Body and Soul

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Frances Young

This chapter demonstrates how arguments about creation and resurrection in the second century ensured that by the fourth century even those Christian thinkers with the most leanings toward Neoplatonism would espouse the view that the union of soul with body was constitutive of human being as a creature among creatures, and so a necessary aspect of the reconstitution of the human person at the resurrection. Soul-body dualism is often treated as the default anthropological position in antiquity, but the fourth-century anthropological treatise of Nemesius of Emesa shows that, despite huge debts to the legacies of philosophy, creation and resurrection, though barely mentioned, in fact shape his conclusion that the body-soul union is fundamental to what a human being is; the same is true, for example, of the Cappadocian Gregories and Augustine.

Author(s):  
Isabella Image

This chapter discusses Hilary’s dichotomous body–soul anthropology. Although past scholars have tried to categorize Hilary as ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’, these categories do not fully summarize fourth-century thought, not least because two-way as well as three-way expressions of the human person are also found in Scripture. The influence of Origen is demonstrated with particular reference to the commentary on Ps. 118.73, informed by parallels in Ambrose and the Palestinian Catena. As a result, it is possible to ascribe differences between Hilary’s commentaries to the fact that one is more reliant on Origen than the other. Nevertheless, Hilary’s position always seems to be that the body and soul should be at harmony until the body takes on the spiritual nature of the soul.


Author(s):  
Martin Eisner

This article investigates the significance of the manuscripts of Virgil and other classical poets that Dante might have read. Calling attention to the presence of musical notation (neumes) in copies that share the particular Virgilian readings Dante quotes, this essay explores the resonance of one of those passages (Aeneas’ dream of Hector) in Dante’s poem. It shows how Dante uses this Virgilian episode to craft his encounter with Manfred where he considers the relationship of body and soul that constitutes one of the major differences between classical and Christian thought, as Augustine frequently noted. Just as Christian anthropology maintains that the body constitutes an essential element of the human person, this essay argues that the materiality of the texts Dante read constitutes a crucial source for understanding how Dante interpreted these texts.


Author(s):  
Rangar H. Cline

Although “magical” amulets are often overlooked in studies of early Christian material culture, they provide unique insight into the lives of early Christians. The high number of amulets that survive from antiquity, their presence in domestic and mortuary archaeological contexts, and frequent discussions of amulets in Late Antique literary sources indicate that they constituted an integral part of the fabric of religious life for early Christians. The appearance of Christian symbols on amulets, beginning in the second century and occurring with increasing frequency in the fourth century and afterward, reveals the increasing perception of Christian symbols as ritually potent among Christians and others in the Roman Empire. The forms, texts, and images on amulets reveal the fears and hopes that occupied the daily lives of early Christians, when amulets designed for ritual efficacy if not orthodoxy were believed to provide a defense against forces that would harm body and soul.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 433-466
Author(s):  
J. Edward Walters

Abstract The fourth-century Syriac corpus known as the Demonstrations, attributed to Aphrahat, the Persian Sage, provides a unique window into the early development of Christianity among Syriac-speaking communities. Occasionally these writings attest to beliefs and practices that were not common among other contemporaneous Christian communities, such as Aphrahat’s apparent belief in the “sleep of the soul” and the implications of that belief for his concept of the soul-body relationship and what happens to the soul and body at the resurrection. Aphrahat addresses this topic in the context of a polemical argument against an unnamed opponent, which provides the occasion to consider whom these arguments might be addressed against. The present article seeks to understand Aphrahat’s views on the body and soul within the broad religious milieu of the eastern Mediterranean world in Late Antiquity. The article concludes with an argument for reading and understanding the Demonstrations as a witness to the contested development of Christian identity in the Syriac-speaking world.


Author(s):  
Isabella Image

This chapter presents Hilary’s understanding of the Fall. Hilary uses the ‘historical’ Genesis narrative and apparently rejects Origen’s teaching of the Fall of souls into bodies. His most interesting discussion of the Fall (InMt 10.23–4) sees the scriptural narrative as an allegory for the components of the human person. At the Fall, the human is changed and now comprises body, soul, will, disobedience (infidelitas), and sin; however, Christ’s coming gives the body and soul dominance over the other three elements. This intriguing analogy demonstrates that for Hilary the first sin, disobedience, is also its own punishment (an idea later found in Augustine). The importance of infidelitas in Hilary’s works is demonstrated, as is the role of the will at the Fall.


