HISTORY AND PATTERN

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Schmidtz
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Natural Distribution ◽  
The Core ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Core Idea ◽  
The Way

This essay compares Rawls's and Nozick's theories of justice. Nozick thinks patterned principles of justice are false, and offers a historical alternative. Along the way, Nozick accepts Rawls's claim that the natural distribution of talent is morally arbitrary, but denies that there is any short step from this premise to any conclusion that the natural distribution is unjust. Nozick also agrees with Rawls on the core idea of natural rights liberalism: namely, that we are separate persons. However, Rawls and Nozick interpret that idea in different ways-momentously different ways. The tension between their interpretations is among the forces shaping political philosophy to this day.

Systematicity and Normative Justification

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Unique Form ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Normative Justification ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.

scholarly journals A Defense of Nonideal Theories of Justice / Uma Defesa de Teorias de Justiça Não Ideais

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Goya Tocchetto
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
The Core ◽  
Current Prevalence ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Inalienable Rights

Abstract: The overwhelming majority of contemporary theories of justice is grounded in the rationalist tradition (Frazer, 2010). As a consequence, political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) have interpreted moral systems as axiomatic, substantially based on concepts of inalienable rights and duties—usually guided by the core value attached to human dignity. Once ethicists started working under an axiomatic framework, empirical evidence has become less and less useful. This road has been conducive to the current prevalence of ideal theories in the field. On a dissonant note, recent debate in political philosophy has rekindled our attention to the development of nonideal theories of justice. Yet before one argues in favor of nonideal (or comparative) theories of justice, one has to be certain that all arguments against the broader incorporation of empirical evidence in the development of political philosophical theories are not valid. Therefore the focus of the present paper is the assessment—and dismissal—of these arguments.Keywords: Theories of Justice; Nonideal Theories; Empirical Evidence; MethodologyResumo: A grande maioria das teorias de justiça contemporâneas se baseiam na tradição racionalista (Frazer, 2010). Como consequência, filósofos políticos como John Rawls (1971) têm interpretado sistemas morais como axiomáticos, baseados substancialmente em conceitos de direitos e deveres inalienáveis – geralmente guiados pelo valor central concedido à dignidade humana. Uma vez que os eticistas começaram a utilizar uma moldura axiomática, as evidências empíricas se tornaram cada vez menos úteis. Esse caminho foi relevante para a atual prevalência de teorias ideais nesse campo. De maneira dissonante, o debate recente na filosofia política reacendeu a atenção para o desenvolvimento de teorias de justiça não ideais. Contudo, antes que alguém argumente em favor de teorias de justiça não ideais (ou comparativas), é preciso estar certo de que todos os argumentos contrários a uma incorporação mais ampla de evidências empíricas no desenvolvimento de teorias políticas filosóficas não são válidos. Portanto, o foco deste artigo é a avaliação – e rejeição – destes argumentos.Palavras-chave: Teorias de justiça; Teorias não ideais; Evidência empírica; Metodologia.

Justice and the Market

1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. MacLeod
Keyword(s):  
Character Trait ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Official View ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Way

Direct comparison of the ostensibly competing principles embedded in rival theories of Justice is often complicated by differences of view as to the nature and scope of the concrete Judgments a theory of Justice must attempt to illumine. Aristotle's official view, for example, is that Justice is a disposition or character trait. This commits him to scrutiny of Judgments about the Justice of particular actions since it is actions which serve to reveal, and to help form, the disposition in question. But it also stands in the way of any proper recognition of the fact that the competing principles of Justice he examines apply in the first instance neither to actions nor to dispositions but to states of affairs or situations: actions are Just for Aristotle when they help to bring about a Just distribution.

The Logic of Legitimacy: Ethics in Political Realism

2013 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Jörg Sigwart
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Political Ethics ◽  
Political Realism ◽  
Realist Theory ◽  
The Core ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Core Idea ◽  
Realist Perspective

AbstractThe article examines the recent debate on a genuinely realist perspective in political philosophy and argues that the core idea of realism is a certain type of ethical theory. In spite of the notorious polemic against “moralism” in politics that is characteristic of realist thinkers since Machiavelli, political realism as put forth in the current debate is not to be understood as a strictly fact-oriented perspective on politics, but rather as a perspective that itself is founded on a theory of political ethics. This peculiarly realist theory of political ethics can be characterized by its focus on the theoretical importance of political application problems, by a genuine priority principle underlying its understanding of political ethics, by its distinctive understanding of the concept of legitimacy and, finally, by its claim that any form of ethics, as far as it is concerned with political questions, is necessarily ambivalent in character.

How to Justify Principles of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Zhang Guoqing
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Core ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

AbstractJohn Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.

Against Restitution

2003 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Vernon
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Core ◽  
Clear Case ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Core Idea

Recently, states and other institutions have undertaken to make restitution for past abuses. Distinctions need to be made between various kinds of restitutive practices that rest on quite different normative grounds. Moreover, the core idea of restitution, in attaching obligation to particular historically grounded relationships, is questionable, and what is being attempted is better explained and justified in terms of a number of standard principles of justice of a non-restitutive kind; for although there is, in principle, a clear case of restitutive justice, its elements rarely, if ever, exist in the real world in an unmixed state. Although there are significant objections to deriving local obligations from principles of universal justice, they have no force in this case. Policies termed ‘restitutive’ may well be justifiable, but they are misdescribed.

The Evolution of Conative Representational Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin W. Schulz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Cognitive Efficiency ◽  
The Core ◽  
The World ◽  
Core Idea ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

This chapter defends a cognitive-efficiency-based account of the evolution of conative representational decision making. The core idea behind this account is that, similarly to cognitive representational decision makers, conative representational decision makers can, in some circumstances, adjust more easily to a changed environment and streamline their neural decision making machinery. However, as I also make clearer, the origins of these benefits are different here than in the case of cognitive representational decision making: they center on patterns in the way the organism reacts to the world, and not on patterns in the states of the world that the organism can react to. This has some important implications for the situations in which conative representational decision making is adaptive relative to when cognitive representational decision making is adaptive. The chapter ends by combining the picture laid out here with that laid out in the previous chapter to develop a clearer account of the relationship between the evolution of conative and the evolution of cognitive representational decision making.

Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Theology ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Influential Theory

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.

The Tyranny of the Ideal

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Open Society ◽  
The Past ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The World ◽  
Diverse Society ◽  
Just Society ◽  
The Ideal

This book lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. It shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. The book argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice—essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years—needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, the book points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society—with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives—have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. The book defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, this book rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.

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