Effects of Matrimonial Causes Legislation in Botswana

1974 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. G. Himsworth

As in other former British territories in Africa, the means of introducing a system of common-law rules into Botswana (then the Bechuanaland Protectorate) was the so-called “reception statute”. This was the device whereby at a particular date the laws of one country (usually England) were “received” wholesale by the colonial territory subject to various conditions contained in the reception statute itself. For Botswana, as for the other former High Commission Territories, Lesotho and Swaziland, it was not the English common law that was introduced but rather the law prevailing in the several parts of what is now South Africa. The General Law Proclamation of 19092 had the effect of introducing the Roman-Dutch law from the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Cape statutes promulgated after the date of reception were expressly declared not to be applicable in the territory, whilst amendment of the received law by local statutes was, of course, possible.

1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. R. Venour

As the Writ System that prevailed in England until the nineteenth century defined particular rules and procedures for each Form of Action, so today our modern causes of action take to themselves a host of idiosyncratic details. Until recently the common law had long conceived of tort and contract law not as parts of a general law of obligation but as separate bodies of rules divided by a boundary wall that kept each from invading the territory of the other. New developments in the law have breached this wall in places and allowed tort to intrude into domains traditionally ruled by contract. But this process is far from complete, and many differences still remain between actions in contract and tort.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor

The realization that the directors occupy important position in corporate governance, and as business men and women, cannot be prevented from having dealings with the company, demand a close scrutiny of corporate transactions in which they are directly or indirectly involved or have an interest to ensure that such interest is not placed above their duty to the company. One of the ways in which the law strives to achieve this balance is by imposing a duty on the director to disclose to the board any interest he has in company’s transactions. This requirement which was previously governed by the common law and the company’s articles, is presently increasingly finding a place in companies statutes in different jurisdictions. The paper examines, through a comparative analysis, the provisions on the duty of the director to disclose interest in company’s transactions in South Africa and United Kingdom with the aim of discovering the extent to which the statute in both jurisdictions upholds the common law prescriptions. The paper argues that the need for transparency in corporate governance and the preservation of the distinct legal personality of the company demand that the duty to disclose interest should be upheld even in those cases of companies run by a sole director.


Author(s):  
Stannard John E ◽  
Capper David

This chapter discusses the nature of termination for breach. Termination for breach can be seen both as a process and as a remedy. Traditionally, the topic has been dealt with under the broader umbrella of ‘discharge’, alongside such topics as performance, frustration, and agreement. Problems arise, however, when the notion of discharge is pressed too far; in particular, the idea of the contract ‘coming to an end’ can be a misleading one, and has given rise to various errors and misconceptions. For this and other reasons, more emphasis is now given to termination in the context of remedies. Termination can be one of the most useful weapons in the armoury for the victim of a breach of contract, not least because, unlike many other remedies, it does not require recourse to the courts. However, this notion of termination as a remedy should not obscure the close relationship between termination and the other modes of discharge, most notably frustration. The chapter then looks at the problems in this area of the law, including problems of terminology, the different ways in which common law and equity have approached the question, and the relationship between discharge and damages. It also considers the most important aspects of the right to terminate, including the right to refuse performance.


Author(s):  
Stannard John E ◽  
Capper David

This chapter discusses express rights of termination. It is not always easy for a party to know for certain whether they are entitled to terminate or not. This is particularly so where the right in question depends on proof of fundamental breach or repudiation. For this reason, parties to a contract frequently, in the interests of certainty, make express provision for this by agreeing in advance that one or both of them may terminate if certain conditions are met. Such express rights of termination can depend on a wide variety of contingencies, but very frequently these will include a breach by the other party. Where this is the case, it is often difficult to distinguish termination under the express right from termination under the general law, particularly where the latter involves termination for breach of condition. The chapter then assesses four key issues with regard to express rights of this sort, most notably: (1) the relationship between express rights of termination and conditions at common law; (2) the requirements for the exercise of such rights; (3) the effect of termination under such a right; and (4) the problem of concurrent rights of termination.


Author(s):  
Max Loubser ◽  
Tamar Gidron

Both the Israeli and the South African legal systems are classified as mixed legal systems, or mixed jurisdictions. In Israel, tort law was originally pure English common law, adopted by legislation and later developed judicially. In South Africa, the law of delict (tort) was originally Roman-Dutch but was later strongly influenced by the English common law. Under both systems, tort law is characterized by open-ended norms allowing extensive judicial development. This paper traces and compares the structural basis, methodology, policy, and trends of the judicial development of state and public-authority liability in the Israeli and South African jurisdictions. Specific factors that have impacted the development of state- and public-authority liability are: (1) constitutional values, (2) the courts’ recognition of the need for expanded protection of fundamental human rights and activism towards achieving such protection, (3) the multicultural nature of the societies, (4) problems of crime and security, and (5) worldwide trends, linked to consumerism, toward the widening of liability of the state and public authorities.Within essentially similar conceptual structures the South African courts have been much more conservative in their approach to state liability for pure economic loss than their Israeli counterparts. This can perhaps be attributed to a sense of priorities. In a developing country with huge disparities in wealth, the courts would naturally be inclined to prioritize safety and security of persons above pure economic loss. The South African courts have been similarly more conservative in cases involving administrative negligence and evidential loss.The development of the law on state and public-authority liability in Israel and South Africa is also the product of factors such as the levels of education, the effectiveness of the public service, and the history and pervasiveness of constitutional ordering. Despite important differences, the law in the two jurisdictions has developed from a broadly similar mixed background; the courts have adopted broadly similar methods and reasoning; and the outcomes show broadly similar trends.


