A science of culture: Clarifications and extensions

2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 366-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mesoudi ◽  
Andrew Whiten ◽  
Kevin N. Laland

We are encouraged that the majority of commentators endorse our evolutionary framework for studying culture, and several suggest extensions. Here we clarify our position, dwelling on misunderstandings and requests for exposition. We reiterate that using evolutionary biology as a model for unifying the social sciences within a single synthetic framework can stimulate a more progressive and rigorous science of culture.

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bateson

Charles Darwin has had an extraordinary impact on many aspects of human affairs apart from revolutionizing biology. On the 200th anniversary of his birth, the Cambridge Darwin Festival in July 2009 celebrated these contributions to the humanities, philosophy and religion and the approach to medicine, economics and the social sciences. He is a man to revere. It is no discredit to him that the science of evolutionary biology should continue to evolve. In this article I shall consider some of the ways in which this has happened since his day.


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1686) ◽  
pp. 20150066
Author(s):  
Caroline Catmur ◽  
Emily S. Cross ◽  
Harriet Over

In order to interpret and engage with the social world, individuals must understand how they relate to others. Self–other understanding forms the backbone of social cognition and is a central concept explored by research into basic processes such as action perception and empathy, as well as research on more sophisticated social behaviours such as cooperation and intergroup interaction. This theme issue integrates the latest research into self–other understanding from evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience and psychiatry. By gathering perspectives from a diverse range of disciplines, the contributions showcase ways in which research in these areas both informs and is informed by approaches spanning the biological and social sciences, thus deepening our understanding of how we relate to others in a social world.


2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mesoudi ◽  
Andrew Whiten ◽  
Kevin N. Laland

We suggest that human culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary properties, and argue that the structure of a science of cultural evolution should share fundamental features with the structure of the science of biological evolution. This latter claim is tested by outlining the methods and approaches employed by the principal subdisciplines of evolutionary biology and assessing whether there is an existing or potential corresponding approach to the study of cultural evolution. Existing approaches within anthropology and archaeology demonstrate a good match with the macroevolutionary methods of systematics, paleobiology, and biogeography, whereas mathematical models derived from population genetics have been successfully developed to study cultural microevolution. Much potential exists for experimental simulations and field studies of cultural microevolution, where there are opportunities to borrow further methods and hypotheses from biology. Potential also exists for the cultural equivalent of molecular genetics in “social cognitive neuroscience,” although many fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. It is argued that studying culture within a unifying evolutionary framework has the potential to integrate a number of separate disciplines within the social sciences.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Beck

ArgumentFriedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) is mainly known for his defense of free-market economics and liberalism. His views on science – more specifically on the methodological differences between the physical sciences on the one hand, and evolutionary biology and the social sciences on the other – are less well known. Yet in order to understand, and properly evaluate Hayek's political position, we must look at the theory of scientific method that underpins it. Hayek believed that a basic misunderstanding of the discipline of economics and the complex phenomena with which it deals produced misconceptions concerning its method and goals, which led in turn to the adoption of dangerous policies. The objective of this article is to trace the development of Hayek's views on the nature of economics as a scientific discipline and to examine his conclusions concerning the scope of economic prediction. In doing so, I will first show that Hayek's interest in the natural sciences (especially biology), as well as his interest in epistemology, were central to his thought, dating back to his formative years. I will then emphasize the important place of historical analysis in Hayek's reflections on methodology and examine the reasons for his strong criticism of positivism and socialism. Finally, in the third and fourth sections that constitute the bulk of this article, I will show how Hayek's understanding of the data and goal of the social sciences (which he distinguished from those of the physical sciences), culminated in an analogy that sought to establish economics and evolutionary biology as exemplary complex sciences. I will challenge Hayek's interpretation of this analogy through a comparison with Darwin's views inThe Origin of Species, and thus open a door to re-evaluating the theoretical foundations of Hayek's political claims.


