9. Devolution in Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland has had a devolved legislature and government, off and on, since 1921. This chapter first examines the nature of the devolution arrangements in place between 1921 and 1972 and then explains what was done to keep Northern Ireland running during the periods of direct rule from Westminster and Whitehall between 1972 and 1999 and between 2002 and 2007. The third section looks at how devolution operated under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement from 1999 to 2002 and from 2007 to 2017. The chapter then considers the reasons for the failure since 2017 to get devolution re-established and concludes by canvassing what the future constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland might be. Taken in the round, Northern Ireland’s experience of devolution during the past 98 years has been very troubled. Brexit, alas, seems unlikely to make it less so in the years ahead.

5. The Internationalization of Public Law and its Impact on the UK

Municipal public law (by which is meant the public law of national or sub-national polities, including but not limited to local government) is always influenced by events taking place elsewhere in the world and the activities and norms of other polities. For example, the existence of a state depends at least partly on its recognition by other states, and political theories and legal ideas have always flowed across and between regions of the world even if they provoked opposition rather than adoption or adaptation. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, this, any state has good reasons for controlling the introduction of foreign legal and constitutional norms to its own legal order. It is important to check that the norms are compatible with one’s own national values and interests before allowing them to operate within one’s own system. A state which values a commitment to the rule of law, human rights, or democratic accountability is entitled to place national controls over potentially disruptive foreign influences. This chapter considers the nature and legitimacy of those national controls, particularly as they apply in the UK, in the light of general public law standards, bearing in mind that influences operate in both directions, not only between states but also between municipal legal standards and public international law.

8. The Foundations of Justice

Everybody agrees there is broad consensus that the constitutional principle of judicial independence is important. In relation to the core judicial functions of hearing cases and writing judgments, the central meaning and application of the principle is fairly straightforward: people holding public office (politicians, parliamentarians, and officials) must refrain from interfering with judicial decision-making in individual cases; and judges should be protected from illegitimate pressure from the news media and other organizations. But hearings and judgments do not ‘just happen’; they have to be facilitated by a wide array of institutions and processes (the justice infrastructure), covering matters as diverse as court buildings, litigation procedures, judicial careers, and legal aid. In the absence of a codified constitution, in the United Kingdom the justice infrastructure is set out in Acts of Parliament, delegated legislation and ‘soft law’ (including the 2003 ‘Concordat’). The day-to-day running of the justice infrastructure can be understood in terms of who carries out functions related to the administration of justice—the judges, government (in particular, the Lord Chancellor), functions shared between judges and government, and functions given to arm’s length bodies. Periodically, the justice infrastructure is reshaped. This is a constitutionally significant activity that may take place in different settings—the political environment, expert environments, and blended environments. The day-to-day running of this infrastructure, along with its periodic reshaping, presents numerous and complex challenges for a legal system intent on respecting judicial independence and facilitating access to justice.

6. Parliament: The Best of Times, the Worst of Times?

Parliament fulfils functions that are long-standing, but its relationship to government has changed over time. It has been criticized for weakness in scrutinizing legislation, holding government to account, and voicing the concerns of the people. Despite changes in both Houses in the twentieth century, the criticisms have persisted and in some areas Parliament has seen a constriction in its scope for decision-making. The twenty-first century has seen significant steps that have strengthened both Houses in carrying out their functions, the House of Commons in particular acquiring new powers. Members of both Houses have proved willing to challenge government. It remains a policy-influencing legislature, but a stronger one than in the preceding century. While strengthening its position in relation to the executive, it has faced major challenges in its relationship to the public. It has seen a greater openness in contact with citizens, but has had to contend with popular dissatisfaction and declining levels of trust.

4. Brexit and the UK Constitution

This chapter is, for obvious reasons, not a modification of the chapter from the previous edition. It is a completely new chapter, which considers the effect of Brexit on the UK constitution. There is discussion of the constitutional implications of triggering exit from the EU, and whether this could be done by the executive via the prerogative, or whether this was conditional on prior legislative approval through a statute. The discussion thereafter considers the constitutional implications of Brexit in terms of supremacy, rights, executive accountability to the legislature and devolution. The chapter concludes with discussion as to the paradox of sovereignty in the context of Brexit.

