Counting People and Making People Count

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jessica J.T. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Value Judgements ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Aggregate Amount ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Abstract Common-sense morality seems to tell us that a rescuer who can save either one individual or five other individuals from death has a duty to save the greater number. But contractualism, a moral theory on which principles must be justifiable to individuals, seems to imply that it is permissible to save the one. This is because a commitment to individual justification blocks the possibility of appealing to the aggregate amount of lives saved. Does contractualism really have this implication? If so, should we side with the common-sense approach, or is there any reason to side with the contractualist? In this paper, I first examine a new argument from Jay Wallace which claims to reconcile contractualism with a duty to save the greater number. I find the argument to be unsuccessful. I then suggest that common-sense morality doesn't support a duty to save the greater number as straightforwardly as it might initially seem as it might initially seem. I introduce two mundane cases in which the permissibility of saving either the lesser or greater number is intuitively plausible, and I offer some reasons to think that the permissibility of saving the lesser number coheres with our value judgements more generally.

Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Argument ◽  
Regular Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Forceful Critique ◽  
Critique Of Religion

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.

Sumner on Abortion: Utilitarian Abortion

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-682
Author(s):  
John Woods
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Classical Version ◽  
Central Effects ◽  
Classical Utilitarianism ◽  
Conservative View ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
Moderate Position

In Abortion and Moral Theory, L. W. Sumner develops a moderate view of abortion, having dispatched as “indefensible” (ix) “two equally prominent and extreme positions: the liberal view … and the conservative view” (ix). It is a distinctive feature of the book that, having formulated what he regards as the correct intuitive position, the author seeks for it “the needed foundation for a moderate view of abortion” (ix), since “the defense of a moderate position must ultimately be grounded in moral theory” (ix), in which the position acquires “theoretical depth”, and without which it would lack “philosophical justification” (ix). The moral theory in which Professor Sumner seeks to lodge his moderate position is the “classical version of utilitarianism” (x), which “can serve as the deep structure of a moderate view of abortion” (195). Thus, a central task for the appraisal of Abortion and Moral Theory is to ascertain whether classical utilitarianism can be made to accommodate “common-sense morality [which] plainly regards murder as wrong principally because of its central effects …”, that is, because murder causes “its victim some form of harm” (201).

The Promoting and the Financing of the Suez Canal

1956 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Baer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
World History ◽  
Suez Canal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Professional Fields

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.

scholarly journals ‘I felt a noble shock’: James Boswell in German Princely Courts

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Markku Kekäläinen
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Culture ◽  
Positive View ◽  
James Boswell ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
British Court

The article deals with James Boswell’s (1740–1795) attitudes towards the courtly milieu in the context of eighteenth-century British court discourse. The central argument is that, strongly contrary to the anti-court ethos of his intellectual and social milieu, Boswell had an affirmative and enthusiastic attitude towards the court. Moreover, the fact that he was neither an Addisonian moralist ‘spectator’ nor a cynical court aristocrat like Lord Chesterfield, but in many senses a highly affective ‘man of feeling’ of the age, did not diminish the uniqueness of his positive view of court culture. On the one hand, Boswell’s appreciation of the court was connected with his firm monarchism and belief in hereditary rank; on the other hand, he was aesthetically fascinated by the splendour and magnificence of the courtly milieu. His appraisal of the court did not include the common-sense moralism of the moral weeklies or the cynical observations of the  aristocratic court discourse; rather his attitude was immediate, emotional, and enthusiastic in the spirit of the cult of sensibility.

scholarly journals El sentido común en el horizonte del humanismo / Common Sense and the Humanistic Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-140
Author(s):  
Ana Marcela Mungaray Lagarda ◽  
Herminio Núñez Villavicencio
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
Classical Traditions ◽  
The One ◽  
Interdisciplinary Integration ◽  
Great Call