1902 ◽  
Vol 70 (459-466) ◽  
pp. 66-74

Since the second half of the last century chemical statics and dynamics have developed into a veritable science of their own. The general law governing velocity of chemical reaction and chemical equilibrium in homogeneous systems is now known as the law of action of mass; the law governing velocity of physical or molecular transformations in heterogeneous systems proves also to be of a general and simple nature: the velocity is directly proportional to the surface of contact of the reacting parts and to the remoteness of the system from the point of equilibrium;! the velocity of chemical reaction in heterogeneous systems and chemical equilibrium in heterogeneous systems represent no phenomena sui generis , and the laws governing them are only combinations of the other two laws mentioned.


1940 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-221
Author(s):  
S. A. Rochlin

Writing about life in Mecca in 1884–5 Professor C. Snouck Hurgronje made this observation: ”A class of Jâwah who dwell outside the geographical boundaries but who in late years have made regular pilgrimages to Mekka are people from the Cape of Good Hope. They are derived from Malays, formerly brought to the Cape by the Dutch, with a small mixture of Dutch blood. Some words of their Malay speech have passed into the strange, clipped Dutch dialect of the Boers. On the other hand they have exchanged their mother tongue for Cape Dutch, of course retaining many Malay expressions. Taking into consideration the genuinely Dutch names of many of these Ahl Kâf (as they are called in Mekka) one is tempted to believe that degenerated Dutch have been drawn by them into their religion, and many types among them increase the probability of this suggestion. Separated from intercourse with other Moslims they would scarcely have had the moral strength to hold their religion had not eager co-religionists come to them from abroad. When and whence these came is not known to me; however this may be, the mosques in Cape Colony have been more fervently supported in the last twenty years than ever before, more trouble is taken in teaching religion and every year some of the Ahl Kâf fare on pilgrimage to the Holy City.“


1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-375
Author(s):  
Serjeant A. M. Sullivan

Forty years ago in my old country the legal world was in a state of transition. The old order was changing in a great number of ways. The Judicature Act had just got into swing and although four Courts still opened in the hall beside the Liffey they were soon to be fused into one. These were at that time the Court of Chancery, the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas, and the doors of these four opened on the Central Hall and their names stood over them. The Court of Chancery stood by itself, but it was thought in those days that you had your choice of three Common Law Courts in which to have your case tried. If you had some merit on your side but thought that the law was against you, you issued your writ in the Queen's Bench, which was presided over by Mickey Morris, as he was invariably called although he was a lord, because Mickey had a good deal of common sense, a great deal of humanity, but his ideas of jurisprudence were peculiarly his own. On the other hand, if you were strongly of opinion that however iniquitous your client was, he had the law on his side, you issued your writ in the Court of Exchequer, presided over by Christopher Palles, the greatest judge before whom I have ever appeared. Christopher Palles decided according to what he believed to be the law, and would pay no attention to any other consideration that might be advanced before him.


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
José Luis Bárcenas-Puente ◽  
Miguel Ángel Andrade-Oseguera

In simple terms, a shareholder is a person who puts their money at risk by providing it to a business, what we call investment, which, if it generates profits, these are distributed in proportional parts to each partner, called dividends. In this way, the payment of dividends to shareholders represents the fair remuneration to the risk assumed. Dividend income is regulated in the Law on Income Tax and its correlation with the General Law of Commercial Companies, through precise guidelines. However, average business practice does not follow these provisions. Indeed, shareholders have money during the year in amounts on considerable amounts, without following any legal formality; thus facing fiscal and financial consequences. On the one hand, then, there is a reasonable right to remuneration and, on the other hand, compliance with the law. That is why alternatives to the old problem, of the checks without verification, set up as fictitious dividends.


Obiter ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
RB Bernard ◽  
MC Buthelezi

Children are considered to be vulnerable, and therefore need to be protected against parents, strangers and even themselves. As a consequence, the State’s quest for the protection of children in South Africa is expressed in the implementation of legislation designed to offer greater care and protection. For instance, section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, offers a wide range of rights which are designed to offer greater protection to children. The rights of children can, in effect, be categorized into two themes. The first relates to the protection of children – as the child is dependent on those around him or her due to a lack of capacity, and is therefore vulnerable. The second theme relates to the autonomy of children. Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that in any matter concerning a child, the best interests of the child are of paramount importance. However, most South African legislative provisions that deal with minor children seem to miss this principle, and are riddled with inconsistencies. In many statutes, where the principle is recognized, there is either limited appreciation of the significance of the principle and its overall impact on issues concerning children, or there is no coherence with the manner the courts have interpreted and applied the principle. For example, the recent judgment of  the Teddy Bear Clinic case declared sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act unconstitutional. The judgment has been heavily criticized by different segments of society for encouraging teens to engage in wanton sexual intercourse, but illustrates some of the flaws in legislation aimed at protecting the welfare of minor children in South Africa. Furthermore, the common law and other legislation such as the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, the Marriage Act, and provisions of the Children’s Act regulating contraceptives and condoms, all contain such inconsistencies. For instance, the common law and section 24 (together with s 26) of the Marriage Act allow a minor from the age of puberty to enter into a valid marriage; section 129 of the Children’s Act requires that a minor aged twelve be assisted by a guardian to undergo a surgical operation; whereassections of the Choice Act do not require parental consent for terminating a minor’s pregnancy. This note reviews the above and other inconsistences currently prevalent in the law of the child in South Africa. A brief overview of the Teddy Bear Clinic case will be considered. Thereafter, it outlines and examines various gender-based contradictions in the law, and examines the possible rationale for justifying the particular legislative measure concerned. The note concludes by proposing possible solutions to the discrepancies that have been identified.


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