Regulating China's Power Sector: Creating an Independent Regulator without Autonomy

2014 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. 452-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chung-min Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
The State ◽  
Regulatory Capture ◽  
Resource Reallocation ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
Regulatory Commission

AbstractThroughout its period of economic transition, the Chinese state has readjusted its relationship with industry and developed new regulatory schemes. China's first industry-specific independent regulatory agency, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), was created in 2003. Its operation does not follow Western practice which adopts the best institutional arrangement for autonomous regulators. This article will examine the failings and regulatory capture of SERC. I argue that because the process of creating a new regulator involves resource reallocation and power redistribution, SERC has suffered both endogenous and exogenous disadvantages since its inception. The compromised institutional design, along with insufficient resources and fragmented authority, has considerably weakened SERC's regulatory capacity. Moreover, SERC was not designed as part of the reform schedule, but rather emerged later as a response to institutional necessities, which also contributes to its vulnerability. As a result, the state has exposed SERC to potential capture by both government entities and regulated enterprises.

scholarly journals Reforms, Restructuring, and Infrastructure Sector: A Study of Initiatives in Orissa Power Sector

2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Thillai Rajan
Keyword(s):  
Business Processes ◽  
Electric Utility ◽  
The State ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Reform Programme ◽  
Key Features ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
And Function

In 1994, the Government of Orissa initiated power sector reforms and restructuring. The reform programme resulted in vertical unbundling of the state-owned integrated electric utility, corporatization of the resultant entities, and constitution of an autonomous regulatory commission for power sector regulation in the state. One of the key features of the reform programme was the privatization of distribution activity. To make the process successful and obtain more revenues, there was a need for the distribution entities to change the existing culture and approach to management. The Government of Orissa undertook a process of organizational strengthening to develop appropriate organizational structure, systems, and business processes suitable to the new environment. This study describes the various strengthening measures implemented by Grid Corporation of Orissa to make it commercially viable and function effectively in the new environment following power sector reform.

scholarly journals REVVING UP THE FORTUNES OF KARNATAKA’S ESCOMS

2021 ◽  
pp. 55-59
Author(s):  
Mahesha, V. ◽  
Naveen, G.V.
Keyword(s):  
Drip Irrigation ◽  
The State ◽  
Electricity Supply ◽  
Financial Health ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Stakeholder Groups ◽  
The Government ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Transmission And Distribution

When the power sector reforms were ushered in, many protagonists of the reforms believed that the reforms would break new ground in more ways than one. After all, generation, transmission and distribution of power would be entrusted to dedicated entities and if they failed, they could be held individually accountable and answerable. Even a hike in power tariff would be effected only after taking the stakeholder groups into confidence. But nothing of the sort happened even with the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) around. The bottom lines of the various electricity supply companies (Escoms) of the state began to turn increasingly red with each passing year. It is high time the Escoms were nursed back to financial health. An investigation undertaken by the researcher after interacting with stakeholder groups like CESCO officers and the farmer-consumers, among others, led him to conclude that a few steps must be taken immediately to arrest the falling bottom lines of the Escoms. To begin with, the government should transfer the subsidy payable to the farmer-consumersdirectly to the bank accounts of the latter. However, if this is to materialise, the IP sets installed by the farmer-consumers should be necessarily metered . This will ensure that the beneficiary does not take the subsidised / free supply of power for granted. Underserving beneficiaries can be easily spotted and kept out of the subsidised power / free power loop. Government should promote drip irrigation to conserve precious water table and power. Even large farmers can be considered for the purpose if they are ready to share the tariff incurred for the purpose, with the government.

