United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Urquhart

At its founding one of the UN's most publicized advantages over its predecessor, the League of Nations, was the fact that it was a peace organization “with teeth.” This somewhat unattractive phrase referred to Chapter VII of the Charter and the possibility of military force being put at the disposal of the Security Council. In fact this provision of the Charter was one of the first victims of East-West disagreement, and, although the Military Staff Committee met regularly for many years and in the early years held voluminous discussions, the actual military arrangements foreseen in Chapter VII never became a reality. The assumption of the continuing unanimity of the great powers, which particularly affected this part of the Charter, proved to be illusory almost at once, while the idea that the Organization could not and should not take collective action against one of the great powers has continued, with the partial exception of Korea, to be respected. Thus it has become increasingly clear that the United Nations can neither deal with an aggression arising from a great-power conflict nor use the military resources of the great powers directly in dealing with other breaches of the peace, since such a use might all too easily project the great-power struggle onto the situation being dealt with. The development of new forms of peace-keeping machinery have in part been the response of the Organization to this dilemma.

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1529-1544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mai Taha

Mark Mazower's latest book,No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nationsintelligently weaves in the League of Nations as the primary informant of the United Nations to deconstruct any claims of discontinuities between the two institutions. In doing so, Mazower offers an eloquent polemic against the literature's tendency to idolize the United Nations' founding as a symbolic and material break from empire. Exploring the dark sides of its intellectual origins and early years, however, Mazower points to the decolonization movement to argue for the potential of the United Nations as a site of emancipatory struggle — his book concludes with a reinvestment in its promise of a more inclusive and just world order. The issue left to the reader, and which I hope to address in this review essay, is the legitimacy of Mazower's claim that the United Nations has indeed escaped its imperial heritage.


Author(s):  
Vijay Naidu

The Republic of Fiji is a small archipelagic state of less than a million people in the southwest Pacific. It has a relatively minuscule military force in global terms but is the largest among the island states of Oceania. The size of the Republic (formerly “Royal”) Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) in the early 21st century is due to its role in peacekeeping for the United Nations. The Fijian military became entangled in Fiji politics having usurped political power on four separate occasions in the last 30 years, and it can be unequivocally said that there has been a militarization of politics. At first, the military’s involvement in national politics was on the behest of defeated politicians but, 30 years later, the military itself has become a major political player. This is most evident by the fact that former military commanders and coup. The military has becoming a powerful player in Fiji politics has occurred in haphazard but overwhelming ways. Fiji politics has an ever-present “elephant in the room” which is the RFMF.


1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 970-981 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. R. Fox

The Security Council of the United Nations will, from the first day of its existence, include in its membership all of the great powers. The Council, backed by the united will of the five powers with permanent seats in that body, will act, if it acts at all, with an authority which no organ of the League of Nations ever possessed. In the League Council, there was no time during which all of the great powers participated. Only two of them, France and the United Kingdom, were League members throughout its period of activity. Some may believe that too high a price, or a higher price than was necessary, was paid to insure the participation of the Five Powers, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, in the United Nations Organization. The price was paid largely in provisions of its Charter relative to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security which circumscribe carefully the situations in which the Security Council can take action.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burns H. Weston

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines “legitimacy” as it applies to the rules applicable among states. “Legitimacy,” he writes, “is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with “generally accepted principles of right process.” It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the “new world order” that is claimed for tomorrow.


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 970-975
Author(s):  
James K. Pollock

With the military defeat of Germany now assured, it becomes imperative to complete plans for occupation of the country. There is apparent agreement among the United Nations that Germany must be occupied; but, although much work has been done on the subject, by both the military and political branches of the several Allied Governments, to date we have not had any general policy directives from the heads of the three great powers, namely, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Presumably, at the Teheran conference Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came to a preliminary meeting of minds with reference to the various aspects of the war against Germany. At the second Quebec conference, it may reasonably be assumed that the President and Mr. Churchill, keeping in close contact with the Soviet leader, finally came to some definite agreement regarding the measures necessary to encompass the complete defeat and occupation of Germany.It has been generally agreed all around that Germany must be occupied by the troops of the Allied Nations, but many of the specific details of such an occupation have not yet been thought through. When we speak of the occupation of Germany, we must first of all define exactly what we mean by the term Germany. It is expected that “Germany” will be understood to cover only those territories included within the Republic prior to Hitler's accession to power. It might be better to agree that the boundaries shall be understood to be those of January 1, 1932.


