The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (92) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Copleston
Keyword(s):  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Sixth Century ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Individual Substance ◽  
Rational Nature

I. In the early part of the sixth century a.d. Boethius defined the person as “an individual substance of rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as “substance” is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.

John Paul II in the Light of Thomas Aquinas

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51
Author(s):  
Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Human Being ◽  
John Paul Ii ◽  
Human Worth

In the quest to understand the meaning of existence, the human being is torn between many choices, exposed to individualism of all forms, especially atheistic perspectives. John Paul II’s personalism in the light of Thomas Aquinas’ personalistic notion of mercy suggests an alternative of meaningful living, co-existence, and holistic transcendence. John Paul’s search for the basis on which individual and social rights may grow and enhance human dignity demonstrate the ontological human worth. Following Aquinas’ model, John Paul shows that human dignity takes precedence over all options and needs preservation. Similarly, Aquinas’ classification of the human person as “rational subsistent” portrays this dignity in “effective mercy” that allows one to thrive in all kinds of existential vicissitudes. This essay explores John Paul’s personalist notion of mercy reflecting Aquinas’ model in the contemporary milieu in view of holistic existence.

The Immortality of Man

1941 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-427
Author(s):  
Jacques Maritain
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Soft Or ◽  
The World

Let us think of the human being, not in an abstract and general way, but in the most concrete possible, the most personal fashion. Let us think of this certain old man we have known for years in the country, —this old farmer with his wrinkled face, his keen eyes which have beheld so many harvests and so many earthly horizons, his long habits of patience and suffering, courage, poverty and noble labor, a man perhaps like those parents of a great living American statesman whose photographs appeared some months ago in a particularly moving copy of a weekly magazine. Or let us think of this certain boy or this girl who are our relatives or our friends, whose everyday life we well know, and whose loved appearance, whose soft or husky voice is enough to rejoice our hearts. Let us remember—remember in our heart—a single gesture of the hand, or the smile in the eyes of one we love. What treasures on earth, what masterpieces of art or of science, could pay for the treasures of life, feeling, freedom and memory, of which this gesture, this smile is the fugitive expression? We perceive intuitively, in an indescribable not inescapable flash, that nothing in the world is more precious than one single human being. I am well aware how many difficult questions come to mind at the same time and I shall come back to these difficulties, but for the present I wish only to keep in mind this simple and decisive intuition, by means of which the incomparable value of the human person is revealed to us. Moreover, St. Thomas Aquinas warns us that the Person is what is noblest and most perfect in the whole of nature.

scholarly journals El entendimiento agente según Tomás de Aquino

2002 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Juan F. SELLÉS
Keyword(s):  
Saint Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Body ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Knowledge

The "intellectus agens" is the zenith of the theory of the human knowledge according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is personal in each human being: one with the being of the human person. Separated from the body, without mixture with it, impassible and always in act. Innate cognoscitive light. It proceeds from God, and from Him it participates natural and supernaturally. Through the "intellectus agens" we are free and responsible. It permits to know everything, because it activates the different human cognoscitive faculties. It uses the innate habits as instruments. It is perpetual, but after this life it will no know as now.

scholarly journals Hombre, persona y dignidad Man, Person and Dignity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Ramos Rosete
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Saint Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
Human And Social Sciences ◽  
Social Discipline

Toda disciplina de tipo humanista o de carácter social asume como uno de sus presupuestos fundamentales una noción de lo que es el ser humano. Llevar a cabo una reflexión de tipo filosófico sobre las nociones de hombre, persona y dignidad se vuelve imprescindible para aclarar elementos antropológicos que son fundamentos teóricos de las ciencias humanas y sociales. La palabra “hombre” admite significados que en parte coinciden y en parte difieren con la noción de persona. La expresión “persona humana” no es siempre una redundancia. Siguiendo el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, que distingue entre las nociones de hombre y persona, la subsistencia de la persona humana se vuelve fundamento de la dignidad humana y fuente de los derechos humanos.All humanist or social discipline assumes as one of its fundamental principles an idea of what human being is. Accomplishing a philosophical reflection about the man notions, person and dignity become essential to clarify antropological elements which are theorical fundaments of human and social sciences. The Word man accepts meanings that are partly the same and partly different with the concept of human person, in some way, is not totally a redundancy. Following Saint Thomas Aquinas´s thought who distinguishes between the notions of man and person, it is noted that the subsistency of the human person turns into the human dignity basis and source of all human rights.

