The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aharon Barak
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Revolution ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Normative Value

In March 1992, Israel underwent a Constitutional Revolution. In March 1992, two new Basic Laws were passed: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Under these new Basic Laws, several human rights — among them Dignity, Liberty, Mobility, Privacy, Property — acquired a constitutional force above the regular statutes. Most of these rights were already protected, prior to the constitutionalization. While a few were protected by the legislator, most were protected by the case law of the Supreme Court, developed by some of our greatest judges since the establishment of the State. The main difference made by the Basic Laws is the strengthening of the normative value of these rights. A regular Knesset (Parliamentary) statute can no longer infringe upon these rights, unless it fulfils the requirements of the Basic Laws (the ‘limitation clause’) namely, it befits the values of the State of Israel, it was passed for a worthy purpose and the harm caused to the constitutional Human Right is proportional to the purpose. Thus, we became a constitutional democracy.

Enforcement of Divorce Judgments in Jewish Courts in Israel: The Interaction Between Religious and Constitutional Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Coercive Measures ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Do So

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.

Human Dignity and Its Impact on German Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Lagodny
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Protection Of Life

Since 1992, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has been in force in Israel. Its purpose according to sec. 1 is: “to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”. In sec. 2 and subsec. it guarantees: preservation of life, body and dignity (sec. 2); protection of property (sec. 3); protection of life, body and dignity (sec. 4); personal liberty (sec. 5); leaving and entering Israel (sec. 6) and privacy (sec. 7). The guarantees in sec. 2 and subs. might thus be seen as a concretization of art. 1. Here we have already an interesting parallel to constitutional theory in Germany. Human dignity is the article with which our constitution begins. The following guarantees may be seen — asDürigalready pointed out in the 1950's — as an emanation of human dignity with its main aspects of freedom/liberty (Art. 2 German Basic Law [GBL]) and of equality (Art. 3 GBL).

Constitutional revolutions: Israel as a case-study

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Sapir
Keyword(s):  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Legal Literature ◽  
Sense Of Security ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Severe Erosion ◽  
False Sense ◽  
Constitutional Revolution ◽  
State Of Israel

From its foundation in 1948 and until the 1990s, the State of Israel lacked a formal Bill of Rights. Although the Declaration of Independence had promised a constitution, a series of obstacles prevented its adoption. In the intervening years, several attempts to anchor a Bill of Rights in a Basic Law met with failure.In 1992, the Knesset adopted two Basic Laws dealing with human rights. The Supreme Court used these laws as a platform for creating a full-fledged Bill of Rights, and Israeli scholars helped to expedite this process. And yet, despite extensive academic discussion of these developments, the dearth of legal literature remains conspicuous on one question: How did it happen? How is it that after forty-four years of failures and parliamentary paralysis, the Knesset suddenly voted in favour of anchoring a Bill of Rights in Basic Laws?In this article, I examine four possible explanations. The first attributes these developments to the successful exploitation of a constitutional moment that reflected a severe erosion of public trust in politics. The second pins success on the tactics adopted by the proponents of the law. Instead of insisting on the adoption of a complete Bill of Rights, they split it into small sections and worked to enact only the consensual ones. According to the third thesis, the adoption of these laws was enabled by their proponents’ failure to expose the full import of this move, thereby lulling their traditional opponents into a false sense of security. According to the fourth explanation, success resulted from two major shifts in Israeli politics. The first was the Labor Party’s loss of hegemony and the ensuing uncertainty regarding the identity of future coalitions, and the second was the strengthening of sectorial elements that threatened the dominance of the secular bourgeoisie. The first shift weakened the coalition’s inherent resistance to the constitutionalization of the political system, and the second neutralized the institutional interest of Knesset members representing the old elites against the constitutional project.Finally, my conclusion points out that these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and all the elements they consider joined together to bring about the ‘constitutional revolution’, as it came to be known.

PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Finance ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

7 The Supreme Court and Northern Ireland

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Good Friday ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Good Friday Agreement

This chapter begins by considering the arms trial in the early 1970s and outlines the gist of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 before considering the challenge to that Agreement dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Boland case. There follows an examination of the Court’s views on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in McGimpsey v Ireland, decided in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and on the constitutionality of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in the Riordan case. There is an analysis of Law Enforcement Commission’s report and of the Court’s views on resulting Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975. The focus next moves to the shifting views of the Supreme Court on when it is appropriate to extradite suspected terrorists to Northern Ireland. Cases concerning Dominic McGlinchey, Séamus Shannon, Robert Russell, Dermot Finucane and Owen Carron are examined, as is the state of extradition law today.

