The Possibility of an Agreed Ethics

Philosophy ◽  
1946 ◽  
Vol 21 (78) ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
A. C. Ewing
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Way

The editor suggested my writing an article on the question whether it was possible to provide an ethics based upon principles which would be agreed to by all enlightened men, and he further suggested that I should begin the article by stating clearly what morality is. That is a somewhat difficult task, because while “morality” might be defined as “living as one ought,” it is a very disputable question whether and how this “ought” is itself to be defined, and I could not undertake to deal with this question by the way as an introduction to an article on something else. It is, however, clear that there is another sense of “ought” besides the strictly moral sense. We do use the term in cases where it does not entail that a man is neglecting his moral duty if he does not do what he “ought.” For instance we say: “You ought to have seen that film,” “You ought not to have made that move,” “You ought to have seen through that argument,” even “Hitler ought to have invaded England after Dunkirk” where we should have regarded it as the reverse of a good thing if he had done what we say he ought. In none of these cases are we asserting a moral obligation. For we do not ordinarily regard people as under a moral obligation to seek their own pleasure, nor to make certain moves in a game, and while we should say that in matters of serious concern a person is morally obliged to do his best to form a true view as to the merits of a relevant argument, we should not say that he was morally obliged actually to form a true view, for this does not depend solely on his will. And in the fourth instance the action is one which we should think morally wrong rather than morally obligatory. What is there in common between “ought” as used in these cases and the moral “ought”? It is that in each case the action fits the situation, either wholly, or with certain limitations, as in the last instance where we presumably mean that to invade England would have fitted in better with Hitler's ends in the given environment than did the policy Hitler actually adopted.

scholarly journals THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL VIEW

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Chris O. Abakare
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
New Form ◽  
Kantian Deontology ◽  
Ethical View

<span lang="EN-US">Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics</span>

scholarly journals The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Chris O. Abakare
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
New Form ◽  
Kantian Deontology ◽  
Ethical View

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.

scholarly journals Moral hypocrisy and the hedonic shift: A goal-framing approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siegwart Lindenberg ◽  
Linda Steg ◽  
Marko Milovanovic ◽  
Anita Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Situational Cues ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Goal Framing ◽  
Normative Consensus ◽  
Moral Stance ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

The most investigated form of moral hypocrisy is pragmatic hypocrisy in which people fake moral commitment for their own advantage. Yet there is also a different form of hypocrisy in which people take a moral stance with regard to norms they endorse without thereby also expressing a commitment to act morally. Rather they do it in order to feel good. We call this hedonic moral hypocrisy. In our research, we posit that this kind of hypocrisy comes about when people’s overarching goals are shifted in a hedonic direction, that is, in the direction of focusing on the way one feels, rather than on moral obligation. Hedonic shifts come about by cues in the environment. People are sometimes sincere when expressing a moral stance (i.e. they mean it and also act on it), and sometimes, when they are subject to a hedonic shift, they express a moral stance just to make them feel good. This also implies that they then decline to do things that make them feel bad, such as behaving morally when it takes unrewarded effort to do so. In two experimental studies, we find that there is such a thing as hedonic moral hypocrisy and that it is indeed brought about by hedonic shifts from cues in the environment. This seriously undermines the meaning of a normative consensus for norm conformity. Seemingly, for norm conformity without close social control, it is not enough that people endorse the same norms, they also have to be exposed to situational cues that counteract hedonic shifts. In the discussion, it is suggested that societal arrangements that foster the focus on the way one feels and nurture a chronic wish to make oneself feel better (for example, in the fun direction through advertisements and entertainment opportunities, or in the fear direction by populist politicians, social media, economic uncertainties, crises, or wars and displacements) are likely to increase hedonic hypocrisy in society.

scholarly journals ¿Es posible reclamar un supuesto derecho a ser desgraciados? El “mundo feliz” de la eugenesia