The State as an Actor

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Menz
Keyword(s):  
Service Sector ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regulatory Capture ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
Political Left ◽  
Central Actor ◽  
Capitalist State ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Despite the state being such a central actor in establishing and policing the rules of the game of any given political economy, its role is often neglected. In this chapter, we briefly review relevant state theories and explore changes to the nature and appearance of the capitalist state. The awesome increase in the political fire power of the financial service sector has unfortunately led to regulatory capture. The state can no longer be considered a neutral umpire, being heavily influenced by the prerogatives of major banking institutions. This state of affairs corrupts the hopes that liberals place in the self-policing powers of the marketplace and reflects certain fears on the political left regarding the pernicious effects of ‘financialization’.

scholarly journals The State of the Power Sector in Rwanda: A Progressive Sector With Ambitious Targets

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bimenyimana ◽  
Godwin N. O. Asemota ◽  
Lingling Li
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Power Sector

Can the State Create Cooperation?: Problems of Reforming the Labor Supply in France

2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
PEPPER D. CULPEPPER
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The State ◽  
Vocational Education And Training ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Industrial Countries ◽  
Primary Obstacle ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
And Training

Governments in the advanced industrial countries increasingly rely on supply-side reforms to intervene in the economy. This article examines one such reform, that of vocational education and training in France, whose successful implementation required that private actors cooperate not with the state, but with each other. As demonstrated through an empirical analysis of two employment zones, theories of institutional design that underscore the necessity of sanctioning cannot explain the successful emergence of cooperation, because new sanctioning regimes lack credibility under the uncertain conditions of economic reform. The primary obstacle to successful implementation of these reforms is uncertainty about the consequences of reciprocal cooperation, and the article highlights the mutual roles of states and employers' associations in overcoming this uncertainty. Active collaboration between policymakers and employers' associations, which have uniquely good access to private information about firms, is necessary to enable state policies to target those firms which are the most likely potential cooperators.

Reproduction of Danwei Institutional Features in the Context of China's Market Economy: The Case of Haidian District's High-Tech Sector

1996 ◽  
Vol 147 ◽  
pp. 839-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corinna-Barbara Francis
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
The State ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Labour Unions ◽  
New Associations ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Private Entrepreneurs

The literature on the political and economic transition from Communism, developed largely in the context of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has been dominated by the idea that horizontal forms of social and political association displace the vertically structured, segmented forms of social control and organization which are characteristic of traditional Communist systems. Social forces, by linking together in broadly based, horizontally structured associations such as industry-wide labour unions and associations of private entrepreneurs, are able to break out of the vertical structures of control and strengthen their collective bargaining position vis-a-vis the state. New associations of entrepreneurs, workers, religious organizations and eventually political parties emerge and coalesce and further strengthen the power of civil society against the state. Economic liberalization is seen as a particular catalyst to this process. Market reforms weaken the state's centralized control and enable social forces to mobilize autonomously.

Uttarakhand

Mapping Power ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 296-318
Author(s):  
Jonathan Balls
Keyword(s):  
Low Cost ◽  
Thermal Power ◽  
Uttar Pradesh ◽  
The State ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Hydro Power ◽  
High Level ◽  
Financial Base ◽  
Breathing Room ◽  
High Share

Uttarakhand was created out of Uttar Pradesh and endowed with a substantial benefit: sole access to cheap hydro power. Low-cost power allowed the state to attract industry by cutting tariffs, providing a stable financial base, and enabling a well-functioning sector. With low tariffs, the power sector has not become an arena for populist policies despite frequent electoral shifts. However, this comfortable situation also limited the pressure to use the breathing room created by low cost power coupled with high share of industrial consumption to address long-standing loss levels in other parts of the state. As the limits of low-cost power are reached, the threat to Uttarakhand’s high-level equilibrium comes from having to turn to high-cost thermal power and stagnating industrial consumption.

scholarly journals Regulation with Chinese Characteristics: Deciphering Banking Regulation in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orhan H. Yazar
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Political Survival ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
Chinese Characteristics ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Regulatory Actions

The regulatory agency responsible for prudential supervision of the banks in China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), is not an independent authority. The agency's regulatory actions are constrained by the central government, which has to balance the prudential and non-prudential consequences of bank regulation for its political survival. The conditions and limits of the government's influence on the CBRC is analysed through an investigation of three regulatory cases. The conclusion is that the CBRC's regulatory actions are determined by the relative importance of prudential outcomes for the government's policy objectives.

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