Biotechnology, International Law, and the National Interest

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-112
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Crump Hanson

On November 25, 1969 Richard Nixon announced that because of the “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” of biological weapons, the United States would never use these weapons, would destroy all existing stocks, and would confine its research to strictly defined measures of defense (Harris, 1987:193). This unilateral renunciation followed an extensive review by the National Security Council of U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy, which lasted six months and involved every relevant agency in the U.S. government and which concluded that U.S. biological warfare capabilities provided no compelling military advantages (Tucker, 1984-85:61). Three years later the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed; it was the first postwar arms control agreement to elminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of states (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982:122). The treaty was ratified unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1974, and over 100 nations have acceded to it. This arms control achievement has been attributed in part to the serious doubts which many countries, including the United States, shared about the military value of biological weapons (Harris, 1987:205-6). Within a decade of the signing of this treaty, however, the development of recombinant-DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technology had raised the possibility of a new and more effective form of biological warfare.

2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiwei Chen

AbstractChinese allegations that the United States used biological weapons against Chinese troops and Korean civilians is one of the most shocking episodes of the Korean War. While the Chinese government repeatedly reprimanded the U.S. government for its uncivilized combat behavior, the U.S. government vigorously issued denials, treating the charges as an extreme propaganda maneuver applied by China in that moment of military crisis, ideological fervor, and political passion. Since then, a huge amount of scholarship has been produced on the allegation.1 None, however, provided a persuasive conclusion on the incident, mainly due to the lack of reliable sources.


1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhard Geissler

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-41
Author(s):  
Gregory Winger

The overthrow of the monarchy in Afghanistan in 1973 was a seminal moment in the country's history and in U.S. policy in Central Asia. The return of Mohamed Daoud Khan to power was aided by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, the Communist party) and military officers trained in the Soviet Union. Even as Communism was making its first substantive gains in Afghanistan, the United States was wrestling with how best to pursue its strategy of containment. Stung by the experience of Vietnam, President Richard Nixon concluded that the United States could not unilaterally respond to every instance of Communist expansion. In the turbulent years that followed, U.S. diplomacy and Daoud's desire for nonalignment combined to mitigate Soviet influence in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. triumph was fleeting insofar as Daoud's shift toward nonalignment triggered the erosion of Soviet-Afghan relations, culminating in the overthrow of his government and the final ascension of the PDPA.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


Author(s):  
Alexander Savelyev

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


Author(s):  
N. Sokov

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.’ own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia’s decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.


2022 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65
Author(s):  
Symbol Lai

In 1951, six years after the United States defeated Japan and commenced the Occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) issued an ordinance in support of agricultural cooperatives. Despite the appearance of altruism, the move marked the emergence of the U.S. anticolonial empire, a form that advocated racial and ethnic self-determination even as it expanded the U.S. military presence. This article shows how U.S. policymakers in Okinawa borrowed from modernization theory to implement models to foster ethnic identification through economic development. Their plans sought to render the United States an ally to Okinawa freedom despite the devastating effects militarism had on the local landscape. Specifically, military plans posited frameworks like the Okinawan economy, which strategically turned the military into a partner without whom Okinawa could not modernize. The article further focuses on agriculture, an arena where the contradictions of the U.S. Occupation was most acute. It argues that rehabilitating the local cooperative network drew Okinawans into the military project, not only to paper over the U.S. colonial presence, but also to further the reach of military discipline.


Author(s):  
Andrew Goodhart ◽  
Jami K. Taylor

For most of its history, the U.S. military has maintained a policy of exclusion toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people serving in uniform. The justifications for these exclusions have included the view that being homosexual or transgender is a psychological disorder, that it undermines military morale and effectiveness, and a fear that LGBT people would be vulnerable to foreign espionage. Explicit policies banning consensual homosexual sex—and excluding from service those who engage in it—date to the period between World Wars I and II, but de facto efforts at exclusion have existed since the early days of the republic. Regulations governing homosexuals in the military came under pressure in the 1970s and 1980s as societal views toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people changed, and those LGB service members discharged under the policy increasingly challenged their treatment in court. (Public pressure to change regulations governing transgender people in the military arose mostly in the 2000s, though litigation efforts date to the 1970s.) In addition to general shifts in public and legal opinion, the debate over LGB people serving in the U.S. military was affected by the experience of foreign militaries that allow LGB people to serve. United States law began to loosen formal restrictions on LBG people serving in uniform with the passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) in 1994, but it still required LGB people to serve in secret. Changing public perceptions of LGB people and problems implementing the ban galvanized support for eliminating such restrictions. In 2010, President Obama signed legislation repealing DADT and removing all restrictions on LGB people serving in the military. However, transgender people do not enjoy the same rights. The Trump administration has revised Obama-era rules on transgender service members to enable greater exclusion. The issue is being contested in the courts and appears ripe for further political and legal dispute.


Author(s):  
Richard J. Kilroy Jr.

The United States military has taken a number of steps to confront the threat of cyber warfare. These include organizational, operational, and personnel changes by all the armed services, as well as the joint commands, which conduct operational warfare. Many of these changes began before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as military planners recognized the vulnerabilities the nation faced to asymmetrical warfare conducted in cyberspace, as well as the military’s dependency on key critical infrastructures within the United States that were vulnerable to cyber warfare. Although many changes have taken place, to include training new classes of military officers and enlisted specialists in career fields and military doctrine related to cyber warfare (both offensive and defensive), the military continues to remain vulnerable to an adversary’s ability to control the informational battlefield. Thus, a key strategic goal of the U.S. military leadership is to achieve information superiority over its current and potential adversaries.


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