Keeping the Peace Between Egypt and Israel, 1973–1980

1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nissim Bar-Yaacov

Third party involvement in keeping the peace in the Middle East has been a constant phenomenon accompanying the vicissitudes of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the war of 1948 up to the present day. The dominant pattern has been the employment of United Nations forces and observers, charged with supervising either the implementation of Security Council resolutions calling for the cessation of hostilities, or the implementation of agreements reached between the parties concerned. The uninterrupted presence of UN personnel in the Middle East has shown that the international community as a whole and the parties in conflict have considered UN peacekeeping essential for reducing tensions and instrumental in bringing to an end local flare-ups. It was only natural that immediately after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 the states actively involved in the pursuit of peace should rely on the establishment of effective UN supervisory machinery to monitor the execution by the parties of the various security arrangements agreed upon. A United Nations Emergency Force was accordingly dispatched to the Egyptian-Israeli sector and undertook the task of supervision, with the cooperation of observers belonging to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. However, foreseen and unforeseen problems arose in the process leading from one disengagement agreement to another and to the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel of March 1979.

Author(s):  
Bakare Najimdeen

Few years following its creation, the United Nations (UN) with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), as a multilateral mechanism geared at fulfilling the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which empowered the Security Council to enforce measurement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Since its creation, the multilateral mechanism has recorded several successes and failures to its credit. While it is essentially not like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years and have emerged as a new form of diplomacy. Besides, theoretically underscoring the differences between diplomacy and foreign policy, which often appear as conflated, the paper demonstrates how diplomacy is an expression of foreign policy. Meanwhile, putting in context the change and transformation in global politics, particularly global conflict, the paper argues that traditional diplomacy has ceased to be the preoccupation and exclusive business of the foreign ministry and career diplomats, it now involves foot soldiers who are not necessarily diplomats but act as diplomats in terms of peacekeeping, negotiating between warring parties, carrying their countries’ emblems and representing the latter in resolving global conflict, and increasingly becoming the representation of their countries’ foreign policy objective, hence peacekeeping military diplomacy. The paper uses decades of Pakistan’s peacekeeping missions as a reference point to establish how a nation’s peacekeeping efforts represent and qualifies as military diplomacy. It also presented the lessons and good practices Pakistan can sell to the rest of the world vis-à-vis peacekeeping and lastly how well Pakistan can consolidate its peacekeeping diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Sabine von Schorlemer

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage by extremist non-State actors—be it by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, or Boko Haram in Nigeria—is on the rise. Using the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali in 2012–13 as a case study, this chapter argues that the creation of the self-proclaimed independent State of ‘Azawad’ in Mali became a ‘test case’ for the United Nations’ will and capacity to prevent further destruction of world cultural heritage, and it also analyzes the legal foundation of the 2013 French military Operation Serval in Mali. It also discusses the responsibility to protect as applied to cultural heritage, evaluates the subsequent deployment of the United Nations MINUSMA, and evaluates the mandate given by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), the first in UN history that included comprehensive protection of cultural and historical sites as a task of a UN peacekeeping operation. Therefore, the chapter reviews critically not only the mandate of MINUSMA, but also its potential relevance concerning future culture-embedded UN peace missions, and also contributes to the debate of the usefulness of more ‘robust’ cultural protection action by the United Nations.


1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 534-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Lapidoth

Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and have agreed “that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (article 24 of the U.N. Charter). The question may be asked whether the Security Council lived up to this responsibility during the May 1967 crisis in the Middle East which preceded the Six Day War. Did the Security Council do everything in its power to avoid the clash, and what were the reasons for its failure to avert the crisis?In order to be able to evaluate the Council's stand, it will be necessary to recall summarily the developments which led up to the hostilities of June 1967, as well as the Security Council's powers under the Charter of the U.N.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Griffiths ◽  
Sara Jarman ◽  
Eric Jensen

