Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of a Dispute

1961 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Richard Lowenthal

The policy declaration and the appeal to the peoples of the world adopted last December by the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties mark the end of one phase in the dispute between the leaderships of the ruling parties of China and the Soviet Union—the phase in which the followers of Mao for the first time openly challenged the standing of the Soviet Communists as the fountain-head of ideological orthodoxy for the world movement. But the “ideological dispute” which began in April was neither a sudden nor a self-contained development: it grew out of acute differences between the two Communist Great Powers over concrete diplomatic issues, and it took its course in constant interaction with the changes in Soviet diplomatic tactics. Hence the total impact of that phase on Soviet foreign policy on one side, and on the ideology, organisation and strategy of international Communism on the other, cannot be evaluated from an interpretation of the Moscow documents alone, but only from a study of the process as a whole, as it developed during the past year on both planes.

1987 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry R. Posen

Two American debates on foreign policy and national security. The Reagan administration and those who share its ideology see today's Soviet Union as not much different from yesterday's, and yesterday's Soviet Union as not much different from Nazi Germany. Like its progenitors in the 1930s, the modern Soviet Union is a “totalitarian” state, and therefore by nature expansionist, armed to the teeth, disposed to violence, fond of diplomatic tests of political will, and—as a consequence of all these factors —hard to deter and harder to beat. A different view prevails among most of the arms control community, the NATO allies, and some American academics. In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is seen as a fairly typical great power whose behavior in international politics can be explained by the mixture of fear, greed, and stupidity that has characterized most great powers in the past as they have tried to secure their borders and pursue their interests in a world without law. It does not like to take great risks, it fears war, and it is, at worst, opportunistically expansionist. In sharp contrast to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is more conservative than reckless; if anything, nuclear weapons have reinforced this conservatism.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-678
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz

This paper analyzes the way in which internal forces are likely to affect Soviet foreign policy over the next few years. Four developments are examined: potential Soviet petroleum shortages, the growing Soviet Muslim population, the slowdown in the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union, and the imminent post-Brezhnev succession struggle. The question is posed: Will these factors soon impel the Soviet Union toward foreign expansion and adventurism? It is our conclusion that two of these factors, the leveling off of oil production and the rapid growth of Soviet Muslims, are not likely to have a strong influence on Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, the decline in growth rates and the demise of Brezhnev are likely to have a major impact on future Soviet policies. The Soviet system is not experiencing a terminal crisis, but it is definitely laboring under growing burdens. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this will necessarily result in foreign expansion. A new, rejuvenated leadership may well seek a relaxation of tensions, as it did upon Stalin’s death in 1953, so as to create favorable conditions for dealing with its pressing problems. The future remains highly uncertain. International developments will be at least as important as domestic factors, and much will depend upon the policies adopted by Western governments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-321
Author(s):  
Vasile Rotaru

The 2008 Georgia war represented a turning point in Russian foreign policy. It was for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Moscow invaded an independent country and for the first time when two members of the Council of Europe fought against each other. A premiere for Russian post-Soviet foreign policy was registered in 2014 too. The annexation of Crimea represented the first incorporation of foreign territories by Moscow since World War II. These two events generated the West's protest and blatantly contradict Russia's proclaimed foreign policy discourse centered around the respect for states' sovereignty and equality of actors in the international system. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia's foreign policy is determined by the West's international behavior — Moscow looking whether to emulate or to find alternatives to it; the present paper will compare Russia's legitimization arguments for the 2008 war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea trying to assess how Moscow answers Western criticism and whether there is a continuity in Russian official legitimization narratives.


Author(s):  
Toby C. Rider

This chapter explores the range of tactics used by the U.S. government in securing a favorable climate of opinion on the U.S. participation in the Olympics and discrediting the performance of the Soviet Union in the case of either victory or defeat. While it was easier to defend the U.S. sporting culture when U.S. athletes were winning athletic events around the world and dominating at the Olympics, the evolving nature of Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of Stalin's death put pressure on the U.S. psychological warfare apparatus in the Olympic propaganda war. Thus, psychological warfare experts became even more involved in the activities of U.S. sports organizations, and began to press the boundaries of the state–private relationship.