scholarly journals Biopolitica e persona

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriano Pessina
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Intrinsic Quality ◽  
Person Characteristics

La Dichiarazione universale dei Diritti dell’uomo del 1948 dell’ ONU ha posto in termini politici, e non soltanto filosofici o religiosi, al centro stesso della logica della cittadinanza l’affermazione della dignità umana e della libertà come qualità innate e non acquisite. Affermare che tutti gli uomini nascono liberi ed eguali in dignità significa affermare di fatto che la dignità è un attributo ontologico, una qualità intrinseca (e quindi inalienabile) dell’essere umano, al di là di differenze di sesso, di salute, di stato sociale. L’uso della nozione di persona come sinonimo delle qualità dell’adulto rischia di frantumare questo guadagno della politica. La biopolitica liberale rischia di essere fonte di discriminazioni tra gli uomini quando adotta un concetto di persona distinto da quello di essere umano. In essa rivive il dualismo antropologico proprio del platonismo. Le tesi di Hannah Arendt, di Eva Kittay e di Martha Nussabaum ci permettono di evidenziare i caratteri della persona umana sia come soggetto sia come essere corporeo diveniente nel tempo, secondo quell’intuizione che fu propria di Tommaso d’Aquino. Se si torna a pensare alla persona umana come essere umano diveniente nel tempo, è possibile salvaguardare i diritti di tutti e in particolare difendere quelle fasi della vita umana in cui la persona umana è esposta, per le fasi dello sviluppo o per la malattia, alla dipendenza. Solo così si può pensare ad una giustizia che includa tutti e tutte le fasi dell’esistenza, anche quelle segnate dalla disabilità. ---------- The United Nations Universal declaration of human rights (1948) has centred the assertion of human dignity and freedom as innate (not acquired) qualities in the logic of citizenship itself; this claim has been made not only in philosophical and religious terms, but also in political terms. Affirming that all men born free and equal for what concerns their dignity means to affirm actually that dignity is an ontological attribute, an intrinsic quality (and therefore inalienable) of the human being, beyond sex, health and social standing differences. The use of the notion of person as synonym of the qualities of adult risks to crush this gain of politics. The liberal biopolitics risks to be a source of discriminations among men when it adopts a concept of person different from that of human being. According to this view, the anthropological dualism peculiar to the Platonism lives again. Hannah Arendt, Evas Kittay and Martha Nussabaum’s thesis allow us to underline the human person characteristics as both subject and bodily being, according to the Thomas Aquinas’ intuition. If we think again human person as human being, it is possible to safeguard the everybody rights and particularly to defend those phases of human life in which human person is exposed, for the phases of the development or for the illness, to the dependence. Only in this way justice could be thought including all and all the phases of the existence, also those marked by disability.

scholarly journals Sustancia individual de naturaleza racional: el principio personificador y la índole del alma separada. Individual Substance of Rational Nature: The Personification Principle and the Nature of the Separated Soul

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Martí Andrés
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Body ◽  
La Réunion ◽  
Individual Substance ◽  
Rational Nature ◽  
Personal Nature ◽  
The Mind

