Conflicting Conceptions of Deterrence

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Shue

The Baptism of the BombHere is a two-step plan to rescue nuclear war from immorality. First, the United States should build the most moral offensive nuclear weapons that money can buy and bring nuclear warfare into compliance with the principle of noncombatant immunity. Then it should build a defensive “shield” that will make offensive nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” and take the world “beyond deterrence.” In this second stage, called the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) by believers and “Star Wars” by doubters, antimissile technology will confront missile technology like a Hegelian antithesis confronting its thesis, and we will all be lifted up out of the age of nuclear war into a realm made safe for conventional war.1 Even according to believers in the SDI, however, intermediate deployment, not to mention full deployment, of a strategic defense is some time away, pending breakthroughs on technological problems at which public money is now being thrown.

Author(s):  
Joseph Cirincione

The American poet Robert Frost famously mused on whether the world will end in fire or in ice. Nuclear weapons can deliver both. The fire is obvious: modern hydrogen bombs duplicate on the surface of the earth the enormous thermonuclear energies of the Sun, with catastrophic consequences. But it might be a nuclear cold that kills the planet. A nuclear war with as few as 100 hundred weapons exploded in urban cores could blanket the Earth in smoke, ushering in a years-long nuclear winter, with global droughts and massive crop failures. The nuclear age is now entering its seventh decade. For most of these years, citizens and officials lived with the constant fear that long-range bombers and ballistic missiles would bring instant, total destruction to the United States, the Soviet Union, many other nations, and, perhaps, the entire planet. Fifty years ago, Nevil Shute’s best-selling novel, On the Beach, portrayed the terror of survivors as they awaited the radioactive clouds drifting to Australia from a northern hemisphere nuclear war. There were then some 7000 nuclear weapons in the world, with the United States outnumbering the Soviet Union 10 to 1. By the 1980s, the nuclear danger had grown to grotesque proportions. When Jonathan Schell’s chilling book, The Fate of the Earth, was published in 1982, there were then almost 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled with a destructive force equal to roughly 20,000 megatons (20 billion tons) of TNT, or over 1 million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ anti-missile system was supposed to defeat a first-wave attack of some 5000 Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missile warheads streaking over the North Pole. ‘These bombs’, Schell wrote, ‘were built as “weapons” for “war”, but their significance greatly transcends war and all its causes and outcomes. They grew out of history, yet they threaten to end history. They were made by men, yet they threaten to annihilate man’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen B. Toon ◽  
Alan Robock ◽  
Michael Mills ◽  
Lili Xia

Of the nine countries known to have nuclear weapons, six are located in Asia and another, the United States, borders the Pacific Ocean. Russia and China were the first Asian nations with nuclear weapons, followed by Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Most of the world's nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals or maintaining them at historic levels, but several of those in Asia—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—continue to pursue relentless and expensive programs of nuclear weapons development and production. Hopefully, the nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 between Iran, the European Union, and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be a step toward eliminating nuclear weapons throughout Asia and the rest of the world. As we will discuss below, any country possessing a nuclear arsenal is on a path leading toward self-assured destruction, and is a threat to people everywhere on Earth.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

The primary mission assigned to the British Army from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War was deterring Soviet aggression in Europe by demonstrating the will and capability to fight with nuclear weapons in defence of NATO territory. This ‘surreal’ mission was unlike any other in history, and raised a number of conceptual and practical difficulties. This book provides the first comprehensive study on how the British Army imagined the character of a future nuclear land warfare, and how it planned to fight it. Based on new archival evidence, the book analyses British thinking about the political and military utility of tactical nuclear weapons, the role of land forces within NATO strategy, the development of theories of tactical nuclear warfare, how nuclear war was taught at the Staff College, the Army’s use of operational research, and the evolution of the Army’s nuclear war-fighting doctrine. The book argues that the British Army was largely successful in adapting to its new nuclear mission in Germany, but that it displayed a cognitive dissonance when faced with some of the more uncomfortable realities of nuclear war.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel

Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.


