The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act

2003 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen E. Schnietz

In recent research on the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), there has been no examination of the reaction of private actors to the RTAA. Did producer groups and investors in 1934 believe the Democratic RTAA was the solution to Republican protectionism, as institutional analyses of the RTAA claim, or did they realize the RTAA was no “magic bullet” against a return of protectionism, as skeptics argue? Archival data suggests that many producer groups believed the RTAA would result in durable liberalization, but that fewer understood the likely effects of its specific features. An event study of investor reaction to the RTAA reveals that export-dependent firms experienced a significant, positive stock return increase on news of the RTAA, while heavily tariff-protected firms experienced a significant stock decline, albeit several months later.

Google Rules ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Joanne Elizabeth Gray

This chapter evaluates Google’s approach to copyright enforcement across its own platforms. Increasingly, Google self-regulates and negotiates with rightsholders to privately devise copyright rules. Google then deploys algorithmic regulatory technologies to enforce those rules. Indeed, over the past decade, Google has developed a range of algorithmic tools it uses to deter copyright infringement, enforce copyrights, and remunerate rightsholders. These activities limit transparency and accountability in digital copyright governance and privilege private interests and values over the public interest. In a digital environment dominated by powerful private actors, the use of algorithmic regulatory systems poses a critical problem for public rights and democratic, accountable systems of governance, now and into the future.


Author(s):  
Paul Kemp ◽  
Rebecca Galemba

In this article, illicit trade and smuggling refer to the unauthorized sale, purchase, exchange, or transport of goods, persons, animals, or technology across borders. Illicit trade across borders may entail goods considered dangerous, those that circumvent prohibitions in one or both countries, or mundane items and population movements that evade controls or regulations. However, smuggled goods may be produced, consumed, or recirculated legally, informally, or illegally. Lacking a universal, global set of norms and regulations across time, much of what is considered to be illicit trade may be legal in one place while prohibited in another, or tolerated in one time and banned in another. The forms smuggling takes and its profitability are shaped by regulations, their inconsistent application, and their differences across different regulatory spheres. Illicit trade often dovetails with legal global trade; forms of integration from below may proceed alongside, compete with, resist, or even complement and foster legal global economic flows. Power relations, within countries and wielded by more powerful nations with influence to shape trade agreements, trade policies, financial norms, and global prohibition regimes, normalize the kinds of international trade considered legal and beneficial and foster the criminalization of competing alternatives. Yet, such norms are not necessarily widely shared or consistently applied and implemented. Individuals engaging in forms of illicit trade and smuggling may not share the perspective of states or international organizations regarding the morality and legitimacy of their actions. Scholars contend that perceptions of illicit trade risk perpetuating seeing like a state, making historical and comparative perspectives paramount. Not everything the state does is moral and not every aspect of illicit trade is amoral. This may pertain especially with respect to the marginalized; extra-legal trade may provide a mode of subsistence, and state regulations may be experienced as selective, predatory, and protective of elite privilege and prevailing arrangements of inequality. States have the power to determine what is legal or criminal in the first place. Yet critical perspectives also point to how states and elite actors may benefit not only from forms of corruption, but also from illicit trade more broadly such that illicit trade is constitutive of state power, bureaucratic expansion, and international norms. Debate persists regarding whether illicit markets stabilize, build, compete with, or destabilize governance arrangements. Scholars also disagree whether illicit trade has grown, facilitated by globalization, or whether perceptions of this rising threat are shaped more by questionable numbers, state/private interests, and changing prohibitions.


Author(s):  
Regina Sandra Kusuma

This study aims to analyze the Indonesian hotel stock price performance during the pandemic of Covid-19 by testing the effect of Covid-19 pandemic on stock return and abnormal stock return. The data were collected from secondary data at www.finance.yahoo.com, Indonesian hotel companies stock period from 26 February 2020 to 2 March 2020 during the pandemic of Covid-19. Further, the data were analyzed by using Event Study Methodology to examine the effect of Covid-19 pandemic on Indonesian hotel stock return and abnormal return. The result of this study finds that there is stock reaction after the announcement of Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia during 15 days after the announcement. Also in this research, can be found a relationship between the stock condition with the pandemic. This research can be used as a reference for investors for their investments by looking at the relationship between the Indonesian hotel companies stock and pandemic of Covid-19.


The study focuses at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in India and explains the shareholder’s value creation using stock return data from 2005 to 2016. The data analyzed with the use of market model of event study. The deals classified into cash-financed and stock-financed on the basis of mode of payment. The results suggest that the reaction towards the M&As announcements are spontaneous in Indian economy and the shareholders gaining positively around the M&As announcement on an average. Shareholders of cash financed deals are creating more value than that of the stock financed deals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 169
Author(s):  
Dylan Siong-Yain Chen ◽  
Venus Khim-Sen Liew

This study examines the effect of Unusual Market Activity (UMA) announcement on stock return in Malaysian market with a sample of 62 companies listed on the ACE market at Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2007-2015. This study employs event study methodology to show that there were few days in which the average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) are statistically significant. In addition, this study also further investigates the abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for individual companies. It was found that majority of the stocks returns fell significantly 30 days after the UMA announcement. The magnitude of the fall in returns ranges from 4% to 234%. Hence, it is not advisable for investors to buy stock after UMA announcement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Dinh Bao Ngoc ◽  
Nguyen Chi Cuong

