Mill and Millians on Liberty and Moral Character

1985 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry M. Clor
Keyword(s):  
Character Development ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Human Excellence

This essay critically explores the efforts of John Stuart Mill and contemporary Millian scholarship to provide a utilitarian justification for a categorical principle of personal liberty. What is distinctive about Mill's argument is its pronounced emphasis upon character development as an essential constituent of happiness; the heart of the argument is that freedom of choice promotes a kind of elevated or worthy human character upon which happiness ultimately depends. Hence, society must be prevented from imposing any conventional or customary morality which would restrict individual autonomy. This case for the sovereignty of personal autonomy is infected with a number of difficulties and ambiguities. Central among these are weighty problems associated with Mill's crucial concept of individuality and its relation to human excellence or nobility of character. The refinements upon Millian doctrine introduced by his current supporters do not, and cannot, resolve its inherent ambiguities.

History and Personal Autonomy

1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Mele
Keyword(s):  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
The Self ◽  
Personal History ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
List Type ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
New Model ◽  
Self Reflection

John Christman, in ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ advances a novel genetic or historical account of individual autonomy. He formulates ‘the conditions of the [i.e., his] new model of autonomy’ as follows:(i) A person P is autonomous relative to some desire D if it is the case that P did not resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted that development had P attended to the process;(ii) The lack of resistance to the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection;and(iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (i) [sic] is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. (11)

Adam Smith’s Libertarian Paternalism

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Otteson
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Libertarian Paternalism ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Cass Sunstein ◽  
The Right

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue for “libertarian paternalism,” defined as the strategy to devise policy that will “maintain or increase freedom of choice” and at the same time “influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”. These two goals are often in conflict, and striking the right balance between them has proved difficult in both theory and practice. Where does Adam Smith fall in this debate? This chapter argues that Smith developed his own version of “libertarian paternalism.” It differs in important ways from that of Thaler and Sunstein, but it shares with them an attempt to balance respect for individual autonomy with a desire to help people lead better lives. Smith’s position accommodates the importance of both liberty and paternalism in enabling individuals to construct lives worth living, while avoiding some of the problems that have beset more recent versions of libertarian paternalism.

scholarly journals Redefining liberty: is natural inability a legitimate constraint of liberty?

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-62
Author(s):  
Zahra Ladan
Keyword(s):  
Disabled Persons ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
External Influence ◽  
Political Liberty ◽  
Physically Disabled ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
The Government ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

In P v Cheshire West, Lady Hale stated that an act that would deprive an able-bodied or able-minded person of their liberty would do the same to a mentally or physically disabled person. Throughout the judgement, there is no definition of what liberty is, which makes defining an act that would deprive a person of it difficult. Ideas of liberty are described in terms of political liberty within a society, the state of being free from external influence and individual autonomy. This essay explores various philosophical ideas of liberty and what a legitimate constraint of liberty is. It will be argued that defining liberty in terms external influence from other human agents undermines the impact of natural inability on a person’s ability to fulfil their intrinsic desires—a true constraint of liberty is any which prohibits a person from acting in the way they desire. If liberty is not the same for all, it follows that a deprivation of liberty differs between different agents. Although the government must protect personal liberty, it is important to recognise that an act that may deprive an able-bodied or minded person of their liberty, may in fact promote the liberty of a disabled persons. It will be argued that acts that allow a disabled person to act out desires that they ordinarily would not be able to perform, do not deprive them of their liberty.

Ethical Autonomy

2020 ◽  
pp. 153-216
Author(s):  
Lucas Swaine
Keyword(s):  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Democratic Life

This chapter expounds the idea of ethical autonomy. Ethical autonomy is personal autonomy modulated by moral character. It is different in kind from personal autonomy. Fusing personal autonomy with moral character alters the autonomous individual’s utilization of her rational and imaginative faculties, her will, her capabilities, and her options. Ethical autonomy is supportive of various kinds of social, political, and religious forms of difference. It is not a comprehensive doctrine. It is suitable for inclusion in educational spheres and it supports citizenship in free societies. Ethical autonomy strengthens reasonable pluralism and the cardinal principles of a liberalism of conscience. It holds special promise for liberalism and democratic life.

scholarly journals A Comparison of the Social-Adaptive Perspective and Functionalist Perspective on Guilt and Shame

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi L. Dempsey
Keyword(s):  
Character Development ◽  
State Level ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
The State ◽  
Shame Proneness ◽  
The Social ◽  
Trait Level ◽  
Guilt Proneness

Within the field of guilt and shame, two competing perspectives have been advanced. The first, the social-adaptive perspective, proposes that guilt is an inherently adaptive emotion and shame is an inherently maladaptive emotion; thus, those interested in moral character development and psychopathology should work to increase an individual’s guilt-proneness and decrease an individual’s shame-proneness. The functionalist perspective, in contrast, argues that both guilt and shame can serve a person adaptively or maladaptively—depending on the situational appropriateness, duration, intensity, and so forth. This paper reviews the research conducted supporting both positions, critiques some issues with the most widely used guilt- and shame-proneness measure in the social-adaptive research (the TOSCA), and discusses the differences in results found when assessing guilt and shame at the state versus trait level. The conclusion drawn is that although there is broad support for the functionalist perspective across a wide variety of state and trait guilt/shame studies, the functionalist perspective does not yet have the wealth of data supporting it that has been generated by the social-adaptive perspective using the TOSCA. Thus, before a dominant perspective can be identified, researchers need to (1) do more research assessing how the social-adaptive perspective compares to the functionalist perspective at the state level, and (2) do more trait research within the functionalist perspective to compare functionalist guilt- and shame-proneness measures with the TOSCA.

Personal Autonomy: Development of a Nursing Outcomes Classification Label

2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol L. Caldwell ◽  
Dianne Wasson ◽  
Veronica Brighton ◽  
Lois Dixon ◽  
Mary Ann Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Freedom Of Choice ◽  
Group Approach ◽  
Autonomy Development ◽  
Nursing Outcomes ◽  
Nursing Outcomes Classification ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

Autonomy is defined as having control over one’s life, not being subject to the will of another, the right of self-determination, and the right to decide, or freedom of choice. An autonomous individual is protected from unwanted interference. There is a consistent theme running through the literature of nursing, medicine, and ethics that assumes that the autonomous individual is sufficiently competent to receive, understand, and make choices based on information available. Using a focus group approach, a Nursing Outcomes Classification label, a definition, and indicators were developed for personal autonomy. The definition and indicators were refined into a conceptually and clinically coherent outcome. Findings include the definition and 11 measurable indicators. Clinical relevance and utility are currently under investigation.

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