2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michael Martinez

In the wake of India's May 1998 decision to resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1974, as well as arch-rival Pakistan's subsequent response, the attention of the world again has focused on nuclear nonproliferation policy as a means of maintaining stability in politically troubled regions of the world. The 1990s proved to be an uncertain time for nonproliferation policy. Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities. Iraq displayed its well-known intransigence by refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors access to facilities suspected of manufacturing nuclear weapons. North Korea maintained a nuclear weapons program despite opposition from many Western nations. Troubling questions about nuclear holdings persisted in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. New nuclear powers were created in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even the renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 failed to assuage the concerns of Western powers fearful of aggressive measures undertaken by rogue nuclear proliferants.


1976 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz

AbstractThere has been a great deal of controversy among Western scholars concerning the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the final years and months of Stalin's rule.1 One of the crucial questions at issue is whether or not there were significant divisions of opinion within the Politburo over foreign policy matters. This article attempts to explore this particular question through an examination of a doctrinal controversy that surfaced during Stalin's last years. In one of his most famous works, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Lenin argued that war was an inevitable concomitant of the capitalist system. He contended that the unending struggle for markets meant that periodic wars among the capitalist powers were unavoidable and inevitable.2 Stalin adhered to this view throughout his long reign, and it was not until three years after Stalin's death, in Khruschchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, that it was finally revised. Yet despite Stalin's strict adherence to the Leninist analysis of imperialism, and despite the harsh discipline that characterized his rule, there is evidence that the official interpretation was being publicly questioned even while Stalin was still alive. Given the nature of esoteric communication in the Soviet Union,and the close connection between doctrinal and policy debates, an examination of the controversy concerning the inevitability of war can provide important evidence having a direct bearing upon our understanding of this period.3


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.


Keruen ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (69) ◽  
Author(s):  
A.S. Jumadilov ◽  

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet state of post-Soviet autonomous republics turned out to be the ideology for which cinematographers and screenwriters have to make a film epic of epoch - national cinema. In this article, the author can only use the ever-present cinematography, the unmerciful nationalistic culture, the ideological orientation of the film industry, the uniqueness or national identity. It's a good idea to have a world-renowned artisan who is doing all the same, seeking internationalization and gloss? Another - cinematic and astrophysical art of Shaken Aimanov, whose works live in volumes or polls, and others. For many years, many changes have taken place in the national cinema, such as national culture, a national emblem of national culture. For the first time in the history of national cinema, national cinema and the world of cinema, the future and future films have been transformed into a lot of changes. The Concept of distinguished singer Shaken Aimanova is embodied in the volume, which, unlike the researchers and artists all over the world of cinema Shaken Aimnayev, the director of which, as long as he is a filmmaker, creates a film studio as part of national culture.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of “containment.” Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.


1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Zimmerman ◽  
Robert Axelrod

This study systematically identifies the Soviet lessons of Vietnam as presented in eleven Soviet newspapers (specialized and regional as well as the central papers) and eight journals. Altogether, 1,585 citations were coded, representing more than 70 different lessons. A predominant finding is that the most common lessons the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam differed from their American counterparts: the Soviet lessons would not have warned the leadership about the dangers of military intervention in Afghanistan. A left/right scale was constructed, based on such issue clusters as why the communists won in Vietnam, the nature of imperialism, and the implications of Soviet policy in the Third World. Substantial variation was found among the media examined, many of which are linked to specific Soviet institutions. The implication is that Soviet foreign policy is contingent upon individual choices, institutional interplay, and changing contexts. This, in turn, suggests that Western policy makers should not lose sight of their capacity to influence the Soviet policy dialogue, and hence Soviet policy choices.


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