2010 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Balboni ◽  
Tracy A. Balboni

Modern medicine owes many of its founding principles to a spiritual heritage. However, passage through the Enlightenment and entry into a secular, pluralistic health context have yielded an estranged relationship between care of the body and care of the soul.1 Scientific medicine now holds the primary role in care of the body while religious communities are solely responsible for care of the soul. The needs of both body and soul are in many respects served well by this specialization and division of labor, but ultimately, of course, human experience is not susceptible to such a simplistic dichotomization. The lack of integration of spiritual and material care of the human person in contemporary life has led to increasingly evident tensions, most notably in the mechanization and isolation of the experiences of illness and dying.2


2006 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Lucas F. MATEO-SECO

Gregory of Nisa was one of the most cultivated men of the fourth century. He reflects the advances that had been made concerning the concept of the person and his/her relatioship with nature. In Gregory’s view, the dignity of the human person is grounded on the fact that the person is the image and likeness of God. This is equivalent to stating that the human being has attributes which no one may deprive him/her of; prominent among these is freedom, which is the crowning glory of his/her personal being, as he/she was made in the image of God, who is a-déspotos, that is, has no master. Rejection of slavery, together with firm defense of parrhesia (freedom of speech), is one of the most suitable perspectives for evaluating Gregory’s concept of human nature and the dignity of the person. Gregory discusses this subject in several places. Here we shall confine our survey to the most important ones: Homily IV On Ecclesiastes, the treatise On the origin of man, and the Great catechetical discourse. According to Gregory, freedom was given to human beings so that they could participate in the divine good. Gregory supported his arguments on the thinking insipired by Plato in which virtue is essentially free and voluntary, and so freedom is an attribute of the dignity of the person that cannot be relinquished.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (86) ◽  
pp. 130-134
Author(s):  
O.V. Ohirko

Philosophical, anthropological and Christian views on a person as a reasonable, free, religious and social person are considered. Theocentric and anthropocentric views are analyzed. Man is three worlds: physical, cognitive, and affective. Man differs from other creatures by having reason and will and natural inclinations. Man is embodied in the spirit and the spiritualized body, and its human spirit is expressed in bodily form. The body and soul of man are not two realities that are separated from one another. The body is a living matter, merged with the soul. The body, having the ability to feed, move, rest, multiply, falls under the laws of matter, that is, in particular, under the law of death. The human soul animates the body, reveals the spiritual ability to think abstractly, to create ideas, assessments, reasoning, make decisions freely. She does not suffer corporal death and can not decompose. In order for a person to live according to his nature, the mind must freely and sincerely seek the truth, and the will must always desire the truth offered as reason by the mind. A person is a person who has his own mind, will and feeling. In view of its dignity, the human person is the center of public life. Man as an image and likeness of God, is able to know, to love the Creator, and to serve Him. Man as a person is a goal in itself and in no case is not only an instrumental instrument. The purpose of human life is to love people and God, to be kind, to know, to speak and to testify the truth.


Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

While self-knowledge is usually considered to be knowledge of our soul by our soul, this is not the case in Stoicism. There is hardly a debate on self-knowledge in Stoicism, because there is no perception of myself as something different from my own body. The Stoics tend to identify the self with the ruling part of the soul, but they have no certain knowledge about it. Self-perception is the perception of the whole body and soul as a unity and of the parts of the body and the soul, and this allows a human being to rule his/her own body, but it is neither perception nor knowledge of the ‘self’. Since a human being is a complete mixture of a body and soul, it knows itself as an animated body, and this kind of knowledge is quite different from the form of self-knowledge involved in most of ancient philosophies.


Etyka ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Szawarski

Human life is a process. It is the process of becoming and ceasing to be a human being and it is a process of becoming and ceasing to be a human person. I accept the distinction between being a human being and being a human person and distinguish further – future, present, and past human persons. The main problem of the paper is when do we become past persons? Having distinguished and presented four distinctive modi of human dying (hospital death, hospice death, nursing home death, and death at home) I concentrate on the problem of good death and ask what are the goods of the dying person. The goods are: life, the good of the mind, the good of the body, the good of the communal life, and (paradoxically) the good of death. The decision who is a terminal patient is a moral one and implies two different strategies with regard to life: the affirmation of life, and the affirmation of death strategy. The first one, based on the concept of respect for human life, ignores the value of human dignity. The second one assumes that we should respect not only human biological life, but the whole human person, and we cannot respect the whole person if we do not respect her freedom of choice and her right to self-respect. Care for the artificially sustained but absolutely personless human life, is not a proper terminal care but rather is post-terminal care, and as such requires other, special justification.


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