Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Comments on the Contributions of Marie Isabelle Chevier and Lynn Marvin Hansen

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhard Geissler

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-06
Author(s):  
Robert Skopec

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiwei Chen

AbstractChinese allegations that the United States used biological weapons against Chinese troops and Korean civilians is one of the most shocking episodes of the Korean War. While the Chinese government repeatedly reprimanded the U.S. government for its uncivilized combat behavior, the U.S. government vigorously issued denials, treating the charges as an extreme propaganda maneuver applied by China in that moment of military crisis, ideological fervor, and political passion. Since then, a huge amount of scholarship has been produced on the allegation.1 None, however, provided a persuasive conclusion on the incident, mainly due to the lack of reliable sources.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2199236
Author(s):  
Shannon Portillo ◽  
Alesha Doan ◽  
Ashley Mog

Current debates about bathrooms and bathroom policy contribute to a long history of how space shapes norms and expectations about privacy and gender equity in the workplace. The military serves as a significant site of discussion, particularly as the Department of Defense moves forward with efforts to integrate women into combat positions. Relying on an analysis of 27 focus groups with a total of 198 participants we collected from Special Operations in the U.S. Army, we examine bathrooms as a site where male soldiers contest and resist female integration. Using Sasson-Levy and Katz’s concept of institutional de-gendering and re-gendering, we argue that men’s resistance to gender-neutral toilets is an effort to re-gender Special Forces and maintain the hegemonic masculine culture that acutely defines it.


1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-112
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Crump Hanson

On November 25, 1969 Richard Nixon announced that because of the “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” of biological weapons, the United States would never use these weapons, would destroy all existing stocks, and would confine its research to strictly defined measures of defense (Harris, 1987:193). This unilateral renunciation followed an extensive review by the National Security Council of U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy, which lasted six months and involved every relevant agency in the U.S. government and which concluded that U.S. biological warfare capabilities provided no compelling military advantages (Tucker, 1984-85:61). Three years later the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed; it was the first postwar arms control agreement to elminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of states (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982:122). The treaty was ratified unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1974, and over 100 nations have acceded to it. This arms control achievement has been attributed in part to the serious doubts which many countries, including the United States, shared about the military value of biological weapons (Harris, 1987:205-6). Within a decade of the signing of this treaty, however, the development of recombinant-DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technology had raised the possibility of a new and more effective form of biological warfare.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Robert Skopec ◽  

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.


This chapter is a brief history of the military developments leading to the creation of the Military Advanced Regional Anesthesia and Analgesia Initiative (MARAA) and eventually the Department of Defense Center of Excellence for Pain the Defense and Veterans Center for Integrative Pain Management.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-262
Author(s):  
Kenneth I. Berns

Members of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) have a considerable history of bringing scientific and technical knowledge to the issue of biological weapons control and being available to serve in advisory roles to the government. ASM's involvement with the biological weapons issue began in the 1940s, when microbiologists served as advisors to the government's Biological Defense Research Program and participated in the Biological Warfare Committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. In 1970, a controversy resulting from the ASM's involvement with this issue abated when the ASM Council approved a statement concerning non-secrecy and free movement in research. Simultaneously, the society affirmed support for President Richard M. Nixon's action to end the U.S.'s offensive biological weapons program. The society's code of ethics, published in 1985, contains two relevant sections that seek to discourage ASM members from participating in biological weapons development.


1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Franz

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.


2003 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard D. Stupak ◽  
Michael C. Scheuller ◽  
David N. Schindler ◽  
David E. Ellison

Recent bioterror attacks and other world events have focused the medical community's attention on agents that might be used in biological warfare. One of these potential biological weapons is Francisella tularensis, a gram-negative coccobacillus that is one of the most infectious bacteria known. F tularensis can cause severe, even fatal, systemic tularemia. Under normal circumstances, F tularensis is transmitted by infected ticks, insects, and other animals. As a weapon of terrorism, the bacterium would likely be disseminated as an aerosol and contracted by inhalation. Because many cases of tularemia are characterized by head and neck symptoms, otolaryngologists should be familiar with the diagnosis and management of this disease. In this article, we describe a case of zoonotic tularemia that manifested as a neck mass, and we review the pathophysiology, diagnosis, and treatment of tularemia. We also summarize what is known about its potential as a biological weapon.


Hypatia ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Wagner Decew

I first discuss reasons for feminists to attend to the role of women in the military, despite past emphasis on antimilitarism. I then focus on the exclusion of women from combat duty, reviewing its sanction by the U.S. Supreme Court and the history of its adoption. I present arguments favoring the exclusion, defending strong replies to each, and demonstrate that reasoning from related cases and feminist analyses of equality explain why exclusion remains entrenched.


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