Il conflitto fra Leone III Isaurico e il papato fra il 725 e il 733, e il ‘definitivo’ inizio del medioevo a Roma: un'ipotesi in discussione

1991 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 231-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Marazzi

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LEO III ISAURICO AND THE PAPACY BETWEEN 725 AND 733 AND THE ‘DEFINITIVE’ BEGINNING OF THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD IN ROME: A HYPOTHESIS UNDER DISCUSSIONThis paper aims to bring to the fore an aspect of Italian history between the end of the sixth century and the first half of the eighth century which has been considered rarely to date: that is, the continuity of the strong economic ties between Rome and some regions of the Mezzogiorno, in particular Sicily and, to a lesser extent, Calabria. Thanks to the large papal estates in these regions, Rome continued throughout these centuries to secure for herself a considerable part of her own food supply through long distance provisioning, as she had done before the end of the Roman Empire in the West. In the context of extremely marked contractions of exchange and commerce, which were affecting all of western Europe at that time, this system appears to be an anomalous anachronism. However, it continued to function until external factors intervened (fiscal measures adopted by the Emperor of Byzantium, Leo III, between 724 and 733). The laborious reorganisation of the papal economic interests was probably one of the reasons why the popes were compelled to think of the idea of creating a regional political seigniory.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xabier Irujo

The Battle of Rencesvals is the one of the most dramatic historical event of the entire eighth century, not only in Vasconia but in Western Europe. This monograph examines the battle as more than a single military encounter, but instead as part of a complex military and political conquest that began after the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 and culminated with the creation of the Kingdom of Pamplona in 824. The battle had major (and largely underappreciated) consequences for the internal structure of the Carolingian Empire. It also enjoyed a remarkable legacy as the topic of one of the oldest European epic poems, La Chanson de Roland. The events that took place in the Pyrenean pass of Rencesvals (Errozabal) on 15 August 778 defined the development of the Carolingian world, and lie at the heart of the early medieval contribution to the later medieval period.


2019 ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
D. W. Harding

For most of the twentieth century migration and invasion were the default explanation of material culture change in archaeology. This model was largely derived from the record of documentary history, which not only recorded the Gaulish diaspora of later prehistory but the migrations that resulted in the breakup of the Roman Empire. The equation of archaeological distributions—the formula ‘pots = people’—was a model adopted and promoted by Gordon Childe, and remained fundamental to archaeological interpretation into the 1960s. Thereafter diffusionism was discredited among British prehistorians, though less so among European archaeologists and classical or historical archaeologists. Even the Beaker phenomenon became a ‘cult package’ rather than the product of settlers, and it is only as a result of more recent isotopic and DNA analyses that the scale of settlement from the continent introducing Beakers has begun to be demonstrated. Other factors in culture contact including long-distance trade have long been evident, for example, from the distribution of finds of Baltic amber from Northern and North-Western Europe to the Mediterranean, or the distribution of continental pottery and glass via the western seaways in the post-Roman period.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 396-406
Author(s):  
Arno G. Huth

There is today a new kind of international agreement which, going beyond general provisions and vague expressions of goodwill, has proved to be of immediate, practical consequence. Cooperative radio agreements or, as they are sometimes called, “agreements for mutual assistance”, provide the legal and organizational framework for international relations among broadcasting services in sixteen European countries. At the same time, some of them constitute a basis for the collaboration and coordination of communist-controlled stations, and thus for spreading and strengthening Soviet propaganda; they effectively supplement military and economic ties of the Cominform group in the fields of information and mass communications. Their provisions reflect a new trend in international law, taking into account technical and cultural factors as well as legal considerations, political and economic interests. Although no less than thirty-two agreements have been concluded during the last five years – some also by broadcasting organizations in western Europe – they are little known outside the countries directly concerned.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 37-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Wood

ABSTRACTAlthough there had been substantial donations to the church in the course of the last two centuries of the Roman Empire, the amount of property transferred to the episcopal church and to monasteries in the following two and a half centuries would seem to have been immense. Probably rather more than 30 per cent of the Frankish kingdom was given to ecclesiastical institutions; although the Anglo-Saxon church was only established after 597, it also acquired huge amounts of land, as did the churches of Spain and Italy, although the extent conveyed in the two peninsulas is harder to estimate. The scale of endowments helps explain the occasional criticisms of the extent of church property, and also the secularisations and reallocation of church land, and indeed suggest that the transfer of property out of the control of the church in Francia and England in the eighth century may have been greater than is often assumed. The transfer of land should probably also be seen as something other than a simple change of ownership. Church property provided the economic basis for cult, for the maintenance of clergy, who were unquestionably numerous, and for the poor. In social and economic, as well as religious terms, this marked a major break with the Classical World.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (25) ◽  
pp. E5661-E5668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Longman ◽  
Daniel Veres ◽  
Walter Finsinger ◽  
Vasile Ersek

The Balkans are considered the birthplace of mineral resource exploitation and metalworking in Europe. However, since knowledge of the timing and extent of metallurgy in southeastern Europe is largely constrained by discontinuous archaeological findings, the long-term environmental impact of past mineral resource exploitation is not fully understood. Here, we present a high-resolution and continuous geochemical record from a peat bog in western Serbia, providing a clear indication of the extent and magnitude of environmental pollution in this region, and a context in which to place archaeological findings. We observe initial evidence of anthropogenic lead (Pb) pollution during the earliest part of the Bronze Age [∼3,600 years before Common Era (BCE)], the earliest such evidence documented in European environmental records. A steady, almost linear increase in Pb concentration after 600 BCE, until ∼1,600 CE is observed, documenting the development in both sophistication and extent of southeastern European metallurgical activity throughout Antiquity and the medieval period. This provides an alternative view on the history of mineral exploitation in Europe, with metal-related pollution not ceasing at the fall of the western Roman Empire, as was the case in western Europe. Further comparison with other Pb pollution records indicates the amount of Pb deposited in the Balkans during the medieval period was, if not greater, at least similar to records located close to western European mining regions, suggestive of the key role the Balkans have played in mineral resource exploitation in Europe over the last 5,600 years.