Author(s):  
Raymond K. MacKinnon,

Canadians rightly pride themselves on their technological achievements in outer space. Heralded as a pioneer with several “firsts” in space exploration, public perception is that Canada explores the “final frontier” in the name of peace. This is the myth perpetuated by scientists and politicians alike, distorting clear evidence to the contrary. This study aims to rectify this fallacy by demonstrating that Canadian space initiatives were a product of Cold War relations, a need for domestic and international security against the threat of nuclear war. Contextualized within the paradigm of a bipolar world, an ostensibly civilian space program only thinly veiled military objectives. Consulting military, political and scientific sources from the end of the Second World War to contemporary conflicts, what emerges is a complex relationship between civilian and military initiatives. Balancing demands from the United States for hemispheric security against the increasing threat of the Soviet Union whilst maintaining sovereignty over Canadian territory presented immense challenges to government leaders. Coupled with a shrinking defence budget, space research fulfilled specific niche roles in Canadian‐American relations. Deconstructing the objectives of prominent satellite programs, Canada‐U.S. (CANUS) agreements, and concomitant government sponsored defence research into theoretical space programs reveals policy marked by the vestiges of war. Peaceful orientations toward outer space perpetuated in historical literature sets a dangerous precedent. Future conflicts will not always pit technologically advanced societies against underdeveloped armies, and ignoring the military advantages of outer space could prove a fatal mistake in confrontations that will assuredly come.Defence in


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

Chapter 2 analyses how the British deterrence habit of mind manifested in a preference for a ‘pure-deterrence’ strategy for NATO. NATO’s forums were a market for strategic ideas, and competing visions of nuclear warfare reflected the often incompatible preferences of its member states. Bargaining and compromise resulted in significant changes to defensive concepts throughout the Cold War and saw the emergence of two distinct strategies, massive retaliation and flexible response, which provided the conceptual framework for the Army’s thinking about nuclear war. The chapter explores the most important assumptions made about the character of nuclear warfare, the political and military utility of tactical nuclear weapons, and the perceived role of ground forces within NATO’s deterrent posture. It argues that the British reluctance to accept that military organizations could perform a useful function during or after a nuclear exchange set an ominous tone for the Army’s own theorizing about future war.


1981 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard H. Hiatt

The first of a series of meetings, sponsored by Physicians for Social Responsibility, took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in February 1980, to consider the Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War. It was followed by others elsewhere and led to the horrifying convictions that (1) it is highly unlikely that any nuclear war would be ‘limited’, and (2) no effective medical response can be conceived to deal with the human damage which would result from a nuclear attack. Consequently an organization entitled International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War has been established to hold further meetings and promote general enlightenment towards avoiding widespread—even global—human carnage and environmental destruction which would accompany a nuclear war involving even a small fraction of the weapons that now exist.The atomic bomb which was exploded over Hiroshima in August 1945 is estimated to have killed 75,000 of that city's population of 245,000 and to have destroyed two-thirds of the 90,000 buildings within the city limits. It had an explosive power equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT, whereas many of the thermonuclear devices now deployed at the ready are some 50 times more powerful than it although still far less destructive than the most devastating contemporary weapons. Consequently the world's leaders must be brought to their senses and these horrific weapons dismantled to avoid what could be ‘the last epidemic’.The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the fact that at present more than 50,000 nuclear warheads are reported to be deployed and ready to launch—most of them being sufficient in destructive power to dwarf the bomb that was used against Hiroshima. Sufficient nuclear devices exist outside the United States to destroy totally every major American city. Six nations are now acknowledged possessors of nuclear weapons, and there are almost certainly others to increase the degree of instability. This situation is not so much ‘unthinkable’ as insufficiently realized or even thought about—hence the failure to reject nuclear war as a ‘viable option’ in the conduct of world affairs. Medically, any treatment programmes would be virtually useless and the costs quite staggering, so prevention becomes imperative.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 851-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. L. M. Burns

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one facet of the problem of preventing nuclear war, a problem which has engaged the statesmen of the world ever since the dust of the Nagasaki explosion settled. In the Truman-Attlee-King declaration of November 15, 1945, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada proposed that the United Nations set up a commission to study how atomic energy could be controlled so as to limit its use to peaceful purposes, how atomic weapons could be eliminated from national armaments, and how safeguards could be set up so as to ensure that all nations would comply widi the obligations which they undertook to these ends. Thus fell to the United Nations one of the most intractable problems of international organization, a problem which might be looked on as the creation of a new sphere of international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 563-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Matthew G. McKinzie

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.


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