La persona, siguiendo en esto a Boecio y Tomás de Aquino, es sustancia individual de naturaleza racional, es decir, un supuesto que, en cuanto que tal, es algo completo, un todo unitario cuyos aspectos fundamentales son la individualidad y la subsistencia. Con esto, lo definitorio del supuesto personal, lo que diferencia esencialmente a las personas de los individuos inanimados, los animales y las plantas, es la mente. Pero su constitutivo formal es el esse, el acto de ser personal. Desde el ser la subsistencia de la persona se nos revela como autoposesión y la individualidad, como total incomunicabilidad, ambas de un ser pleno. Por lo demás, en cuanto parte de la especie, en cuanto sustancia incompleta, el alma separada no es hipóstasis, pero el ser con el que funda la persona le pertenece en propiedad y, en este sentido, conserva la índole personal, y ello explica su tendencia natural a la reunión con el cuerpo.The person, according to Boecio and Thomas Aquinas, is an individual substance of rational nature, that is to say, a suppositum and, as such, it is something complete, an unitary whole whose fundamental aspects are individuality and subsistence. Accordingly, the mind is what defines suppositum as a person, and it is also what essentially differentiates it from inanimate individuals, animals and plants. However, his formal constituent is the esse, the act of being a person. From esse, the subsistence of the person is revealed as self-possession and individuality as total incommunicability, both of them belonging to a full being. In addition, the separated soul is not hypostasis in the sense that it is part of a species as incomplete substance, but its esse that becomes the person and belongs to it. In this sense, it retains its personal nature, and it explains its natural tend to reunite with the body

Locke on Personal Identity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Fundamental Point ◽  
Legal Term ◽  
Word Consciousness ◽  
History Of

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.

scholarly journals Educating to Forgive as an Expression of Concern for Order in a Person's Natural Environment. Part. 1: Evil and Harm in the Life of a Human Person and the Source of the Need to Forgive

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-139
Author(s):  
Michał Wyrostkiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Natural Environment ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Climate ◽  
Good And Evil

The paper defines philosophical categories of good and evil in the process of upbringing and development of the personality. People are good by nature. That is why they tend towards the good, they desire what is good, they feel bad and do not function well when they are touched by evil. Goodness is part of the natural environment of the human being; goodness is the natural climate of the human person. At the same time, however, people perform bad deeds. They create evil. They often harm others. This is the cause of disorder in a person's environment. It turns out that the only effective and reasonable means of restoring such order is forgiveness. It is the only thing that has a chance to realistically stop the potential avalanche of evil that appears to be the obvious result of wrongdoing and “nurturing” harm or planning revenge. The evil that “insidiously” enters the world creates the need for forgiveness as the only way to respond to harm; as a way that leads to real order in a person's environment

Body and Soul

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Frances Young
Keyword(s):  
Human Person ◽  
Fourth Century ◽  
The Body ◽  
Second Century ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Body And Soul

This chapter demonstrates how arguments about creation and resurrection in the second century ensured that by the fourth century even those Christian thinkers with the most leanings toward Neoplatonism would espouse the view that the union of soul with body was constitutive of human being as a creature among creatures, and so a necessary aspect of the reconstitution of the human person at the resurrection. Soul-body dualism is often treated as the default anthropological position in antiquity, but the fourth-century anthropological treatise of Nemesius of Emesa shows that, despite huge debts to the legacies of philosophy, creation and resurrection, though barely mentioned, in fact shape his conclusion that the body-soul union is fundamental to what a human being is; the same is true, for example, of the Cappadocian Gregories and Augustine.

The social theory of the Trinity

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Fifth Century ◽  
Individual Substance ◽  
Divine Essence ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Rational Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractSubsequent to the fifth century until modern times all theologians agreed that God the Trinity is constituted by three persons (in Boethius's sense of ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’) who have a common divine essence, and are individuated only by their relations to each other. Having that essence entailed each being omnipotent and so perfectly good. In virtue of his perfect goodness the Father necessarily produces the Son (in order to have one equal whom to love and be loved by) and the Spirit (in order that the Son have one equal other than the Father to love and be loved by). There cannot be more than three divine persons because three persons are sufficient for the existence of unselfish love, and so any fourth divine person would be produced by an act which none of the three needed to produce, and so would not exist necessarily and so could not be divine. Necessarily if there is one divine person, there are three and only three divine persons.

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