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Jorge Sierra Merchán
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Engineering ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Human Genome ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Hereditary Diseases ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Future

ResumenEn la discusión sobre las implicaciones éticas de la ingeniería genética, es común establecer una diferencia entre eugenesia negativa y eugenesia positiva. La eugenesia negativa está conformada por procedimientos orientados a corregir defectos genéticos, es decir, a evitar o minimizar la trasmisión de enfermedades hereditarias. La eugenesia positiva consiste en potenciar u optimizar caracteres que se consideran deseables (belleza o inteligencia). Una cosa es reparar, con fines terapéuticos, un error genético y otra cosa es mejorar genéticamente un rasgo que se considera bueno y deseable. En este sentido cabe preguntarse: ¿hay un deber moral de evitar, mediante la ingeniería genética, que los niños nazcan con discapacidades y no se les condene a una vida de desgracia? ¿O hay también un deber moral equivalente de garantizar que los niños posean belleza e inteligencia? El presente texto busca responder ambas cuestiones mediante una evaluación de los argumentos en pro y en contra de la eugenesia desarrollados por Singer y Nussbaum. Sostendré que hay una obligación moral de aplicar la eugenesia negativa, mientras que tal obligación no es extensiva para el caso de la eugenesia positiva. Esto implica que no es posible exigir un presunto derecho a ser desgraciado ni desde el punto de vista de los padres ni desde el punto de vista de los futuros hijos para el caso de la eugenesia negativa, en tanto que para el caso de la eugenesia positiva el derecho a ser desgraciados parece ser más defendible. Palabras clave: Eugenesia, genoma humano, principio preventivo, Singer, Nussbaum**********************************************************Is it possible to claim a alleged right to be disgraced? The “happy world” of eugenicsAbstractIn the discussion about the ethical implications of genetic engineering it is usual to distinguish between negative and positive eugenics. Negative eugenics refers to genetic imperfections correction procedures, which aim to avoid or minimize the transmission of hereditary diseases. Positive eugenics consists in the improvement or optimization of features considered desirable (as beauty or intelligence). One thing is to repair, for therapeutic purposes, a genetic error, and another to genetically improve a feature considered good and desirable. In this sense one could ask if it is a moral duty to avoid, through genetic engineering, impairments in newborns, saving them from an unfortunate life; and if there is also an equivalent moral duty to guarantee that children possess beauty and intelligence. This paper aims to answer both questions through an evaluation of the arguments for and against eugenics proposed by Singer and Nussbaum. I will hold that though there is a moral obligation to apply negative eugenics, this kind of obligation is not present in the case of positive eugenics. This implies that it is not possible to demand a presumed right to be miserable, either from the parent’s or the future children’s point of view, in the case of negative eugenics, although this presumed right to be miserable seems to be more defensible in the case of positive eugenics. Key words: Eugenics, human genome, preventive principle, Singer, Nussbaum.**********************************************************É possível reclamar um alegado direito a ser desgraçado? O “mundo feliz” da eugenesiaResumoNa discussão sobre as implicações éticas da engenharia genética é frequente estabelecer uma diferenciação entre eugenesia negativa e eugenesia positiva. A eugenesia negativa está conformada pelos procedimentos orientados a corrigir defeitos genéticos, ou seja, evitar ou minimizar a transmissão de doenças hereditárias. A eugenesia positiva consiste em potenciar ou aperfeiçoar caracteres que se consideram desejáveis (beleza ou inteligência). Uma coisa é reparar, com fins terapêuticos, um erro genético, e outra coisa é melhorar geneticamente um traço que se considera bom ou desejável, Nesse sentido é possível perguntar: há o dever moral de evitar, mediante a engenharia genética, que as crianças nasçam com incapacidades e não sejam condenados a uma vida de desgraça? Ou há também um dever moral equivalente de que as crianças possuam beleza e inteligência? O presente texto procura responder ambas as questões mediante uma avaliação dos argumentos em prol e em contra da eugenesia desenvolvidos por Singer e Nussbaum. Vou suster que há uma obrigação moral de aplicar a eugenesia negativa, enquanto que tal obrigação não é extensiva para o caso da eugenesia positiva. Isto implica que não é possível exigir um pressuposto direito a ser desgraçado nem desde o ponto de vista dos pais nem desde o ponto de vista dos futuros filhos no caso da eugenesia negativa, em tanto que no caso da eugenesia positiva o direito a ser desgraçados parece ser mais defendível. Palavras chave: Eugenesia, genoma humano, princípio preventivo, Singer, Nussbaum.

