Should Imprisoned Criminals have a Constitutional Right to Vote?.

1987 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 153-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zdravko Planinc
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Rights ◽  
Reasonable Limit ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legislative Assembly

Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms sets out the democratic rights of Canadian citizens. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein. Donald Smiley has written that “some of the rights contained in the Charter are stated so explicitly that there is little doubt about their meaning and effect,” and that section 3 is one of the best examples of such clarity. But Smiley was wrong. The “meaning and effect” of section 3 has been thrown into doubt by the question whether its guarantee of the right to vote extends to imprisoned criminals. Newfoundland obviously thinks that it does, for in The Charter of Rights Amendment Act 1985, it repealed the traditional prohibition of prisoner voting. Other jurisdictions have chosen to retain the legal prohibition and to defend it against constitutional challenges mounted by inmates of Canadian prisons. The issue is probably headed for the Supreme Court, which will have to decide whether prisoners are full “citizens” within the meaning of section 3, and, if they are, whether a limit on their right to vote can be justified under section 1 as a “reasonable limit, demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.”

Part V Rights and Freedoms, B Rights and Freedoms under the Charter, Ch.34 Democratic Rights

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawood Yasmin
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Future Challenges ◽  
Democratic Rights ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
Bundle Of Rights ◽  
The Right

This chapter examines the scope and protection of democratic rights in Canada. After outlining the source of democratic rights, it focuses on the right to vote by considering judicial decisions on such issues as voter qualifications, residency rules, and the entitlement to vote. It then shows how the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to vote as consisting of a bundle of democratic rights. By using the bundle of rights, the Supreme Court has been able to regulate a wide array of democratic institutions and processes. The chapter proceeds to examine the Court’s intervention in the electoral process by discussing its cases on electoral redistricting, political parties, campaign finance, and the dissemination of electoral information. The chapter concludes with an analysis of current and future challenges facing democratic rights and their protection by the courts.

scholarly journals State Legislatures Have the Courage to Pass Antiabortion Laws and Test the Ideology of the “New” United States Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Undue Burden ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Reported Data ◽  
The Right

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.

scholarly journals Legal Aid by the State as a Constitutional Right of the Poor: Problems and Challenges in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.

scholarly journals Disenfranchisement: Objectives and Objections : Looking Beyond the Rhetoric

Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45
Author(s):  
Casey McDermott
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Society ◽  
The Political ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Living Tree ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
Democratic Rights ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right

Since the entrenchment of the Cana-dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, much debate has focused on the legal, equali-ty, and democratic rights of both individuals and groups. While acknowledging the pro-gress in areas such as legal and equality rights, debates regarding democratic rights seem timeless and unsusceptible to the idea of the “living tree.”; This paper will analyze the high-ly controversial debate surrounding prisoner disenfranchisement and assert that voting is a fundamental right in democratic society. Through the analysis of the political objectives as well as the upholding and dissenting judge-ments in Sauvé 2, a decision where the Court held that prisoners have the right to vote un-der section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [...]

The Past and Present of the Right to Treatment: A Slogan Gone Astray

1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Slovenko
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Involuntary Commitment ◽  
Theoretical Justification ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

The theoretical justification of a constitutional “right to treatment” has been that it makes up for the “deprivation of liberty” stemming out of involuntary commitment. The Supreme Court, however, in 1975 rejected this quid pro quo theory. Though it went without acceptance, the loss of liberty rationale underlying it has had an impact, and will continue to do so.

scholarly journals Judicial protection and interpretation of the right to take part in a referendum – an overview of the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4 (2)) ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Csaba Erdös
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Election ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right ◽  
Judicial Protection

This paper gives an overview of the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court regarding the right to take part in a referendum. This is a fundamental right of political participation, not unlike the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in parliamentary elections. It being a genuine fundamental right, the Constitutional Court interpreted its authentic meaning and stipulated the most important constitutional requirements related to this right. One of the most important requirements was the establishment of a system of remedies, where the final decision on the certification of a question proposed for a referendum must be taken by the Constitutional Court. Parliament fulfilled this legislative requirement and since 1998 the Constitutional Court has controlled the constitutionality of the decisions taken by the National Election Committee on the certification of the referendum questions proposed. The 2013 Act on referendum transferred this competence to the Supreme Court. Since then, the Constitutional Court shall only decide referendum-cases which were submitted with the so-called ‘direct constitutional complaint’, an extraordinary type of constitutional remedy. The present paper compares these two remedy systems introduced for the protection of the right to take part in a referendum.

scholarly journals Enslaved Constitution: Obstructing the Freedom to Travel

2008 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell F. Crusto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Federal District ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Federal Highway ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
The City

Does the Constitution protect a citizen’s intra-state travel (within a state) from unjustified state prohibition? To date, the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue, and many federal courts believe that the right to intrastate travel is not constitutionally protected. This Article explores the constitutional right of intra-state travel that is free from wrongful state infringement along public roadways by law-abiding citizens. Using critical legal history, this Article poses that federal courts’ denial of the right to intrastate travel consciously or unconsciously reflects the antebellum, Southern legal doctrine of people as property, which regulated the travel of enslaved African descendants.The constitutionality of intra-state travel arose most recently during the Hurricane Katrina Crisis when the City of Greta, Louisiana police barricaded a federal highway, denying would-be evacuees the ability to flee from the flooding City of New Orleans. In an ensuing action for infringement of the would-be evacuees’ constitutional right to intra-state travel, Federal District Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon dismissed the matter in Dickerson v. City of Gretna, holding that “[w]hile there is no doubt that a fundamental right of interstate travel exists, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a right of intra[-]state travel exists. This Court declines to find that there is a fundamental right to intra[-]state travel.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling.This Article recommends that when federal courts assess whether there is a constitutional right to intra-state travel, they should embrace the American paradigm of liberty and abandon the antebellum, Southern paradigm of enslavement. Consistent with Professor Derrick Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle, all Americans benefit when the Constitution protects the human rights of the least powerful American.

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

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