The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 867-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Loewenstein

French constitutional theory, on the basis of extensive national experience, distinguishes between revolutions from below—elementary ground-swells among the masses which sweep irresistibly over the nation and destroy all constitutional obstacles—on the one hand, and revolutions from above, by coup d'état of a constituted organ, either a legislative body or a governmental agency, on the other hand. In the latter case, an effort is made to connect the new régime with the preceding order by what constitutional ropes, or even threads, are still available. This habit has created, in spite of frequent upheavals in the first half of French constitutional life since 1789, a strong sense of constitutional tradition and legal conservatism.The events of July, 1940, may amount to a full-fledged revolution, but not a revolution in the common sense of the word, that is, a ground-swell rising from below. When France adopted the authoritarian form of government, no fascist mass party, today the indispensable prerequisite of popular upheavals, was in existence. It was a coup d'état from above, a deliberate act of the defeated military leaders and their political advisers—in short, a skillfully engineered political stratagem. The politicians among the group must have been well aware of the character of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, capable of being abrogated only by a legislative act of equal rank.

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeline C. Crichton

Hall, Wendy J. Alison's Asthma. Mediwonderland, 2018. Part of the Mediwonderland series of works by author Wendy J. Hall, Alison’s Asthma tackles the common inflammatory disease, asthma.  Beginning with listing some of the symptoms of asthma, as faced by the protagonist Alison, the book details the tests required in the process of asthma diagnosis, as well as the available treatments.  Focusing also on positive aspects of the journey, such as Alison’s opportunity to choose a style of medical alert bracelet, as well her continued ability to run and play with her friends, Alison’s story comforts and informs readers who may be facing similar circumstances. The telling of Alison’s story is aided by the brightly coloured drawings, which accompany each page of text. Although these illustrations are simple, they establish flow within the text from one page to the next. These illustrations are also educational, such as the one comparing a normal airway to an asthmatic one.  Highly educational and written in accessible language, this book is intended to educate the masses, and breaks down a medical journey faced by many into simple, undaunting steps. However, because of its educational intent, the book tends to be less engaging. While Alison’s journey is realistic, it lacks the details required to engage the audience, instead presenting facts. With that being said, Alison’s Asthma is a perfect read for young children, who, with the help of an adult, will learn the ins and outs of the medical world.  Therefore, Alison’s Asthma is a worthwhile read, which will leave its audience comforted and informed! Recommended: 3 out of 4 stars     Reviewer: Madeline C. Crichton Madeline Crichton is a University of Alberta undergraduate student with a lifelong passion for reading. When she is not preoccupied with her studies, Madeline is busy volunteering in a variety of roles in her community.


Philosophy ◽  
1941 ◽  
Vol 16 (62) ◽  
pp. 151-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Stamp

The final persistence of democracy depends upon whether its right decisions outweigh the wrong ones in number and value, though conceivably one really bad decision might ruin the structure built on all the right ones. It is passing from the stage where a few reasoning leaders govern the masses through their emotions, to the next perilous stage in which every man's thoughts matter. Right decisions depend upon access to relevant facts and doing the right thinking about them. It is of the essence of Nazi philosophy that general liberty of thought is self-destructive, the common man not being rational; it is of the essence of Nazi practice to flatter the many by the pretence that their thinking does matter, but to control and modify the whole supply of factual material upon which they must reason. One declared to me once that he favoured freedom of thought and was not afraid of it, for if he was allowed to supply the “facts” any ordinary rational mind could come to only one conclusion, viz. the one he intended. And in the process the ordinary man might remain proud of his reasoning power, so long as he could be sheltered from seeing the falsity of his conclusions. Control of facts must be perpetual, and cats must never be allowed to get out of bags. But in a democracy, where facts are all born free (and much too equal), it is the thinking about them that really matters.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 254-273
Author(s):  
Hannan Birenboim

AbstractBoth the Qumran scrolls and the rabbinic sources teach of a controversy between the Pharisees, on the one hand, and the Sadducees and the Qumran sect, on the other, concerning the standing of the red heifer: The Sadducees, considering the red heifer as a sacrifice, held that a tevul yom was not permitted to deal with the heifer, whereas the Pharisees, not considering the red heifer as a sacrifice, held that a tevul yom was permitted to deal with it. This controversy derived from the Pharisees' desire to enable the common people to participate as much as possible in divine worship: by not considering the red heifer as a sacrifice, they made it possible for the masses to participate in the preparation of the ashes and even to sprinkle it upon the impure; this was opposed by the Sadducees and the Qumran sectarians.