Author(s):  
Dominic D. P. Johnson

This chapter considers how and why international relations might benefit from an evolutionary approach. It explains the evolutionary biology's long history of misunderstanding and resistance in the social sciences since the “sociobiology” debate of the 1970s. It also reviews how the natural and social sciences have both moved on since the 1970s, including the promise for a future of mutual collaboration on strategic instincts. The chapter focuses on evolutionary biology to understand the origins and functions of cognitive biases and comprehend the selective pressures that shaped the brain in the first place. It addresses the question of whether psychological phenomena originate from nature or nurture.


Author(s):  
Stephen LeDrew

In the past two decades, the anti-religious movement known as New Atheism has been working to define a scientific basis for opposing religion and its influence in public affairs. New Atheist thought on religion is rooted in scientism and a narrative of progress and Enlightenment that refers to ideas derived from evolutionary biology for its authority. A notable feature of this approach is the New Atheism’s critique of the social sciences, which it dismisses as relativistic and seeks to replace with evolutionary psychology and neuroscience. This chapter examines the New Atheism’s position in terms of an historical division within atheist thought between approaches to religion that are grounded in the natural sciences and the social sciences, and argues that contemporary atheism should be understood primarily as a political project to advance the authority of an ideological vision of ‘true’ science and its representative experts. While typically understood as a response to religious fundamentalism, the New Atheism is as much a reaction to a perceived weakening of universalistic standards of knowledge and morality in an increasingly pluralistic western cultural milieu. Through a reading of influential New Atheist texts in relation to the historical development of modern atheism, the chapter examines the relative decline in importance of the social sciences in popular atheist discourse. This decline is a result of the evolving politics of contemporary atheism, which, in some major forms, has drifted away from its roots in progressive social justice movements and ideologies toward a more libertarian position.


Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

In this book, Mark Fedyk offers a novel analysis of the relationship between moral psychology and allied fields in the social sciences. Fedyk shows how the social sciences can be integrated with moral philosophy, argues for the benefits of such an integration, and offers a new ethical theory that can be used to bridge research between the two. Fedyk argues that moral psychology should take a social turn, investigating the psychological processes that motivate patterns of social behavior defined as ethical using normative information extracted from the social sciences. He points out methodological problems in conventional moral psychology, particularly the increasing methodological and conceptual inconsilience with both philosophical ethics and evolutionary biology. Fedyk's "causal theory of ethics" is designed to provide moral psychology with an ethical theory that can be used without creating tension between its scientific practice and the conceptual vocabulary of philosophical ethics. His account aims both to redirect moral psychology toward more socially realistic questions about human life and to introduce philosophers to a new form of ethical naturalism—a way of thinking about how to use different fields of scientific research to answer some of the traditional questions that are at the heart of ethics.


Author(s):  
Joseph Lau ◽  
Hannah R. Rothstein ◽  
Gavin B. Stewart

Meta-analysis was first introduced in medicine and the social sciences, and was used extensively in these fields decades earlier than in ecology and evolutionary biology. This chapter reviews the development of meta-analysis in medicine and the social sciences in order to illustrate its background and compare its application in these fields to those in ecology and evolution. Here, “medicine” refers to all aspects of health care and the biomedical sciences, including the diagnosis and treatment of individual patients, public health policy, health care financing and decision making, and basic and clinical biomedical research. Social science, as defined in this chapter, covers a variety of disciplines, including social, clinical, and organizational psychology, education, social welfare, criminology, business management, and economics. It encompasses both basic and applied research, and may focus on theory formulation and testing, or on informing policy or practice.


1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Crippen

Sociologists have been unusually reluctant to incorporate into their explanatory systems the theoretical insights of evolutionary biology, behavioral ecology, and population genetics. This skepticism toward genuinely evolutionary approaches is expressed, to varying degrees, in the reactions of Freese and Maryanski to my essay on neo-Darwinian sociology. In this brief response to their comments, I suggest that these general reservations are grounded in an unnecessary fear of resurgent Social Darwinism, unwarranted concerns regarding determinism and reductionism, unjustified allegations of teleology and tautology, and/or general misconceptions of the logic and principles of neo-Darwinian theory.


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