Hume's Tacit Atheism

We consider a string-inspired no-scale SU (5) × U (1) supergravity model. In this model there is a negative contribution to the vacuum energy, which may be suitably canceled by a positive contribution typically present in string theory. One may then end up with a vacuum energy which brings many cosmological observations into better agreement with theoretical expectations, and a fixed value for the present abundance of neutralinos. We delineate the regions of parameter space allowed in this scenario, and study the ensuing predictions for the sparticle and Higgs-boson masses in this model.

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Joseph Hall and Neo-Stoicism

PMLA ◽

10.2307/459725 ◽

1950 ◽

Vol 65 (6) ◽

pp. 1130-1145 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Audrey Chew

Keyword(s):

Eighteenth Century ◽

Seventeenth Century ◽

Point Of View ◽

Natural Religion ◽

Ethical Point ◽

Rule Of Life ◽

Right Reason ◽

The Individual ◽

Thomas Browne ◽

The Universe

During his own lifetime Bishop Joseph Hall was nicknamed “our spiritual Seneca” by Henry Wotton and later called “our English Seneca” by Thomas Fuller; as a result it has recently become fashionable to associate him with seventeenth-century English Neo-Stoicism. A seventeenth-century Neo-Stoic is of interest presumably because he points in the direction of eighteenth-century Neo-Stoicism, away from a revealed religion toward a natural religion, away from faith toward reason. In a recent article Philip A. Smith calls Hall “the leading Neo-Stoic of the seventeenth century” and says that he enthusiastically preached the “Neo-Stoic brand of theology” to which Sir Thomas Browne objected. This theology maintained that “to follow ‘right reason’ was to follow nature, which was the same thing as following God.” Smith goes on to say that “what most attracted seventeenth-century Christian humanists like Bishop Hall was the fact that Stoicism attempted to frame a theory of the universe and of the individual man which would approximate a rule of life in conformity with an ‘immanent cosmic reason‘”—though in the same paragraph he also mentions the point “that Neo-Stoic divines of the seventeenth century were interested in Stoicism almost exclusively from the ethical point of view.” He cites Lipsius to show how a Christian might reach an approximation between the Stoic Fate and Christian Providence, leaving the reader to assume that Hall might also have made this approximation. He says that “the natural light of reason, as expounded by the Stoic philosophers, became, for seventeenth-century Neo-Stoics, the accepted guide to conduct” and that “religious and moral writers endeavored to trace a relationship between moral and natural law which in effect resulted in the practical code of ethical behavior commonly associated with Neo-Stoicism.”

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The ‘Principle’ of Natural Order: or What the Enlightened Sceptics did not doubt

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures ◽

10.1017/s0080443600002582 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 12 ◽

pp. 56-76

Author(s):

Stuart Brown

Keyword(s):

Eighteenth Century ◽

Natural Order ◽

Ultimate Cause ◽

The Universe ◽

Do So

My title advertizes a paradox. The characteristic complaint of the sceptic is that others make assumptions they are not entitled to make. A philosophical sceptic is committed to a systematic refusal to accept such assumptions in the absence of the kind of justification they think is required. A sceptic who, none the less, helps himself to such an assumption, seems to be caught in a paradoxical position. This is the kind of situation in which, it seems, certain eighteenth-century sceptical philosophers were placed in relation to the ‘principle’ of natural order. They did not doubt that there is such a principle, that there is a source or ultimate cause of the order to be found in the universe. And yet, on their own terms, is not the existence of such a principle something we should expect them to have doubted? What I shall try to do in this lecture is to bring out why they did not doubt the existence of such a principle and how serious their failure to do so is for their sceptical position.

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The ‘Principle’ of Natural Order: or What the Enlightened Sceptics did not doubt

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures ◽

10.1017/s1358246100002587 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 12 ◽

pp. 56-76

Author(s):

Stuart Brown

Keyword(s):

Eighteenth Century ◽

Natural Order ◽

Ultimate Cause ◽

The Universe ◽

Do So

My title advertizes a paradox. The characteristic complaint of the sceptic is that others make assumptions they are not entitled to make. A philosophical sceptic is committed to a systematic refusal to accept such assumptions in the absence of the kind of justification they think is required. A sceptic who, none the less, helps himself to such an assumption, seems to be caught in a paradoxical position. This is the kind of situation in which, it seems, certain eighteenth-century sceptical philosophers were placed in relation to the ‘principle’ of natural order. They did not doubt that there is such a principle, that there is a source or ultimate cause of the order to be found in the universe. And yet, on their own terms, is not the existence of such a principle something we should expect them to have doubted? What I shall try to do in this lecture is to bring out why they did not doubt the existence of such a principle and how serious their failure to do so is for their sceptical position.