1956 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Baer

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 228-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Galston

AbstractThis essay explores the ways in which a broadly pluralist outlook can help illuminate longstanding issues of constitutional theory and practice. It begins with a common-sense understanding of pluralism as the diversity of observed practices within a general category (section 2). It turns out that many assumptions Americans and others often make about constitutional essentials are valid only locally but not generically. The essay then turns to pluralism in a more technical and philosophical sense—specifically, the account of value pluralism adumbrated by Isaiah Berlin and developed by his followers. Section 3 sketches this version of pluralism, and section 4 brings it to bear on a range of familiar constitutional issues. In the process, a distinction emerges between, on the one hand, areas of variation among constitutions and, on the other, some general truths about political life that define core constitutional functions. The essay concludes (section 5) with some brief reflections on the normative thrust of pluralist constitutional theory—in particular, a presumption in favor of the maximum accommodation of individual and group differences consistent with the maintenance of constitutional unity and civic order.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Markku Kekäläinen

The article deals with James Boswell’s (1740–1795) attitudes towards the courtly milieu in the context of eighteenth-century British court discourse. The central argument is that, strongly contrary to the anti-court ethos of his intellectual and social milieu, Boswell had an affirmative and enthusiastic attitude towards the court. Moreover, the fact that he was neither an Addisonian moralist ‘spectator’ nor a cynical court aristocrat like Lord Chesterfield, but in many senses a highly affective ‘man of feeling’ of the age, did not diminish the uniqueness of his positive view of court culture. On the one hand, Boswell’s appreciation of the court was connected with his firm monarchism and belief in hereditary rank; on the other hand, he was aesthetically fascinated by the splendour and magnificence of the courtly milieu. His appraisal of the court did not include the common-sense moralism of the moral weeklies or the cynical observations of the  aristocratic court discourse; rather his attitude was immediate, emotional, and enthusiastic in the spirit of the cult of sensibility.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-140
Author(s):  
Ana Marcela Mungaray Lagarda ◽  
Herminio Núñez Villavicencio

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the concept of common sense in the humanism. We´ll consider two proposals for the discussion on this concept: On the one hand, the classical conception of humanism considered in crisis associated with a lack of pluralism and inclusion from the ordinary to the contents and humanistic practice. On the other hand, the idea about that common sense in the context of the humanism is heterogeneous, so it recreates and includes in a new dialogue the everyday man by himself. The invitation from the United Nations about “Humanism, a new idea” (2011) is the context like a great call to refocus the discussion on practices derived from humanistic policy agreements in the world, integration projects between the classical traditions of the concept and dreams of interdisciplinary integration in the concert of nations. The path of analysis on the concept about the common sense in this proposal is a guide to review the rational framework as a concept in crisis. This is considering from several interpretations in a dialogic discussion, both the diversity debate about the nature of the concept as the depth of the social implications of the proposals.RESUMENSe presenta una discusión sobre el sentido común desde dos tesis, una es desde la concepción clásica del pensamiento humanista, al dar por hecho las implicaciones del sentido de lo común; por la otra parte bajo la idea de la necesidad de plantear un humanismo heterogéneo, incluyendo el reconocimiento del sentido propio de la comunidad del hombre cotidiano. La ruta de análisis se plantea desde la invitación de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Humanismo, una nueva idea (2011) como el contexto para replantear la tarea del humanismo actual, hacia las nuevas inclusiones necesarias en un mundo globalizado. Se discute una idea de crisis del concepto de lo humano, de las tareas del humanismo actual, desde las diversas interpretaciones elaboradas históricamente. Podemos decir que el humanismo actual es un recurso dialógico para entrar al debate acerca de la naturaleza del concept, la inclusión del hombre y del sentido común así como sus implicaciones y propuestas sociales.


Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (261) ◽  
pp. 367-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. O. Johnson

In his book, The Principles of Mathematics, the young Bertrand Russell abandoned the common-sense notion that the whole must be greater than its part, and argued that wholes and their parts can be similar, e.g. where both are infinite series, the one being a sub-series of the other. He also rejected the popular view that the idea of an infinite number is self-contradictory, and that an infinite set or collection is an impossibility. In this paper, I intend to re-examine Russell's wisdom in doing both these things, and see if it might not have made more sense, and caused his enterprise fewer problems, if he had simply stuck to our commonplace ideas. To this end, I shall also be considering his treatment of certain paradoxes that he claims can only be resolved by the abandonment of the above notions, as well as certain others which his theories appear to have generated.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Engelking

The concept of a state of emergency is one of the most frequently cited elements of the thought of the German philosopher of the law and political theorist Carl Schmitt. In its discussions, however, the conceptualization of the state of emergency, which Schmitt proposed in 1924 in his juridical comments on Article 48 of the Weimar Republic’s constitution, is often linked with the theory of Ausnahmezustand from Political Theology (1922). Such a juxtaposition is a mistake, because Schmitt was not a consistent thinker and his texts can be mutually contradictory. I propose, therefore, to separate the state of emergency from Ausnahmezustand – translated from German literally as a state without a name. The main difference between them consists in the different types of legitimacy. The state of emergency from the Constitution of the Weimar Republic finds its legitimacy in this document from 1919, however, read by Schmitt in a way that in his Constitutional Theory (1928) he referred to as relativization of the constitution. For the state without a name, as not being included in the legal order and the equivalent of a miracle in theology, such legitimacy is impossible. In order to find it, one must refer to other Schmitt’s works than the strictly judicial ones. I believe that the state without a name may be legally valid – in a word: not a coup d’état – if we acknowledge that Schmitt’s political theology is not just a methodological project that translates theological notions into political and legal ones, but a wider proposal rooted in the faith in Revelation. Therefore, this figure from the work of the German thinker in which the state of emergency finds its legitimacy is taken from St. Paul’s letters; it is the figure of a katechon: the one who comes and stops the world from disintegration. The use of such legitimacy emphasizes the reluctance to accept modernity, which Schmitt did exhibit, and presents him as a thinker who continued the medieval way of thinking, which is completely incompatible with the strictly modern concept of a state of emergency.


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