The myth of religious experience

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICK ZANGWILL

I argue that people do not and cannot have religious experiences that are perceptual experiences with theological content and that provide some justification for the belief in God. I discuss William Alston's resourceful defence of this idea. My strategy is to say that religious perception would either have to be by means of one of the ordinary five senses or else by means of some special sixth religious sense. In either case insoluble epistemological problems arise. The problem is with perceiving God as God, which we need to do if reasons to believe in God are to be generated. To do so, we would have to perceive the instantiation of His essential properties – being all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good. But perceiving the instantiation of these properties of God, even by some special sixth religious sense, is impossible. Hence, God cannot be perceived either by the ordinary five senses or by a sixth religious sense. Religious perceptual experiences are a myth.

Open Theology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

AbstractApplying Michel Henry’s philosophical framework to the phenomenological analysis of religious experience, the author introduces a concept of material introspection and a new theory of the constitution of religious experience in phenomenologically material interiority. As opposed to ordinary mental self-scrutiny, material introspection happens when the usual outgoing attention is reverted onto embodied self-awareness in search of mystical self-knowledge or union with God. Such reversal posits the internal field of consciousness with the self-disclosure of phenomenological materiality. As shown by the example of Vedantic self-inquiry, material introspection is conditioned on the attitude ‘I “see” myself’ and employs reductions which relieve phenomenological materiality from the structuring influence of intentionality; the telos of material introspection is expressed by the inward self-transcendence of intentional consciousness into purified phenomenological materiality. Experience in material introspection is constituted by the self-affection and self-luminosity of phenomenological materiality; experience is recognized as religious due to such essential properties as the capacity of being self-fulfilled, and specific qualitative “what it’s like”(s). Drawing on more than 5000 live accounts of internal religious experience, it is shown that introspective attention can have different trajectories, producing, within a temporal extension of material introspection, different spatial modifications of embodied self-awareness and a variety of corresponding religious experiences.


Open Theology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Fasko

AbstractThe debate about religious experiences has recently been shaped by the question of whether they exist or if they are a myth. One of the most compelling arguments for the non-existence of religious experience was put forward by Nick Zangwill. In his “The myth of religious experience” (2004) he argued that God can be perceived neither by our ordinary five senses nor by some special sixth sense. While I agree with Zangwill that God cannot be perceived with our ordinary five senses (or a sixth religious sense), I do not think his argument shows that religious experience - based on Zangwill’s own understanding of the term - is a myth. In this paper, I offer in two steps a philosophical defence - in the analytical tradition - of the possible existence of religious experience as perceptual experiences. In the first step, I adumbrate Zangwill’s argument for the myth of religious experience, which fails because it ultimately begs the question - as I argue in the second step, by presenting a Berkelean answer to Zangwill’s challenge.


Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed

Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, that she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P. Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if not most, religious beliefs since religion is rife with peer disagreement. Elsewhere (Removed) I argue that one way for a religious believer to avoid sceptical challenges posed by strong conciliationism is by appealing to the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas poses a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious experience. Namely, she argues that an evil God is just as likely to explain negative religious experiences as a good God is able to explain positive religious experiences. In light of this, religious believers need to explain why a good God exists instead of an evil God. I respond to Lancaster-Thomas by suggesting that, at least within the context of religious experience, (i) that the evil God hypothesis is only a challenge to certain versions of theism; and (ii) that the existence of an evil God and good God are compossible.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Fuad Nashori ◽  
R. Rachmy Diana

This study intends to get an overview of the themes and processes of religious experience in Islamic religious education teachers. Data disclosure of research respondents, namely religious teachers, was carried out using in-depth interviews. The results showed that the research respondents had a variety of religious experiences, both physiological, social-psychological, parapsychological, and spiritual. Among the various experiences above, the most prominent theme is the themes of experience of the mind. Various spiritual experiences take place through a process that involves socio-cultural conditions, opportunities, difficulties and challenges of life, worship such as praying, tahajjud prayer, diligent prayer, timely prayer, positive behavior or attitude towards others, and the nearest social environment such as brothers, uncles / mother, and so on.


2004 ◽  
Vol 60 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Buitendag

“Genes Я us” – or not? About human determinism and voluntarism, with reference to homosexualityThis article has as its departure point the conviction of some that human genome mapping predisposes human beings genetically and as a consequence, the homosexual person becomes a mere victim of circumstances. Biological determinism and social construc-tionism are not mutually exclusive and although a person is orientated within a web of boundary matters, the depiction of a human being as imago Dei still prevails. A person has the freedom to choose and the responsibility to do so. One’s understanding of reality provides a frame of reference from which a definition of morality is derived. The suggestion of Nancey Murphey to understand reality as a “nonreductive physicalism” is followed. Reductionism in any form is subsequently avoided. A holistic view of humankind in terms of which religious experience is seen as more than some brain functions and people are embedded in a “sacred canopy”, is therefore advocated.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 329
Author(s):  
June McDaniel

This special issue of Religions brings together a talented group of international scholars who have studied and written on the Hindu tradition. The topic of religious experience is much debated in the field of Religious Studies, and here we present studies of Hindu religious experience explored from a variety of regions and perspectives. They are intended to show that religious experience has long been an important part of Hinduism, and we consider them to be important and relevant. As a body of scholarship, these articles refine our understanding of the range and variety of religious experience in Hinduism. In addition to their substantive contributions, the authors also show important new directions in the study of the third-largest religion in the world, with over one billion followers. This introduction will discuss some relevant issues in the field of Indology, some problems of language, and the difficulties faced in the study of religious experience. It will also give a brief sketch of the religious experiences described by our authors in some major types of Hinduism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniël P. Veldsman

The German systematic theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher has shaped Western Christian theological thinking in many ways. One such influential way has been his formulation and exposition of religious experience, and specifically the concept of the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ (Gefühl der schlechthinnigen Abhängigkeit). From a brief account of his understanding of the ‘feeling of absolute independence’, a few critical remarks are made from the broader context of contemporary hermeneutical discourses, focusing on the constitutive role of affectivity and narrative identity in religious experiences of embodied personhood. It is argued that these two themes in revisiting Schleiermacher’s understanding of the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of religious experience.


Author(s):  
Stephen S. Bush

William James made signal contributions to the philosophical and psychological study of religion. One of James’s greatest contributions to the study of religion is his defense of the permissibility of religious beliefs. In his essay “Will to Believe,” he argues that it can be permissible (morally and epistemically), if certain criteria are met, to hold beliefs for which one does not have conclusive evidence in support (provided there isn’t conclusive evidence against). This applies to religious beliefs, but also to moral beliefs and certain beliefs that are essential to our social lives and to the scientific enterprise. His second-greatest contribution to the study of religion is his methodological focus on individuals’ religious experiences, which we see most extensively in Varieties of Religious Experience. In addition to these two contributions, he has important things to say on the relation between religion and other aspects of culture, such as ethics, politics, science, and philosophy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPH JÄGER

AbstractI discuss the role of religious experience in Richard Swinburne's probabilistic case for theism. Swinburne draws on his principle of credulity to argue that, if in addition to other evidence we consider that many people have theistic religious experiences, theism comes out as more probable than not. However, on many plausible probability assignments for the relevant non-experiential evidence, the conditional probability of theism already converges towards 1. Moreover, an argument analogous to a general Bayesian argument against phenomenal conservatism suggests that, after we take account of evidence from religious experience, the probability of theism cannot be greater than the prior probability that the best rival hypothesis is false. I conclude that these observations are compatible with what Swinburne would call ‘weak rational belief’ in theism and that such weak belief can be strong enough for rational faith.


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