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-82
Author(s):  
Lily Hamourtziadou

The chapter covers the 2006-2007 period, presenting security and political developments. It contains editorials with information about weekly deaths and the author’s commentary, written as the violence occurred, providing a ‘live’ narrative of the human devastation in its context. The price of civilian life in Iraq is discussed through compensation claims that reveal the monetary value of a human life lost as collateral damage, notions of victory and the legal obligation of states to record the casualties of armed conflict. It examines regime security in weak states and its role in growing insecurity and in contributing to the creation of sectarian identities. The roots of Iraq’s current anti-government protests and general discontent are traced to the events of those early years of democracy under occupation. The chapter ends by assessing the American Surge of 2007 as part of a Western security culture where force is the solution or method of control, by applying Paul Rogers’ control paradigm that centres on the military-industrial complex and the use of military force in responding to threats. In Iraq this strategy has been proven to be, at times, insufficient in ensuring peace and stability, and, at times, the cause of further insurgency and insecurity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Tolstrup ◽  
Michael Aagaard Seeberg ◽  
Johanne Grøndahl Glavind

When autocrats face threats of nonviolent mass mobilization, they are likely to respond with repression. However, when will the autocrat initiate, step up, or downscale repressive behavior during such protest events? We propose that signals of support from great power patrons play a pivotal role in emboldening rulers to engage in and intensify repressive behavior. To probe this hypothesis, we analyze how supportive and nonsupportive actions and statements of the great powers in the United Nations Security Council shape the repressive behavior of authoritarian regimes during three recent, and similar, cases of protest events: Burma 2007, Zimbabwe 2008, and Burkina Faso 2014. The cases show that the more unequivocal and consistent patron support for the besieged regime is the firmer and more violent are the responses to the domestic challengers.


Author(s):  
Manjari Chatterjee Miller

What are rising powers? Do they challenge the international order? Why do some countries, but not others, become rising powers? Why Nations Rise answers these questions and shows that some countries rise not just because they develop the military and economic power to do so, but because they develop particular narratives about how to become a great power in the style of the great power du jour. These active rising powers accept the prevalent norms of the international order in order to become great powers. On the other hand, countries that have military and economic power but not these narratives do not rise enough to become great powers—they remain reticent powers. This book examines the narratives in historical (the United States, the Netherlands, Meiji Japan) and contemporary (Cold War Japan, post–Cold War China and India) cases to show patterns of active and reticent rising powers. It ends with lessons for how to understand two rising powers today, China and India.


Author(s):  
Malik Dahlan

The Hashemite Kingdom of Hijaz attracted little notice in the Western international legal history during its brief lifetime, and has not been much covered in the historical literature since. However, the Hijazi state is critical for international law because it stands at the intersection of Arab self-determination and Islamic statehood. Its birth in 1916 was, understandably perhaps, overshadowed by the military significance of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, and the role played in it by Colonel T.E. Lawrence. Its demise, formally declared in 1932 but inevitable after the Saudi invasion of 1924–1925, was met by silence from the members of the League of Nations despite the fact The Hijaz was one of its founding members. This neglect of the Hijazi state is unfortunate for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the earliest attempt at Arab statehood in modern international legal history, the first ethnocentric expression of Arab self-determination to be recognized by the European powers after the Great War and, as home to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it had significance for Islamic governance that is disproportionate to its economic or geopolitical value. Secondly, it presents a test for one of the most fiercely contested areas of international law: how to understand and apply national self-determination to the formation and recognition of states. In this case, the claim for self-determination is bound up with the ethnocentric awakening of Arabs, the struggle over the political and institutional forms that a collectivity should take, and what balance could be struck between Western, Westphalian views of the state and Islamic governance traditions and principles. Thirdly, it provided an early example of how small states would fare in the new international order, and the extent to which they could expect great powers to abide by international law, as it emerged from the Great War. As it turned out, Sharif Hussein’s refusal to acquiesce in the League of Nations’ mandate system, itself based on the Sykes–Picot agreement between Britain and France, coupled with his support for Arab aspirations to control Jerusalem, made the fledgling state vulnerable to imperial Realpolitik. Fourthly, the fall of The Hijaz was bound up with the fall of the Caliphate in 1924, with repercussions that are still being felt. Finally, the historical events, which did much to determine the map of the Middle East today, present a telling example of how international law functions in regions where great powers are actively competing for influence and control. This bibliography collects readings that cast light on how ideas of the nation and the state have been understood and applied, with particular reference to the Islamic collectivity, the Arabs, and The Hijaz. It is divided into two general areas. The first looks at the national aspects of self-determination and the second looks at the state as understood by international law and by Islamic jurisprudence, again with special reference to The Hijaz.


Author(s):  
Shunsuke Obiya

Abstract This article addresses debates surrounding the reform of the League of Nations from the viewpoint of Britain and China. They focused on the pros and cons of collective security because the failure of the League to stop Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Abyssinia threatened the collapse of the League. There were two contrasting visions in debates, the ‘Coercive League’ and the ‘Consultative League’. The ‘Coercive League’ was the course to reinforce collective security to prevent further aggression. Conversely, the ‘Consultative League’ argument was to weaken collective security and induce Germany, Italy, and Japan to cooperate with the League. Deliberations took place in both the Council, in which great powers exerted a strong presence, and the Assembly, in which small powers made their voices heard. Therefore, this article deals with Britain as an example of a great power and China as one of a small power.


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