The year 2020 marks the twentieth anniversary of the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1325, the most important moment in the United Nations’ efforts to achieve world peace through gender equality. Over the past several decades, the international community has strengthened its focus on gender, including the relationship between gender and international peace and security. National governments and the United Nations have taken historic steps to elevate the role of women in governance and peacebuilding. The passage of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 foreshadowed what many hoped would be a transformational shift in international law and politics. However, the promise of gender equality has gone largely unrealized, despite the uncontroverted connection between treatment of women and the peacefulness of a nation. This Article argues for the first time that to achieve international peace and security through gender equality, the United Nations Security Council should transition its approach from making recommendations and suggestions to issuing mandatory requirements under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. If the Security Council and the international community believe gender equality is the best indicator of sustainable peace, then the Security Council could make a finding under Article 39 with respect to ‘a threat to the peace’—States who continue to mistreat women and girls pose a threat to international peace and security. Such a finding would trigger the Security Council’s mandatory authority to direct States to take specific actions. In exercising its mandatory authority, the Security Council should organize, support, and train grassroots organizations and require States to do the same. It should further require States to produce a reviewable National Action Plan, detailing how each State will implement its responsibilities to achieve gender equality. The Security Council should also provide culturally sensitive oversight on domestic laws which may act as a restraint on true gender equality.


1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amos Shapira

More than a year has passed since the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, concerning the “grave situation in the Middle East”. On the basis of this resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations designated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as a Special Representative “to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement…” It is not proposed here to analyze all the political and diplomatic aspects of the Resolution or its practical prospects to bring about peace in the Middle East. Nor is it proposed to advance any particular interpretation of its substantive contents or to assess its merits and shortcomings. The sole purpose of this article is to examine the legal nature and implications of the Resolution within the framework of the United Nations Charter.Intellectual curiosity and academic research are not the only motivations for this legal inquiry. Sceptics of the political relevance of such “theoretical” inquiry need only obtain the November 24, 1968 issue of Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-353 ◽  

During its 1180th meeting held on December 18, 1964, the Security Council had before it the report by the Secretary-General on the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus for the period September 10–December 12, 1964. The object of the meeting was to determine, on the basis of the report, whether or not it was desirable to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond its expected date of expiration on December 25, 1964. At the President's invitation, Spyros Kyprianou, Foreign Minister of Cyprus; Orhan Eralp (Turkey); and Dimitri S. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 73-83
Author(s):  
Jorge Luis Silva González ◽  
Orelvis Gener Crespo ◽  
Pedro Alejandro Vigil García

The United Nation Security Council, although it has been the most reformed organ of the Organization, does not currently respond to the claims of democracy of the international community. In this regard, this article proposes four theoretical legal assumptions that should underpin the democratization of the aforementioned organ, regarding the structure and operation established by the UN Charter. The use of applicable methods in the Legal Sciences allowed the formulation of the postulates, among them: the recognition of the perspective of democracy in the UN Charter, and the transformation of the voting system into non-procedural matters and in relation to the processes of reform and revision of the UN Charter.


2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-48
Author(s):  
Sava Savic

Taking an action by the international community, individual states or their organizations with the aim of protecting citizens in some country from the tyranny of their own authorities has been defined as a humanitarian intervention. According to international law the use of power as an instrument in international relations is, however, prohibited and therefore, any approach to humanitarian intervention is stretched out between the challenges of moral responsibility and limitations of legislature. The subject of discussion in this article is the legislative aspect of humanitarian intervention by force. The research is focused on law and legitimating of humanitarian intervention by force without the United Nations Security Council approval. .


Author(s):  
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen

Chapter 4 applies the proportionality model to two cases of IO exceptionalism at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. First, it explains the normalization of the Council’s self-asserted emergency power to act as a global legislator. After 9/11, the Council, for the first time, decreed abstract, general, and indefinite rules to the entire international community. Despite opposition in the aftermath, it was capable to arrogate a permanent de facto legislative competence by credibly justifying the measures as necessary. Second, the chapter accounts for the constitutional containment of the Council’s regime of targeted sanctions against terror suspects. Through Resolution 1390 (2002), the UN Security Council implemented the so-called “terror lists” financially sanctioning all listed individuals without providing for a legal remedy. Against the preferences of the most powerful states, a coalition of societal actors and courts successfully induced procedural improvements by delegitimizing the measures as excessive.


2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-141
Author(s):  
Amanda Bills

The article examines the relationship between third-party countermeasures and the Security Council’s powers to adopt measures under Chapter vii of the United Nations Charter in response to breaches of obligations erga omnes. It is shown that the resort to third-party countermeasures is neither precluded nor subject to limitations as a result of the relationship to the Security Council’s Chapter vii powers, even when both types of measures are adopted concurrently. Moreover, the fears that third-party countermeasures would interfere with or undermine the effective application of Security Council measures do not appear to have materialised in practice.


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