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the concept of common sense in the humanism. We´ll consider two proposals for the discussion on this concept: On the one hand, the classical conception of humanism considered in crisis associated with a lack of pluralism and inclusion from the ordinary to the contents and humanistic practice. On the other hand, the idea about that common sense in the context of the humanism is heterogeneous, so it recreates and includes in a new dialogue the everyday man by himself. The invitation from the United Nations about “Humanism, a new idea” (2011) is the context like a great call to refocus the discussion on practices derived from humanistic policy agreements in the world, integration projects between the classical traditions of the concept and dreams of interdisciplinary integration in the concert of nations. The path of analysis on the concept about the common sense in this proposal is a guide to review the rational framework as a concept in crisis. This is considering from several interpretations in a dialogic discussion, both the diversity debate about the nature of the concept as the depth of the social implications of the proposals.RESUMENSe presenta una discusión sobre el sentido común desde dos tesis, una es desde la concepción clásica del pensamiento humanista, al dar por hecho las implicaciones del sentido de lo común; por la otra parte bajo la idea de la necesidad de plantear un humanismo heterogéneo, incluyendo el reconocimiento del sentido propio de la comunidad del hombre cotidiano. La ruta de análisis se plantea desde la invitación de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Humanismo, una nueva idea (2011) como el contexto para replantear la tarea del humanismo actual, hacia las nuevas inclusiones necesarias en un mundo globalizado. Se discute una idea de crisis del concepto de lo humano, de las tareas del humanismo actual, desde las diversas interpretaciones elaboradas históricamente. Podemos decir que el humanismo actual es un recurso dialógico para entrar al debate acerca de la naturaleza del concept, la inclusión del hombre y del sentido común así como sus implicaciones y propuestas sociales.

scholarly journals “Verbindlichkeit”: Some drafts of a groundwork in moral philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Werner Moskopp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Formal Structure ◽  
Empirical Inquiry ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The One ◽  
Common Sense Morality

Abstract All of metaethical positions today can be replaced by a universal architecture of moral philosophy, all but one: moral realism. Here, I use the term “metaethics” to refer to any theory of ethics concerning the groundwork of ethics, on the one hand, and the inquiry of the use of philosophical words, concepts or methods on the other. In this article, I will present my hypothesis that in moral philosophy, we do not need any specialized metaethics at all. Metaethics as a discipline of philosophy is only required by the work of moral realists, who try to show us a realm of values and norms that exist (per se) naturally, non-naturally or supernaturally. How can they know? The effort of metaethical realists cannot be proven either in ontology or in the philosophy of language or in cognitive science or in any meta-science that works en plus to ethics, because even in every additional discipline, we have to accept the presupposition of a validity of judgments. So, let us try it the other way around; we have to find a way to found ethics by following its structures, and that means, based on David Velleman’s concepts: a) We have to search for a ubiquitous point of ethical theory in its foundation – here, no kind of value or norm can be found that is not based on a universal formal structure of normativity. b) We have to start an empirical inquiry to collect norms and values in actual use. MFT, moral psychology and moral sociology are in charge here. The combination of such an abstract groundwork with mere empirical study has to be legitimized again. Hence, I am going to try to sum up the main ideas of such a project to show the relevance of a new architecture of moral philosophy today. There is a line of reasoning that addresses the possibility of a transcendental critique in practical philosophy; therefore, it has to look into the different notions of “intuition” in moral methods like it was used by Sidgwick (Rashdall, Green, Ross, Brentano, McTaggart) and Moore on the one hand and Brentano and Bergson on the other. In my view, there is a way to combine these perspectives using the two-level-model of Hare, Singer, Greene, where “intuition” is used to categorize habits and customs of the common sense morality in general while a critical reflection uses act-utilitarian calculus to provide a universal decision – in the sense of “concrete reason” – for any possible actor in a singular situation (Hegel, Peirce, Bloch etc.). The change between these levels may be explained by means of a pragmatistic kind of continuum of research with an ideal summum bonum in the long run and a concept of common sense morality as can be found in every group or society.

