required, but agreement was reached on the principle of a permanent liaison between the western ministers and the Council during the Geneva conference, scheduled to begin on May 11.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-658 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Joint Decisions ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Geneva Conference ◽  
Foreign Ministers

A communiqué issued by the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on May 7, 1959, expressed the Council's opinion that, on the eve of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers, the Soviet Union appeared to be misinterpreting western intentions in proceeding with the orderly development of their program for modernizing the forces of the alliance. The Council noted further that these programs for improving NATO defences were the consequence of long established NATO policies which were arrived at through joint decisions of NATO countries; moreover, they had been in the process of implementation for over two years, and therefore they could not conceivably be designed, as alleged by the Soviet Union, to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting in Geneva.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 524-526
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
High Urgency ◽  
Nuclear Missiles

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its spring ministerial meeting in Oslo, Norway, from May 8 to 10, 1961, under the chairmanship of the new Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced to the assembled Ministers of the fifteen-member alliance that his government was prepared, in pursuance of the plan announced to the NATO Council by his predecessor, Mr. Christian A. Herter, to commit five Polaris nuclear missile submarines to forces assigned to NATO. The Herter plan had been contingent upon agreement by the European members to purchase an additional 100 nuclear missiles for NATO, but according to the press, this part of the proposal was understood to have been abandoned because of European objections to the cost of such an undertaking. The submarines were to be assigned to the command of Vice-Admiral George W. Anderson, who held the dual role of Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet, based in Naples, and of the NATO Strike Force South, it was also made known. Ultimate control of the eighty Polaris nuclear warheads would, however, revert to the President of the United States. A plan for the Permanent Council of the treaty powers to review the alliance's total military situation as a matter of high urgency was tied to Secretary Rusk's announcement on the Polaris submarines. The United States Secretary of State, in addressing the Council, gave his government's views on the situation in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and South Vietnam and stated that the United States would consider it a violation of the legal situation in Berlin if the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with East Germany. Should the Soviet Union proceed to sign such a peace treaty the allies would insist on continued Western rights of access to West Berlin and would make it clear that they were prepared to resist encroachment on their position, Mr. Rusk declared.

Translation and Transformation: English-Language Children's Literature in (Soviet) Russian Guise

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Inggs
Keyword(s):  
Children's Literature ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
English Language ◽  
Children’S Literature ◽  
Socialist Realism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Free Translation ◽  
Soviet Russia

This article investigates the perceived image of English-language children's literature in Soviet Russia. Framed by Even-Zohar's polysystem theory and Bourdieu's philosophy of action, the discussion takes into account the ideological constraints of the practice of translation and the manipulation of texts. Several factors involved in creating the perceived character of a body of literature are identified, such as the requirements of socialist realism, publishing practices in the Soviet Union, the tradition of free translation and accessibility in the translation of children's literature. This study explores these factors and, with reference to selected examples, illustrates how the political and sociological climate of translation in the Soviet Union influenced the translation practices and the field of translated children's literature, creating a particular image of English-language children's literature in (Soviet) Russia.

scholarly journals The All-Buryat Congress for the Spiritual Rebirth and Consolidation of the Nation: Siberian politics in the final year of the USSR

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-71
Author(s):  
Melissa Chakars
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
The Political ◽  
Socialist Republic ◽  
Soviet Socialist Republic ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
People's Party ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Russian State ◽  
General Goals

This article examines the All-Buryat Congress for the Spiritual Rebirth and Consolidation of the Nation that was held in the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in February 1991. The congress met to discuss the future of the Buryats, a Mongolian people who live in southeastern Siberia, and to decide on what actions should be taken for the revival, development, and maintenance of their culture. Widespread elections were carried out in the Buryat lands in advance of the congress and voters selected 592 delegates. Delegates also came from other parts of the Soviet Union, as well as from Mongolia and China. Government administrators, Communist Party officials, members of new political parties like the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party, and non-affiliated individuals shared their ideas and political agendas. Although the congress came to some agreement on the general goals of promoting Buryat traditions, language, religions, and culture, there were disagreements about several of the political and territorial questions. For example, although some delegates hoped for the creation of a larger Buryat territory that would encompass all of Siberia’s Buryats within a future Russian state, others disagreed revealing the tension between the desire to promote ethnic identity and the practical need to consider economic and political issues.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document