Author(s):  
Michel Kazanski

Introduction. Recent finds of Baldenheim-type helmets in the Dnieper (Klimovsk district of Bryansk region, Boldyzhsky Forest and Cherkasy region) indicate the proliferation of prestigious weapons in the territory of the Kolochin and Penkovka cultures, that is, in the zone of settlement of Slavs in the post-Hun time. Helmets of this type are well known in Europe, both in the West, primarily among the Merovingians, and in the Balkan-Danube region, and in the Mediterranean from the second half of the 5th to the second half of the 6th centuries, though most of the finds fall on the period from the late 5th to the mid 6th cc. These helmets, at least in part, were of Byzantine origin. In general, Baldenheim-type helmets are few in number and in Western and Central Europe come mainly from “chief” graves, and in the Byzantine zone from cultural deposits in fortresses and cities. Analysis and Results. Helmets found in Eastern Europe show similarities with both helmets from Western Europe and helmets found in the Balkan-Danube region and in the Mediterranean. Given the historical situation of the time, it seems more logical to assume that Eastern European helmets were of Balkan-Danube origin. Obviously, in Eastern Europe, these helmets belong to the ruling military elite. It is possible that Baldenheimtype helmets fell into the hands of the Slavs as a result of the Danube and Balkan wars of the 6th century against the Eastern Roman Empire.


Author(s):  
Christina Plank

The non-signing of the association and free trade agreement with the EU by the former Ukrainian president Victor Janukovych triggered the on-going conflict in the Ukraine. By offering a deepening of the political and economic relations with the West, the EU did not consider Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet region. Drawing on Harvey, the article argues that within this process the territorial-geopolitical logic prevails over the capitalist logic of power. Economic interests of the European Union exist, but they are not sufficient to explain the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Rather, the conflict can be understood as a non-intentional consequence of the EU’s politics concernging the Ukraine. In particular, three sectors – finance, energy and agriculture – are relevant for the EU in Ukraine. However, up to now the European capital factions are facing difficulties in asserting their interests in these sectors due to strong oligarchic structures in the country. Together with the territorial-geopolitical logic of power they have to be taken into account to explain the conflict. Ultimately, the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine endangers the EU’s economic ties with Russia. These are more important for the EU than its economic relations with Ukraine. As a result, the territorial-geopolitical logic unfolds as opposed to the capitalist logic in the conflict.


Author(s):  
David Abulafia

Ever since Edward Gibbon wrote his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire the question why, when and indeed whether this great Roman Empire fell has been vigorously pursued by historians. It has been observed that at least 210 explanations have been offered, some frankly ridiculous (‘Semitization’, homosexuality, decline in manliness). The argument that it was the barbarian invasions that destroyed Rome – both the city and its empire – lost favour and has returned to favour. Some historians have insisted that the whole concept of the ‘fall of Rome’ is a misconception, and have emphasized the continuity of the Roman inheritance. Yet from a Mediterranean perspective, it is abundantly clear that the unity of the Great Sea had been shattered by 800. That leaves several centuries in which to place the process of disintegration, and several suspects: the Germanic barbarians in the fifth century and after, the Arab conquerors in the seventh century, Charlemagne and his Frankish armies in the eighth century, not to mention internal strife as Roman generals competed for power, either seeking regional dominions or the crown of the empire itself. Evidently there was no single ‘cause’ for the decline of Rome, and it was precisely the accumulation of dozens of problems that brought the old order to an end, rupturing the ‘Second Mediterranean’. During the long period from 400 to 800, the Mediterranean split apart economically and also politically: the Roman emperors saw that the task of governing the Mediterranean lands and vast tracts of Europe west of the Rhine and south of the Danube exceeded the capacity of one man. Diocletian, ruling from 284 onwards, based himself in the east at Nikomedeia, and entrusted the government of the empire to a team of co-emperors, first another ‘Augustus’ in the west, and then, from 293 to 305, two deputies or ‘Caesars’ as well, a system known as the Tetrarchy.


Author(s):  
Frans Theuws

There are good reasons to consider northern Gaul a peripheral area of the Roman Empire in late antiquity (300–450). Its landscape of villas had to a large extent disappeared, and its towns had shrunk to insignificance. The emperor in Trier upheld a façade of well-being for the town and its immediate hinterland, but that façade likewise crumbled when he departed. Toward the mid-fifth century, no one would have believed the prophecy that by the mid-eighth century, all of Gaul would be part of an empire with its center in this northern periphery. What happened? By the mid-sixth century, northern Gaul seems to have experienced astonishing economic development. This change can be deduced from the flourishing vici (rural centers) in the Meuse Valley as well as from the wealth present in rural communities. Their cemeteries, which are now known in the thousands, were filled with objects from regional workshops and workshops at the other end of the former Roman Empire and beyond. The rural population’s demand for nonlocal products must have developed very quickly due to changing ritual repertoires and demographic growth revealed in evidence for the colonization of many areas and the creation of many new cemeteries. While the big question regarding which agents were responsible for this economic growth and recovery has been discussed for a long time, the importance of the rural population’s demand in a quantitative sense has not been considered a critical factor. In this chapter, I suggest that it was indeed critical.


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