Retrospective Economic Voting and the Intertemporal Dynamics of Electoral Accountability in the American States

2014 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1102-1115 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Krause ◽  
Benjamin F. Melusky
Keyword(s):  
Economic Voting ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
American States ◽  
Intertemporal Dynamics

scholarly journals Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 1076-1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Hicks ◽  
Alan M. Jacobs ◽  
J. Scott Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Economic Voting ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Electoral Accountability

Economic Voting during the AKP Era in Turkey

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Erdem Aytaç
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Economic Evaluations ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Positive Economic ◽  
Subjective Evaluations ◽  
State Of The Economy ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Socio Demographic Factors

Economic voting, that is voters’ rewarding or punishing the incumbent according to the state of the economy, is one of the main approaches to voting behavior. This chapter explores economic voting during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era in Turkey. Drawing on data from five nationally representative surveys fielded between 2007 and 2019, it finds that voters’ evaluations of the economy are a significant predictor of voting for the AKP. Even after accounting for several socio-demographic factors, ideological self-positioning, and partisanship, individuals with more positive economic evaluations are more likely to vote for the AKP. These findings hint at the presence of electoral accountability through economic voting in the Turkish context. At the same time, however, there is a significant and growing divergence in economic evaluations across partisanship—evaluations of AKP partisans are consistently more positive than those of other voters, and the magnitude of this gap in evaluations has been increasing since 2007. Given this increasing influence of partisanship on perceptions of the economy, voters’ subjective economic evaluations may not correspond to objective economic conditions. As the gap between subjective evaluations and objective conditions widens, we can expect weakened electoral accountability for actual economic outcomes.

Decentralization and Electoral Accountability

10.1068/c0981 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 318-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago-Peñas ◽  
Santiago Lago-Peñas
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Clarity Of Responsibility ◽  
Regional Elections

On the basis of aggregated and individual-level survey data of national and regional elections in Spain, this paper analyzes how economic voting is impacted by vertical and horizontal dimensions of clarity of responsibility. Our findings suggest that economic voting is enhanced when mechanisms of accountability are simple.

Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes

2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY HELLWIG ◽  
DAVID SAMUELS
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Relative Impact ◽  
Attribution Of Responsibility ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Democratic Performance ◽  
Presidential Systems

Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems – the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems – affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance.

scholarly journals Keeping up with the Joneses: Relative economic voting, electoral participation, and reference points

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Beomseob Park
Keyword(s):  
Voter Turnout ◽  
News Media ◽  
Important Implication ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Do So

This research explores the role relative economy plays in vote choice and turnout. The decision to vote and for whom to vote are heavily predicated on selecting competent policymakers based on their performance handling the economy. To do so, voters must infer the leader's competence based on observations of the economy. I argue that voters can better extract the 'competence signal' by comparing their own economy with the economies of reference countries that share a great deal of familiarity, similarity and connectivity. A relatively strong economy signals incumbent competence whereas a relatively poor one signals their incompetence, and thus, incumbent vote share and voter turnout should be a function of the relative economy. By selecting appropriate reference points from news media in 22 different languages from 33 democracies, this research demonstrates that incumbents tend to be rewarded with increasing vote shares for out-performing growth and are punished for growth that under-performs relative to reference economies. It also reveals that the relatively poor economy makes voters alienated and indifferent from politics, which eventually leads them to abstain from voting. This research has an important implication for democratic electoral accountability; despite frequent instability between the economy and vote choice, this research reaffirms democratic theorists by showing that elections offer citizens periodic chances to change policymakers.

scholarly journals Much More Than Economy: Assessing Electoral Accountability in the CEE Member States

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
Andrea Fumarola
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Political Context ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Media System ◽  
The Media ◽  
European Election ◽  
Free Media

Abstract Electoral accountability is considered the mechanism through which voters hold governments responsible for their performance. Questioning the traditional approach of economic voting theory, the article focuses on the influence exerted by the political context—comprehensively considered as government clarity of responsibility, availability of governing alternatives, electoral formula, and freedom of the media—on the accountability mechanism in eleven countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Using individual and aggregate data collected after the 2014 European Elections by the European Election Study (EES), the present article analyses this process in its double dimension of answerability and enforcement (Schedler 1999). Our findings suggest that voters’ ability to express discontent with economic performance in new European democracies is strongly influenced by specific characteristics of the political context. A stable and cohesive government as well as a free media system, in particular, seem to facilitate performance voting in the region.

Severed Linkages: Distorted Accountability in Uneven Regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (10) ◽  
pp. 1314-1350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan T. Hiskey ◽  
Mason W. Moseley
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Minimal Level ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Perceived Performance

Though a general consensus exists regarding the significance of perceived performance in voters’ evaluations of incumbent governments, much of the research underlying this consensus has been carried out across political systems with little internal variance in the degree of democracy. We propose that in emerging regimes, where such uniformity in terms of the territorial diffusion of democracy is not a given, characteristics of subnational political regimes can prevent electoral linkages from forming. Specifically, we argue that in subnational contexts where some minimal level of political competition has taken hold, performance-based linkages such as those driving economic voting should surface. However, in subnational dominant-party systems, where clientelistic linkages between voters and political bosses tend to prevail, economic performance and other aspects of an incumbent’s governance record will be less consequential for the voting calculus of citizens, in both provincial and national elections. We find support for this theoretical framework in Argentina and Mexico, two democratic countries characterized by highly uneven subnational political contexts. By highlighting how subnational regime characteristics facilitate or undermine electoral accountability mechanisms, we cast light on the very real representational consequences of uneven democratization in emerging regimes.

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