REVISIONARY INTUITIONISM

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 368-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Huemer
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Ethical Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Knowledge ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
Personal Interests

I discuss four kinds of challenges to the reliability of ethical intuitions. Ethical intuitions have been impugned for being incoherent with each other, for being unduly influenced by culture, for being unduly influenced by biological instincts, and for being unduly influenced by personal interests and emotions. I argue that, rather than giving up on the possibility of ethical knowledge through intuition, intuitionists should use the skeptical challenges to help identify which intuitions are most likely to be reliable, and which are instead likely to be biased or otherwise distorted. In many cases, abstract, formal intuitions about value and obligation prove to be least susceptible to skeptical attack and for that reason should be given preference in our ethical reasoning over most intuitions about concrete situations. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally been allied, my approach is likely to generate a highly revisionary normative ethics.

Fichte, Eberhard, and the Psychology of Religion

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Crowe
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Johann Gottfried Herder ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
The Common

In marked contrast to much of twentieth-century psychology and philosophy, prevailing accounts of affect, emotion, and sentiment in the eighteenth century took these phenomena to be rational and, to a certain extent, cognitive.1 Because of a combination of disciplinary diffusion and general lack of physicalist assumptions, accounts of affectivity in the eighteenth century also tended to be quite flexible and nuanced. This is particularly true of an influential stream of Anglo-Scottish and German thought on morality, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Following Shaftesbury, many of the most prominent philosophers of the century regarded affective states and processes as playing a crucial role in accounts of value. In most cases, this tendency was combined with a sort of anti-rationalism, that is, with a tendency to minimize the role of reason in everything from common sense perceptual knowledge to religious belief. Hutcheson's moral sense theory and his well-known and influential criticisms of moral rationalism exemplify this trend.2 It is perhaps more pronounced in Lord Kames, who followed the lead of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in aesthetics, moral theory, philosophy of religion, anthropology, and history.3 In Germany, this stream of thought was quite well-received by philosophers both inside and outside the dominant Wolffian tradition.4 Particularly important and influential in this respect were Johann Georg Hamann, who drew upon Hutcheson, Hume, and the “Common Sense” school to defend a conception of faith as “sentiment (Empfindung),” and Johann Gottfried Herder, a polymath and philosophical pioneer whose work in psychology, anthropology, history, aesthetics, biblical criticism, and theology consistently stresses the fundamental role of passion, affect, and sensibility in every aspect of human culture.5

Wholes, Parts, and Infinite Collections

Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (261) ◽  
pp. 367-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. O. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Series ◽  
Infinite Number ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Popular View ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Infinite Set

In his book, The Principles of Mathematics, the young Bertrand Russell abandoned the common-sense notion that the whole must be greater than its part, and argued that wholes and their parts can be similar, e.g. where both are infinite series, the one being a sub-series of the other. He also rejected the popular view that the idea of an infinite number is self-contradictory, and that an infinite set or collection is an impossibility. In this paper, I intend to re-examine Russell's wisdom in doing both these things, and see if it might not have made more sense, and caused his enterprise fewer problems, if he had simply stuck to our commonplace ideas. To this end, I shall also be considering his treatment of certain paradoxes that he claims can only be resolved by the abandonment of the above notions, as well as certain others which his theories appear to have generated.

The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 867-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Loewenstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Constitutional Tradition ◽  
National Experience

French constitutional theory, on the basis of extensive national experience, distinguishes between revolutions from below—elementary ground-swells among the masses which sweep irresistibly over the nation and destroy all constitutional obstacles—on the one hand, and revolutions from above, by coup d'état of a constituted organ, either a legislative body or a governmental agency, on the other hand. In the latter case, an effort is made to connect the new régime with the preceding order by what constitutional ropes, or even threads, are still available. This habit has created, in spite of frequent upheavals in the first half of French constitutional life since 1789, a strong sense of constitutional tradition and legal conservatism.The events of July, 1940, may amount to a full-fledged revolution, but not a revolution in the common sense of the word, that is, a ground-swell rising from below. When France adopted the authoritarian form of government, no fascist mass party, today the indispensable prerequisite of popular upheavals, was in existence. It was a coup d'état from above, a deliberate act of the defeated military leaders and their political advisers—in short, a skillfully engineered political stratagem. The politicians among the group must have been well aware of the character of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, capable of being abrogated only by a legislative act of equal rank.

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