The Application of Presumptions to the Derivative forms of an Offence

1968 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Z. Feller
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Of Israel

Both the facts of The State of Israel v. Siman Tov, and the solution adopted in that case by the Supreme Court, raise, it is felt, a number of legal problems which warrant particular attention.The respondent, Siman Tov, owner of a grocer's shop, sold goods worth IL. 6,000 on credit to someone called Pressman. When Siman Tov requested payment from Pressman, the latter offered him U.S. $4,000 which Siman Tov was to deposit with a third party of his own choice in return for a loan of IL. 12,000, on the understanding that Siman Tov would deduct the money owing to him from this last sum and hand over the balance of IL. 6,000 to Pressman. Siman Tov accepted the offer and received from Pressman a package containing 4,000 ostensibly genuine dollar banknotes. He then approached a neighbour, Binat, who agreed to accept the dollars as security for a loan of the equivalent sum in Israeli pounds. On examining the package and finding that the dollars were counterfeit, Binat returned them to Siman Tov and refused to go on with the transaction. Siman Tov for his part had believed the notes to be genuine until Binat's disclosure.

Historical Adjudication: Courts of Law, Commissions of Inquiry, and “Historical Truth”

2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Jesus Christ ◽  
The State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Commissions Of Inquiry ◽  
Historical Truth ◽  
State Of Israel

When the State of Israel was established and the Supreme Court inaugurated in Jerusalem, dozens of Christian clerics implored President Smoira to allow the Supreme Court, as the successor of the Great Sanhedrin, the supreme Jewish court during the time of Roman rule, to retry Jesus Christ and thereby rectify the injustice caused to him.

Israeli Law and Jewish Law — Interaction and Independence: A Commentary

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 525-536
Author(s):  
Eliav Shochetman
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
The State ◽  
Jewish Law ◽  
Major Question ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
The World ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Opening Section

The focus of the article written by my colleague, Prof. Brahyahu Lifshitz, was the extent of the influence of Jewish law on the legal system of the State of Israel during the forty years since its establishment. In my view, a symposium on “Forty Years of Israeli Law” ought also to include a study of the innovations and developments which have taken place within Jewish law during this period, since to a certain extent, Jewish law is an integral part of Israeli law. A comprehensive analysis of this issue is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one major question should be dealt with, i.e. to what extent does the legal system of the State find expression in modern Rabbinical case law? Has the new political reality of statehood, achieved after many centuries of exile, and the ramifications of this reality in the field of law, in any way affected modern Rabbinic decisions in the years following the establishment of the State—decisions which are meant to reflect the changes and developments that have taken place in the world of Jewish law?In the opening section of his article, Prof. Lifshitz describes the influence of Israeli law upon Jewish law in the following terms: The generally accepted view is that Jewish law does not respond to, nor is shaped by, developments in the legislative or judicial organs of the State of Israel.

Some New Emphases in Extradition Case Law

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.Z. Feller
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
District Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Of Israel

In Azen v. State of Israel, the Supreme Court heard the appeal of a person who had been declared extraditable to France for offences of stealing by an agent and fraud, committed, according to the request for extradition, in France. One of the pleas raised against the decision of the District Court, in which Azen was declared extraditable, was that the specialty limitation was not guaranteed in the Extradition Treaty between Israel and France, as required by sec. 17 (a) of the Israeli Extradition Law, 1954. This section states unequivocally that —A wanted person shall not be extradited unless it has been ensured, by an agreement with the requesting State, that he will not be detained, tried or punished in that State for another offence committed prior to his extradition;whereas in art. 17 of the said Treaty, specialty is guaranteed in the following words: L'individu qui aura été délivré ne pourra ni être poursuivi ou jugé en sa présence ni être, détenu …i.e. under the Treaty, the specialty limitation is restricted, from the procedural point of view, to those processes involving physical, personal enforcement against the subject of extradition—he will not be “summoned” for interrogation, nor judged “in his presence”, nor “detained”; the Extradition Law, however, contains no such restriction, with the exception of detention which, by its very nature, requires physical enforcement.

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