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On Failing to Resolve Theism-Versus-Atheism Empirically

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412500020229 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 26 (1) ◽

pp. 91-102 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

David O'connor

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Natural World ◽

Core Beliefs ◽

Natural Religion ◽

The Core ◽

The Universe ◽

Enormous Quantity

At least since Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, theism has been under indictment; indeed it has been on trial for its life. In part, this indictment is that the enormous quantity, variety, and distribution of evils evident in the natural world disconfirm the core beliefs of theism. Those core beliefs, I think, are the following pair: there exists a being at once omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, the worshipful creator of the universe (henceforth G); and G stands in a relation to the natural world which might be called one of moral responsibility (henceforth M). Obviously, theism says a lot more than the above, rather abrupt, conjunction; nevertheless, that conjunction constitutes its core.

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Concerning Natural Religion

Harvard Theological Review ◽

10.1017/s0017816000007318 ◽

1911 ◽

Vol 4 (4) ◽

pp. 460-476

Author(s):

W. W. Fenn

Keyword(s):

Recent Issue ◽

Substantial Agreement ◽

Natural Religion ◽

Cause And Effect ◽

The World ◽

Definition Of Religion ◽

Definition Of ◽

The Universe ◽

The Way

In present theological conditions, one who is called upon to discourse concerning “natural religion as it is commonly called and understood by divines and learned men” finds himself embarrassed at the outset by the difficulty of defining his subject in accordance with the requirement, since the term is variously understood by “divines and learned men.” In a recent issue of the Harvard Theological Review Professor Knight of Tufts College described three specific uses of the correlative terms “nature” and “supernatural,” each of which, moreover, comprises many subordinate varieties. The late Dr. C. C. Everett, to whom, by the way, Professor Knight does not refer, defined the natural as “the universe considered as a composite whole,” the world of cause and effect, one might say, in which the laws of Haeckel's “Substance” prevail, or the natura naturata of Spinoza, and the supernatural as the non-composite unity, Spinoza's natura naturans, which manifests itself in and through the natural. If this use be accepted, and with it Dr. Everett's definition of religion corresponding to the stage in the development of the discussion where the terms first appear, namely, as “feeling towards the supernatural,” it is difficult to find any meaning for the term natural religion save as it may denote religion awakened by contemplation of nature. Otherwise, it becomes a contradiction in terms, the adjective cancelling the noun or vice versa. In substantial agreement with these definitions is the habit of regarding the supernatural as covering the realm of free personality, both human and divine, while the world of things, in which law uniformly and inexorably rules, is styled nature. Here too, since religion resides in personality and, at least among those who employ this terminology, involves a relation to personality, natural religion becomes meaningless.

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The Argument From Design: Some Better Reasons for Agreeing with Hume

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412500012130 ◽

1980 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 145-161 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Gary Doore

Keyword(s):

David Hume ◽

Natural Phenomena ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Inductive Proof ◽

Natural Religion ◽

Teleological Argument ◽

Argument From Design ◽

Analogical Argument ◽

Weak Claim ◽

The Universe

I. The argument from design or ‘teleological argument’ purports to be an inductive proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the evidence of the order exhibited by natural phenomena to the probable conclusion of a rational agent responsible for producing that order. The argument was severely criticized by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and it was widely conceded that Hume's objections had cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the teleological argument, if not destroyed its credibility entirely. However, there has been a recent reappraisal of this claim by R. G. Swinburne, who maintains that none of Hume's criticisms have any validity against a ‘carefully articulated version of the argument’. Using an analogical argument based on temporal regularities rather than on spatial regularities (or arrangement of parts), Swinburne claims to have shown that the teleological argument is a legitimate inference to the best explanation whose force depends only on the strength of the analogy and on the degree to which the resulting theory makes explanation of empirical matters simpler and more coherent. Moreover, he claims to have shown that the argument provides support for the Christian monotheistic hypothesis and not merely for the weak claim that the universe was designed (somehow). This is an important claim since it has long been thought that Hume's most devastating blow was dealt when he showed that the teleological argument (if it is admitted to have any force at all) provides just as much support for the negation of certain propositions considered essential to Christian monotheism as it does for their affirmation.