<p>We study the impact of dividend policy on the stock return by investigating reaction of the stock price on the dividend announcement date and the ex-dividend date.<strong> </strong>In order to achieve this goal, a sample comprising 1962 observations of dividend-related events from 432 listed companies in Vietnam during the period 2008 to 2015 is chosen to analyze and the event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal returns to the shares around the announcement date and the ex-dividend date. Our results clearly show that the effect of dividend announcement on the stock return is positive around the announcement date. In addition, the stock price moves up as long as the ex-dividend date approaches and then starts decreasing from this date onwards.</p>


2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Passananti

Notwithstanding the Dííaz regime's slogan ““poca políítica, mucha administracióón,”” in Porfirian Mexico financial policies were fashioned by politics, by unstable alliances between public officials, local elites, and foreign investors. However the nature of those relationships is the subject of much current research and debate. This essay argues against the view of recent scholarship that financial politics was dominated by private actors, claiming instead that the Porfirian government enjoyed a surprising degree of autonomy from financiers, an autonomy it deployed to advance initiatives to stimulate growth while protecting the banking system from speculation and uncertainty. The claims are based on a careful examination of the politics and the political economy of financial reforms undertaken in the 1890s by the Porfirian government. The essay shows that the Mexican government was not hamstrung by private interests, but rather designed and implemented laws to dynamize the economy, shield it from the high costs of volatility, and increase the sources of public finance. A pesar del lema del réégimen de Dííaz, ““poca políítica, mucha administracióón,”” en el Mééxico porfiriano las polííticas de finanzas fueron diseññadas por la políítica, por las alianzas inestables entre funcionarios púúblicos, éélites locales, e inversionistas extranjeros. Sin embargo, la naturaleza de aquellas relaciones es el tema de debate de mucha de la investigacióón actual. Este ensayo se opone a la visióón de trabajos recientes que postulan que la políítica financiera fue dominada por participantes privados, afirmando en cambio que el gobierno porfiriano disfrutóó de un grado sorprendente de autonomíía de los inversionistas; una autonomíía que se desarrollóó para impulsar iniciativas que estimularan el crecimiento y a la vez protegieran el sistema bancario frente a la especulacióón y la incertidumbre. Este argumento estáá basado en un examen cuidadoso de la políítica y la economíía políítica de las reformas financieras emprendidas en los añños 1890 por el gobierno de Porfirio Dííaz. El ensayo muestra que el gobierno mexicano no fue zarandeado por los intereses privados, sino que diseññóó e implementóó leyes para dinamizar la economíía, protegerla de los altos costos de la volatilidad, y aumentar las fuentes de la finanza púública.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-409
Author(s):  
Sawidji Widoatmodjo Et al.

It isn’t easy to define whether a stock return is determined by a certain factor or exchange day. There were many researches that proved that some influenced stock returns. There were also many researches gave facts that stock returns were caused by specific exchange days, such as week day effect. This research tries to track this logic. We tested the impact of gossips—thatspread out through social media—tostock return and persistence of theimpact. To anticipate the impact of exchange days, this research also included them as control variables. Multivariate statistic technique and combined with event study were used as analysis technique. The result suggests that the gossips in social media don’t show significance to influence the stock return, and no persistence to exist. The conclusion is that gossips in social media can’t be used to determine stock returns.


2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 580-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN-ULRICH ROTHACHER

ABSTRACT: The Brazilian government has over the past years promulgated a mix of orthodox and heterodox policies for Brazil's economic development. This paper seeks to test whether the existing economic ideas have been prescriptive in formulating the policies, or whether they have been the outcome of the "infusion of private interests" (Katzenstein, 1978) in the policy making process. To this end, the paper charts the origins of the unilateral opening for trade in the agribusiness and contrasts them with the policy process in the car industry, where trade barriers have been erected. The article will identify the channels through which private actors informed the government's interventions and show that the industry bodies have largely prodded the government. The resulting policy maze has left both the representatives of the orthodox as well those of the heterodox approach unsatisfied and has failed to halt Brazil's dwindling manufacturing capabilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-42
Author(s):  
Sofia Ranchordás ◽  
Ymre Schuurmans

This article discusses the growing trend to employ private parties as informants, private detectives and providers of digital technology (e.g., automated risk assessments) to predict and investigate welfare fraud. In this article, we argue that this type of outsourcing is problematic for multiple reasons. First, private actors and governments often have an ill-defined contractual relationship which creates legal uncertainty and promotes the use of unconventional evidence-gathering instruments. This issue also raises concerns regarding the accountability of public bodies and the transparency and fairness of administrative procedure. Second, the private enforcement of anti-fraud regulations is susceptible of endangering the adequate pursuit of the public interest due to the misalignment of public and private interests. Third, the outsourcing of enforcement tasks to private technology companies and their opaque automated systems can be detrimental to the right to due process, the right to non-discrimination, and the privacy of welfare recipients. This article contributes to the literature with a novel critical account of how private actors are reshaping the welfare state.


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