On the Identity Theory of Truth

Philosophy ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
JC Beall
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Way

In his recent ‘A Prolegomenon to an Identity Theory of Truth’ (Vol. 74, 1999) Stewart Candlish discusses the so called identity theory of truth. His aim in the article is to clear away initial difficulties that apparently stand in the way of developing the budding theory. There is one difficulty, however, that, by Candlish's lights, cannot be overcome—at least not easily. My aim in this paper is to help the identity theory by showing that, pace Candlish, the given difficulty is merely apparent. I do not ‘solve’ the alleged problem; I dissolve it. Dissolution, however, is solution enough.

God and Objective Moral Values

1985 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-549
Author(s):  
Robert Gascoigne
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
General Context ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
General Description ◽  
Human Response ◽  
Individual Action

For some moral philosophers the question ‘Why be moral?’ is fundamentally inappropriate, since it seems to ask for non–moral reasons or motivations for moral action and thus to threaten the integrity and autonomy of morality. Yet the question ‘Why be moral?’ need not be oriented towards discovering non–moral reasons for moral action, but rather towards elucidating what general description of the human condition is most compatible with the fundamental character of morality. Rather than leaving the moral sense as an isolated category of human response, it is relevant to ask what other features of reality it may be associated with and in what general context it can most coherently be situated. The purpose of this paper is to examine the sense of moral obligation as an objective or categorical claim on individual action and to present the thesis that this moral sense is most intelligible within a theological context.

Clients Toward Whom a Social Worker Feels Attraction

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-169
Author(s):  
Joseph Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Social Work ◽  
Social Workers ◽  
Social Worker ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Working Relationship ◽  
The Social ◽  
Positive Feelings ◽  
The Way

The broad nature of the social work profession offers opportunities for practitioners to work with diverse clients. While committed to the welfare of all clients, social workers tend to be drawn to some clients more than others, due in part to their abilities to connect with them. A social worker’s positive feelings about his or her clients is a good thing, but it is possible that at times he or she will experience a special fondness or attraction for a client that can create biases that get in the way of a constructive working relationship. The purposes of this chapter are to explore the circumstances in which positive feelings about clients develop and to suggest ways for social workers to manage those feelings in a way that keeps their focus on the client’s welfare.

Political Obligation

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos
Keyword(s):  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Additional Reason

There are good, prudential reasons to obey the law. The prospect of punishment, not to mention loss of reputation and social exclusion, is enough for most any citizen possessed of a suitably far-sighted self-interest to discharge his or her legal duties. But is there a moral obligation to do what the law requires, just because the law requires it? If the answer is yes and the mere illegality of an act renders its performance prima facie morally wrong, political obligation obtains. Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an action or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. But law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behavior and compelling acts and omissions that people tend to think of as morally discretionary. In such cases, the sole source of one’s moral duty to comply with the law is one’s political obligation.

If I could only make a decree

1971 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-149
Author(s):  
David R. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Total Population ◽  
Junior High ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
College Teachers ◽  
Mathematics Educators ◽  
The Way

President of state mathematics council cannot make decrees, and that is a good thing! I am pleased that I do not have that power- and yet, if I did, I would make but one decree. This dec ree would affect all mathematics educators in the nationelementary, junior high, econdary, and college teachers! That's the way decrees hould be made. They should affect the total population.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

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