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On the Interpretation of Hume's Dialogues

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412500008143 ◽

1975 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 1-18 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

John Bricke

Keyword(s):

Religious Faith ◽

Main Subject ◽

Philosophical Work ◽

Natural Religion ◽

Attributes Of God ◽

World Hypothesis ◽

The Universe ◽

Striking Fact

One of the most striking facts about Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is the fact that it has been subject to so many mutually contradictory interpretations. It is not, to be sure, unusual that a complex philosophical work be capable of a variety of interpretations. The case of the Dialogues is, however, surely an exceptional one, for the contradictory interpretations concern what is clearly the main subject of the book: the justifiability of world-hypotheses, and specifically the justifiability of the religious world-hypothesis. According to some commentators, Hume's point in the Dialogues is that no world-hypothesis whatever is justifiable, perhaps none is even intelligible. According to others, Hume not only does not deny the possibility of a justified world-hypothesis, but actually proposes some particular hypothesis as the most reasonable one. Those who agree that Hume defends some world-hypothesis, however, differ radically about its content. For some, Hume's preferred hypothesis is that the explanation of order in the universe is a deity immanent in the universe. For others, Hume subscribes to a deity distinct from the universe whose order he explains, and possessing many, at least, of the traditional attributes of God, including wisdom, power, and benevolence. Still others hold that Hume's God, while distinct from the universe, possesses only the natural, not the moral, attributes traditionally assigned to him. Some commentators have even argued that Hume's purpose in the Dialogues is to employ scepticism in defence of religious faith. How, one must ask, is it possible that so many mutually contradictory interpretations have been proposed? How is this striking fact about the Dialogues to be explained?

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Tudo é número: uma análise conceitual da ideia de número em Pitágoras

Revista Principia - Divulgação Científica e Tecnológica do IFPB ◽

10.18265/1517-03062015v1n33p99-107 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 1 (33) ◽

pp. 99

Author(s):

Carlos Lisboa Duarte ◽

Hegildo Holanda Gonçalves ◽

Nádia Pinheiro Nobrega

Keyword(s):

Point Of View ◽

Classical Antiquity ◽

Journal Articles ◽

Way Of Life ◽

Number Concept ◽

Ultimate Cause ◽

Methodological Procedures ◽

The Subject ◽

The Universe

<p>This work is an analysis of the number concept based on the thoughts of Pythagoras, well as to seek an approximation of the historical reflections of the Pythagorean School in the Greek context of Classical Antiquity. The guiding objective of the study is to analyze the theory of the integers in the Pythagorean philosophy as ultimate cause of man and matter. From Methodological procedures point of view, the research was the bibliographical type, developed from already published material constituted, primarily, of books and journal articles through which we sought a dialogue with the developed studies concerning the subject in question. Through research it was reached the following findings: First, Pythagoras considered the number as the forming principle of the universe. However, he believed that the number constitutes the agreement between an indeterminate or unlimited element and another determinant or limiting and from there had been origin all things; Second, to the Pythagoreans the structure of numbers started from the assumption that in even numbers in even numbers predominates the indeterminate element and in the odd numbers the limiting element, for this reason they had the odd numbers as perfects, because in their distribution the odd numbers always had a limiting element. In sum, both Pythagoras as the Pythagoreans had in the cult of the number the basis of both his philosophy and his way of life.</p>

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A religião entre os universitários no sul do Brasil

Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira ◽

10.29386/reb.v62i248.1935 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 62 (248) ◽

pp. 845

Author(s):

Ari Pedro Oro

Keyword(s):

Young People ◽

Symbolic Representation ◽

Religious Practices ◽

General Tendency ◽

Social Category ◽

Porto Alegre ◽

Life Circumstances ◽

The Universe

Este texto versa sobre a religião entre universitários de Porto Alegre. Seu objetivo é compreender qual é o espaço que a religião ocupa no universo de representação simbólica desses jovens, qual é a configuração do seu campo religioso e das suas práticas religiosas, e em que circunstâncias da vida apelam à religião. Ver-se-á que essa categoria social acompanha o que ocorre mais amplamente na sociedade, a saber: o predomínio da subjetivação de crenças oriundas de diferentes horizontes e a concepção da religião, não importa qual seja, como importante fonte de sentido para a existência.Abstract:This text deals with religion among undergraduates in the universities of Porto Alegre, RGS. Its objective is to understand the space religion occupies in the universe of symbolic representation of these young people; to discover the configuration of their religiousness and of their religious practices; and find out in which life circumstances they appeal to religion. We will see that this social category follows the trends occurring in society as a whole, namely: a general tendency to consider, in a subjective manner, both the faiths originating from different horizons and the very conception of religion, no matter which, as an important source of meaning for the existence.

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