2. Parliamentary Sovereignty in a Changing Constitutional Landscape

Parliamentary sovereignty is often presented as the central principle of the United Kingdom’s constitution. In this sense, it might be thought to be a constant: a fixed point onto which we can lock, even when the constitution is otherwise in a state of flux. That the constitution presently is—and has for some time been— in a state of flux is hard to dispute. Over the last half-century or so, a number of highly significant developments have occurred, including the UK’s joining— and now leaving—the European Union; the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998; the devolution of legislative and administrative authority to new institutions in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh; and the increasing prominence accorded by the courts to the common law as a repository of fundamental constitutional rights and values. Each of these developments raises important questions about the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The question might be thought of in terms of the doctrine’s capacity to withstand, or accommodate, developments that may, at least at first glance, appear to be in tension with it. Such an analysis seems to follow naturally if we are wedded to an orthodox, and perhaps simplistic, account of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which the concept is understood in unyielding and absolutist terms: as something that is brittle, and which must either stand or fall in the face of changing circumstances. Viewed from a different angle, however, the developments of recent years and decades might be perceived as an opportunity to think about parliamentary sovereignty in a different, and arguably more useful, way—by considering how the implications of this still-central concept are being shaped by the changing nature of the constitutional landscape within which it sits. That is the task with which this chapter is concerned.

10. Devolution in Scotland

Scotland’s devolved Parliament and Government were established in 1999 under the Scotland Act 1998. The current devolved arrangements build upon earlier institutional arrangements for the distinctive governance of Scotland, elements of which date back to the Union of 1707. By creating both a distinct legislature and separate institutions of political representation for Scotland, the 1999 reforms were nevertheless of profound constitutional significance. This chapter traces the development of devolved government in Scotland, arguing that the history of Scottish devolution is best understood as a response to nationalist sentiment: the assertion of the right of the people of Scotland to self-governance and self-determination. The historical trajectory has been one of increasing autonomy and constitutional recognition, and this pattern has continued since 1999 (culminating in an—unsuccessful—referendum in 2014 on the question whether Scotland should become wholly independent of the United Kingdom). However, despite the extensive powers enjoyed by, and the political importance of, the Scottish Parliament and Government, the status of devolution within the United Kingdom constitution is ambiguous and contested. The chapter also explores the constitutional status of devolution across two dimensions: the juridical—i.e. how the powers of the Scottish Parliament and Government are understood and interpreted by the courts; and the political—how the devolved Scottish institutions relate to their counterparts at UK level. The chapter ends by exploring how the tensions between Scotland’s powerful political claims for constitutional recognition, yet weak legal protection, have played out in relation to Brexit, and may play out in future in a Scottish political context still dominated by the independence question.

7. The Executive in Public Law

This chapter focuses on the executive, the branch of government responsible for initiating and implementing the laws and for acting where necessary to secure the interests of the state. We trace its development out of a medieval model of government structured around the king and his court, to a modern world of offices exercising executive functions, grouped under the legacy term ‘the Crown’. The resulting institutions display a complicated pattern of law and custom, and legal concepts and principles relate to them often in convoluted ways. Our analysis focuses on how executive power is normally understood from the legal point of view—deriving from an authorizing statute via rules made within a government department to eventual application by subordinate officials or agents—and traces some of the ways the courts monitor that process. But we also examine the executive’s non-statutory or ‘prerogative’ powers, the two main compartments of which are treated separately, as the general executive powers and the general administrative powers of the Crown respectively.

3. Human Rights and the UK Constitution

UK law relating to civil liberties and human rights has undergone radical transformation over the last few decades, in part because of the influence exerted by the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) on British law. The Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA’), which incorporates the civil and political rights protected by the ECHR into national law, now plays a key role in the UK’s constitutional system. It complements legislative mechanisms for protecting individual rights—such as the Equality Act 2010 —and imposes significant constraints on the exercise of public power. However, the current state of UK human rights law is controversial. The HRA is regularly subject to political attack, while leading politicians bemoan the influence exerted by the ECHR over UK law: yet no consensus exists as to how human rights should best be protected within the framework of the British constitution. It remains to be seen whether Brexit will change the dynamics of this debate.

12. The Relationship between Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary

When examining the recent evolution of the Constitution, it is argued that the UK has become more ‘legal’ as opposed to ‘political’. The last twenty years has seen a growth in legislation and case law, particularly that of the Supreme Court, regulating aspects of the UK constitution. This chapter investigates this claim. It argues that, whilst we can point to a growth in both legislation and case law, when we look at the case law more closely we can see that the courts balance an array of factors when determining how far to control executive actions. These factors include an analysis of the relative institutional features and constitutional role of the legislature, the executive and the courts. This evidence, in turn, questions the traditional understanding of the separation of powers as a hidden component of the UK constitution. It is not the case that courts merely balance the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty in order to determine how far to control executive actions. Rather, the courts determine how to make this balance through the lens of the separation of powers, evaluating institutional and constitutional features. In doing so, they are upholding necessary checks and balances in the UK constitution.